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Chapter 1
Introduction and contributions
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Background
The emergence of the Internet as a sales channel has made it easy for companies to
experiment with selling prices. Web shops can adapt their prices with a proverbial
flick of the switch, without any additional costs or efforts; the same applies for retail
stores that make use of digital price tags (Kalyanam et al., 2006). In contrast, in the past
costs and effort were needed to change prices, for example by issuing a new catalog
or replacing price tags. This current flexibility in pricing is one of the main drivers
for research on dynamic pricing: the study of determining optimal selling prices under
changing circumstances.
These changing circumstances can, for example, be (perceived or expected) changes in
the market, price changes or marketing campaigns by competing firms, technological
innovations in the products, shifts in consumer tastes, or market saturation effects re-
lated to the life-cycle of a product. Even the weather forecast may influence selling
prices, for example in electricity markets, the tourism sector, or in apparel retail stores.
One particularly important example of external factors that drive dynamic pricing is
changing inventory levels. This is important in situations where a firm sells a finite
number of products during a finite time period, as is the case for airline tickets, hotel
room reservations, concert tickets, and perishable products in general. The optimal
selling price usually depends on the inventory level and on the remaining length of the
selling season, and if one of these changes, a price adjustment is beneficial.
Ideas and techniques from dynamic pricing are nowadays widely applied in various
business contexts: airline companies, hotels, restaurants, concert halls and theaters,
amusement parks, car rental, vendors of train tickets, e-books, and many retail com-
panies. Several textbooks are already available that discuss various aspects of dynamic
pricing that are important in practical applications, cf. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004),
Phillips (2005), Özer and Phillips (2012).
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Only little is understood, however, about how the large amount of sales data that typi-
cally is available should efficiently be used in pricing problems. This data can be used to
derive estimates on vital information, such as market trends or price-sensitivity of con-
sumers. Traditional approaches to dynamic pricing have mostly neglected this aspect.
In this thesis, we study data-driven pricing policies that incorporate real-time incoming
sales data to determine optimal pricing decisions.
1.1.2 Dynamic pricing and learning
An intrinsic property of many price optimization problems is lack of information: the
seller does not know how consumers respond to different selling prices, and thus does
not know the optimal price. Dynamic pricing problems are therefore not merely about
optimization, but also about learning the relation between price and market response.
Typically, this relation is modeled by a demand model or demand function that depends
on a number of unknown parameters. The value of these parameters can be learned by
applying appropriate statistical estimation techniques on historical sales data.
The presence of digitally available and frequently updated sales data makes this prob-
lem essentially an on-line learning problem: after each sales occurrence, the firm can
use the newly obtained sales data to update its knowledge on consumer behavior. If,
in addition, selling prices can easily be adapted without much costs or effort - as is the
case with web-based sales channels or in brick-and-mortar stores with digital price tags
- the firm may immediately exploit this improved knowledge of consumer behavior by
appropriately adapting the selling prices.
The decision maker thus faces the task of both estimating the price-demand relation
and optimizing selling prices. An important insight from studies on dynamic pricing
and learning is that these two tasks should not be separated, but rather conducted si-
multaneously. The reason is that chosen selling prices generally influence the quality of
the parameter estimates, which in turn affect the quality of future pricing decisions. A
selling price may for example optimize the expected profit with respect to current pa-
rameter estimates, but hardly increase the quality of future parameter estimates. In such
cases, it may be beneficial to deviate from this price, and sacrifice some of the short-term
earnings in order to improve future profits.
Estimation and pricing are thus two closely related problems, which in general should
be considered simultaneously instead of separately. Neglecting the influence of chosen
prices on the estimation process can lead to significant revenue losses, as illustrated
in Chapter 3. In some other business contexts, however, such a pricing policy may
perform very well, as for example shown in Chapter 5. The main goal of this thesis is to
investigate which pricing policies optimally balance the two objectives of learning and
optimization, for several practically relevant settings.
Dynamic pricing and learning problems fall in the class of sequential decision problems
under uncertainty. In these problems, a decision maker has to repeatedly choose an
action in order to optimize some objective, without exactly knowing which action is
optimal. As time progresses and more actions have been taken, the decision maker may
learn the quality of different actions, based on previously observed outcomes. A key
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question for these type of problems is: should the decision maker always take the action
that, according to current knowledge, is best? Or should he sometimes deliberately
deviate from the (perceived) optimal action, in order to increase his knowledge about
the system and consequently improve his future actions? In this thesis, we address these
questions in the context of dynamic pricing problems.
1.1.3 Relation to revenue management
Dynamic pricing is closely related to revenue management, and the terms are some-
times used interchangeably to denote the same business practice. Revenue manage-
ment mostly refers however to settings where not prices, but capacities are dynamically
adjusted, and the term is often connected to models used in the airline industry; cf.
page 6 of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004), where the authors write: “Where did R[evenue]
M[anagement] come from? In short, the airline industry. There are few business prac-
tices whose origins are so intimately connected to a single industry”.
Common practice in airline industry is to sell different “fare classes” for flight tickets.
A fare class corresponds to a selling price (a “fare”) for a seat on a particular flight,
together with a number of conditions, such as the costs for cancellation, or the amount
of luggage that one is allowed to carry. A fare class is distinct from the usual division of
seats between business and economy class: generally, multiple fare classes correspond
to the same economy or business class seat. The fares and fare classes themselves are
not changed during the selling period. Instead, the firm dynamically adjusts which fare
classes are offered for sale, in order to maximize profit or revenue.
A disadvantage of such decision models with capacity-based controls is the restriction
to a finite number of fare classes and corresponding selling prices. The customer reser-
vation systems of many airline companies can not handle more than twenty-six fare
classes, mainly because the software uses a coding of fare classes that is based on the
letters in the alphabet. In contrast, dynamic pricing models are much more flexible and
generally do not restrict the number of prices that can be deployed by the firm.
Another potential difficulty of capacity-based revenue management is related to esti-
mating the demand for different fare classes. If the expected demand for each fare class
is estimated independently, accumulating sales data for a particular fare class does not
provide any information about the expected demand for other fare classes. This may
hinder the quality of the firm’s decisions when they are based on statistical estimates of
expected demand, particularly when for some fare classes only a few sales records are
available. This problem is less prevalent in dynamic pricing models: there one usually
considers a parametric demand model that describes the relation between price and ex-
pected demand, and that depends on unknown parameters. Accumulating sales data
then improves estimates for the demand at any price, because it improves the estimates
for the unknown parameters.
For these reasons, dynamic pricing is a more flexible approach than capacity-based rev-
enue management methods. These latter methods are tailored to the characteristics of
the airline industry, whereas dynamic pricing is suitable for application in various fields
and branches.
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1.2 Contributions of this thesis
We here provide a summary of the contents of the remainder of this thesis. Chapters 3
to 6 contain our contributions to dynamic pricing problems. Chapter 7 studies the con-
vergence speed of certain statistical estimators; the results from this chapter are applied
in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 to characterize the performance of pricing strategies. The thesis
closes with a discussion on interesting directions for future research, and with a Dutch
summary of our findings.
Chapter 3: pricing a single product with infinite inventory
In Chapter 3, we consider the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist firm selling
a single product with infinite inventory (in practice, this means that stock-outs occur
only with a very small probability, or that orders can be backlogged). We assume a
parametric form of the relation between selling price and expected demand, but we do
not require that the seller has complete knowledge on the demand distribution; only
knowledge on the relation between the first two moments of demand and the selling
price is assumed. This results in a generic model that includes practically all demand
functions used in practice. In addition, the model is more robust to misspecification
than models in which a complete demand distribution is assumed. To estimate the
unknown parameters of the model, we deploy maximum quasi-likelihood estimation;
this is a natural extension of maximum-likelihood estimation to settings where only the
first two moments of the distribution are known.
An intuitive pricing policy is certainty equivalent pricing (CEP), which at each decision
moment chooses the price that is optimal with respect to the available parameter es-
timates. We show that if the seller uses this policy, then with positive probability the
true values of the unknown parameters are never learned, and the selling price does
not converge to the optimal price. The intuitive reason behind this inconsistency is that
CEP puts too much emphasis on instant revenue maximization, and too little emphasis
on information collection through price experimentation.
We propose a new dynamic pricing policy, called Controlled Variance Pricing (CVP).
The key idea is to always choose the price closest to the certainty equivalent price,
but such that a certain amount of price dispersion is guaranteed. The price disper-
sion, measured by the sample variance of the selling prices, influences the quality of the
parameter estimates, and by carefully tuning the growth rate of the price dispersion, we
achieve an optimal balance between learning and instant optimization. We characterize
the performance of CVP, and show that its performance is arbitrarily close to the best
achievable performance of any pricing policy. Two other advantages of CVP compared
to alternative pricing policies in the literature are (1) guaranteed convergence of the sell-
ing price to the optimal price, and (2) the optimal use of all available sales data to form
estimates.
Chapter 3 is based on den Boer and Zwart (2010).
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Chapter 4: pricing multiple products with infinite inventory
In Chapter 4, we consider the problem of dynamic pricing and learning with infinite
inventory, in a setting with multiple products. This allows the modeling of substitute
and complementary products. We deploy a similar type of demand model as in Chapter
3: the seller knows the relation between the selling prices and the first two moments of
the demand distribution (up to some unknown parameters), but does not need to know
the complete distribution. Unknown parameters are estimated with maximum quasi-
likelihood estimation.
Just as in the single product setting, a CEP policy is not suitable. Some amount of
price experimentation is necessary to ensure that eventually the unknown parameters
are learned. In Chapter 3, the sample variance of chosen selling prices is regarded as
a measure of price dispersion, and learning of the parameters is ensured by requiring
a minimum growth rate on this sample variance. In a multiple product setting, we
measure the price dispersion by the smallest eigenvalue of the so-called design matrix.
Our proposed pricing policy is to always choose the price that is optimal with respect to
the current parameter estimates, but with the requirement that this smallest eigenvalue
satisfies a certain lower bound. By carefully tuning this lower bound, we obtain the
optimal balance between learning and instant revenue optimization. Our policy is one
of the first dynamic pricing and learning policies that can handle a multiple-products
setting.
Chapter 4 is based on den Boer (2011).
Chapter 5: pricing a single product with finite inventory
Chapter 5 considers a firm selling a finite number of products during a finite time pe-
riod. This is a classical model in the literature on dynamic pricing and revenue man-
agement, and it has been studied extensively. Existing studies that consider dynamic
pricing and learning for this model are somewhat limited in their scope, either because
they assume a rather simplistic demand model, or because they only analyze the per-
formance of pricing policies when initial inventory and the length of the selling period
grow very large.
We study dynamic pricing and learning in this setting, for any initial inventory level or
length of the selling period. Our main result is that CEP has a good performance, and
additional price experimentation is not necessary. This differs from the infinite inven-
tory setting considered in Chapter 3 and 4, where CEP has a very poor performance.
The reason for this difference is that in the finite inventory setting a certain “endoge-
nous learning” property is satisfied, that leads to abundant price dispersion even when
no active price experimentation is applied. As a result, parameter estimates converge
quickly to their true value, and the chosen prices converge quickly to the optimal prices.
Chapter 5 is based on den Boer and Zwart (2011b).
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Chapter 6: pricing in a changing market environment
The literature on dynamic pricing and learning generally assumes that the relation be-
tween price and expected demand is stable, and does not change over time. In practice,
this strong condition is often violated: the behavior of markets may change regularly for
different reasons, and pricing policies should be able to respond to these fluctuations.
In Chapter 6, we study dynamic pricing and learning of a single product with infinite
inventory, in a setting where the market process is subject to variations. Using weighted
least-squares type estimators, we derive bounds on the performance of a variant of CEP,
and provide guidelines how to optimally choose the estimator. This enables the firm to
hedge against the risk of fluctuations in the market. Numerical examples illustrate the
methodology in several practical situations, such as pricing in view of market saturation
effects, or pricing in a competitive environment. This chapter is one of the first studies
on dynamic pricing and learning in a changing market environment with an explicit
characterization of the performance of pricing policies.
Chapter 6 is based on den Boer (2012a).
Chapter 7: convergence rates for maximum quasi-likelihood estimation
The unknown parameters of the demand models in Chapter 3, 4, and 5 are estimated us-
ing maximum quasi-likelihood estimation. This is an extension of maximum-likelihood
estimation to models where only knowledge on the first two moments of the distri-
bution is available. In Chapter 7, we derive bounds on the convergence rates of the
expected squared estimation error for this type of estimator. These convergence rates
are used to characterize the performance of pricing policies in Chapter 3, 4, and 5. In
addition, they are applicable in many other sequential decision problems under uncer-
tainty.
Chapter 7 is based on den Boer and Zwart (2011a).
Chapter 2
Literature
This chapter surveys the rich literature on dynamic pricing with learning. Section 2.1
briefly reviews some of the pioneering historical work done on pricing and demand
estimation, and discusses how this work initially was difficult to apply in practice. In
Section 2.2 we sketch important references and developments for dynamic pricing in
general, and in Section 2.3 we focus on the literature that deals with dynamic pricing
and learning. Connections between dynamic pricing and related research areas are ad-
dressed in Section 2.4.
2.1 Historical origins of pricing and demand estimation
Dynamic pricing with learning can be seen as the combined application of two research
fields: (1) statistical learning, specifically applied to the problem of estimating demand
functions, and (2) price optimization. Both these fields are already quite old, dating
back more than a century. In this section we briefly describe the historical fundaments
out of which dynamic pricing and learning has emerged, by pointing to some key ref-
erences on static pricing and estimating demand functions that have been important in
the progress of the field.
2.1.1 Demand functions in pricing problems
Cournot (1838) is generally acknowledged as the first to use a mathematical function to
describe the price-demand relation of products, and subsequently solve the mathemat-
ical problem of determining the optimal selling price. As vividly described by Fisher
(1898), such an application of mathematical methods to study an economical problem
was quite new and controversial at the time, and the work was neglected for several
decades. Cournot showed that if F(p) denotes the demand as a function of price p,
where F(p) is continuous, decreasing in p, and pF(p) converges to zero as p grows
large, then the price that maximizes the revenue pF(p) can be found by equating the
derivative of pF(p) to zero. If F(p) is concave, there is a unique solution, which is the
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optimal price (this is contained in Chapter IV of Cournot (1838)). In this way, Cournot
was the first to solve a “static pricing” problem by mathematical methods.
2.1.2 Demand estimation
To make theoretical knowledge on optimal pricing theory applicable in practical prob-
lems, one needs to have an estimate of the demand function. The first known empirical
work on demand curves is the so-called King-Davenant Law (Davenant, 1699) which re-
lates the supply and price of corn (see Creedy, 1986, for an exposition on the origins of
this work). More advanced research on estimating demand curves, by means of statisti-
cal techniques such as correlation and linear regression, took off in the beginning of the
20st century. Benini (1907), Gini (1910) and Lehfeldt (1914) estimate demand curves for
various goods as coffee, tea, salt, and wheat, using various curve-fitting methods. Fur-
ther progress on methodology was made, among others, by Moore (1914, 1917), Wright
(1928) and Tinbergen (1930); the monumental work of Schultz (1938) gives a thorough
overview of the state-of-the-art of demand estimation in his time, accompanied by many
examples. Further references and more information on the historical progress of de-
mand estimation can be found in Stigler (1954, section II), Stigler (1962, particularly
section iii), Brown and Deaton (1972), Christ (1985), and Farebrother (2006).
2.1.3 Practical applicability
Estimating demand curves of various products was in first instance not aimed at profit
optimization of commercial firms, but rather used to support macro-economic theories
on price, supply, and demand. Application of the developed methods in practical prob-
lems was initially far away. An illustrative quote is from Hicks (1935), who doubted the
possibilities of applying the theory of monopoly pricing on practical problems, exactly
because of the difficulty of estimating the demand curve:
It is evidently the opinion of some of the writers under discussion that the
modern theory of monopoly is not only capable of throwing considerable
light on the general principles underlying an individualistic economic struc-
ture, but that it is also capable of extensive use in the analysis of particular
practical economic problems, that is to say, in applied economics. Person-
ally, I cannot but feel sceptical about this. [...] There does not seem to be any
reason why a monopolist should not make a mistake in estimating the slope
of the demand curve confronting him, and should maintain a certain output,
thinking it was the position which maximized his profit, although he could
actually have increased his profit by expanding or contracting. (Hicks, 1935,
page 18,19).
Hawkins (1957) reviews some of the attempts made by commercial firms to estimate
the demand for their products. Most of these attempts were not successful, and suf-
fered from difficulties of obtaining sufficiently many data for reliable estimates, and of
changes in the quality of the product and the prices of competitors. Even a very detailed
study of General Motors on automobile demand ends, somewhat ironically, with:
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The most important conclusion from these analyses of the elasticity of de-
mand for automobiles with respect to price is that no exact answer to the
question has been obtained. (Horner et al., 1939, p. 137).
In view of these quotations, it is rather remarkable that dynamic pricing and learning
has nowadays found its way in practice; many applications have been reported in var-
ious branches such as airline companies, the hospitality sector, car rental, retail stores,
internet advertisement, and many more. A main cause for this is the fact that histori-
cal sales data nowadays is often digitally available; this significantly reduces the efforts
needed to estimate the demand function. In addition, whenever products are sold via
the Internet or using digital price tags, the costs associated with adjusting the prices in
response to updated information or changed circumstances are practically zero. In con-
trast, a price-change in the pre-digital era would often induce costs, for example because
a new catalog had to be printed or price tags had to be replaced.
2.2 Dynamic pricing
In this section we discuss the literature on dynamic pricing. There is a huge amount
literature on this subject, and we do not intend to give a complete overview of the field.
Instead, we briefly describe some of the major research streams and key references, in
order to provide a context in which one can position the literature on dynamic pricing
with learning discussed in Section 2.3.
The literature on dynamic pricing by a monopolist firm can roughly be classified as
follows:
• Models where the demand function is dynamically changing over time.
• Models where the demand function is static, but where pricing dynamics are
caused by the inventory level.
In the first class of models, reviewed in Section 2.2.1, the demand function changes
according to changing circumstances: for example, the demand function may depend
on the time-derivative of price, on the current inventory level, on the amount of cu-
mulative sales, on the firm’s pricing history, et cetera. In the second class of models,
reviewed in Section 2.2.2, it is not the demand function itself that causes the pricing dy-
namics: a product offered in two different time periods against the same selling price, is
expected to generate the same amount of average demand. Instead, the price dynamics
are caused by inventory effects; for example, if the product on sale is almost sold out
and no re-ordering is possible on the short term, it may be beneficial to increase the
price. Naturally, it is also possible to study models that fall both in classes, if both the
demand function is dynamically changing and the price dynamics are influenced by
inventory effects; some of these literature is also reviewed in Section 2.2.2.
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2.2.1 Dynamic pricing with dynamic demand
Demand depends on price-derivatives
Evans (1924) is one of the first to depart from the static pricing setting introduced by
Cournot (1838). In a study on optimal monopoly pricing, he assumes that the (deter-
ministic) demand is not only a function of price, but also of the time-derivative of price.
This models the fact that buyers do not only consider the current selling price in their de-
cision to buy a product, but also the future price path. The purpose of the firm is to cal-
culate a price function, on a continuous time interval, that maximizes the profit. Using
techniques from calculus of variations, the optimal price function is calculated. Various
extensions to this model are made by Evans (1925), Roos (1925, 1927a,b, 1934), Tintner
(1937), and Smithies (1939). Thompson et al. (1971) study an extended version of the
model of Evans (1924), where optimal production level, investment level, and output
price have to be determined. Closely connected to this work is Simaan and Takayama
(1976), who consider a model where supply is the control variable; the time-derivative
of price at each moment is a known function of the current supply and current price.
Methods from control theory are used to derive properties of the optimal supply path.
Demand depends on price history
A related set of literature considers the effect of reference prices on the demand function.
Reference prices are perceptions of customers about the price that the firm has been
charging in the past; see Mazumdar et al. (2005) for a review on the subject. A difference
between the reference price and the actual selling price influences the demand, and as
a result, each posted selling price does not only affect the current demand but also the
future demand. Dynamic pricing models and properties of optimal pricing strategies in
such a setting are studied by Greenleaf (1995), Kopalle et al. (1996), Fibich et al. (2003),
Heidhues and Köszegi (2005), Ahn et al. (2007), Popescu and Wu (2007).
Demand depends on amount of sales
Another stream of literature on dynamic pricing emerged from diffusion and adoption
models for new products. A key reference is Bass (1969), and reviews of diffusion mod-
els are given by Mahajan et al. (1990), Baptista (1999), and Meade and Islam (2006).
In these models, the demand for products does not only depend on the selling price,
but also on the amount of cumulative sales. This allows modeling several phenom-
ena related to market saturation, advertisement, word-of-mouth effects, and product
diffusion. Robinson and Lakhani (1975) study dynamic pricing in such a model, and
numerically compare the performance of several pricing policies. Their work stimu-
lated much further research on optimal dynamic pricing policies, see e.g. Clarke et al.
(1982), Kalish (1983), Clarke and Dolan (1984), and the references therein. The models
studied in these papers are deterministic, and somewhat related to the literature follow-
ing Evans (1924): both types of pricing problems are solved by principles from optimal
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control theory, and the optimal pricing strategy is often characterized by a differential
equation.
Chen and Jain (1992), Raman and Chatterjee (1995), and Kamrad et al. (2005) extend
these models by incorporating randomness in the demand. In Chen and Jain (1992), the
demand is determined by a finite-state Markov chain for which each state corresponds
to a deterministic demand function that depends on price and cumulative sales. The
optimal price path is characterized in terms of a stochastic differential equation, and
compared to the optimal policy in a fully deterministic setting. Raman and Chatter-
jee (1995) model uncertainty by adding a Wiener process to the (known) deterministic
component of the demand function. They characterize the pricing policy that maxi-
mizes discounted cumulative profit, and compare it with the optimal price path in the
fully deterministic case. Under some specific assumptions, closed form solutions are
derived. Similar models that incorporate demand uncertainty are analyzed by Kam-
rad et al. (2005). For various settings they provide closed-form solutions of the optimal
pricing policies.
2.2.2 Dynamic pricing with inventory effects
There are two important research streams on dynamic pricing models where the dy-
namics of the optimal pricing policy are caused by the inventory level: (i) “revenue
management” type of problems, where a finite amount of perishable inventory is sold
during a finite time period, and (ii) joint pricing and inventory procurement problems.
Selling a fixed, finite inventory during a finite time period
In this stream of literature, a firm is assumed to have a certain number of products at its
disposal, which are sold during a finite time period. There is no replenishment; inven-
tory that is unsold at the end of the selling horizon is lost, and can not be transferred
to another selling season. In these problems, the dynamic nature of optimal prices is
not caused by changes in the demand, but rather by fact that the marginal value of re-
maining inventory is changing over time. As a result, the optimal selling price in these
settings is not a fixed quantity, but depends on the remaining amount of inventory and
the remaining duration of the selling season.
Kincaid and Darling (1963) may be the first to characterize and analyze the optimal
pricing policy in such a setting. A more recent key reference is Gallego and van Ryzin
(1994). They consider a continuous-time setting where demand is modeled as a Poisson
process, with arrival rate that depends on the posted selling price. The pricing prob-
lem is formulated as a stochastic optimal control problem, and the optimal solution
is characterized using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. A closed-form solution
may in general not exist, but for a specific demand function a closed-form optimal solu-
tion is derived. The authors furthermore propose two heuristic pricing policies, provide
bounds on their performance, and discuss various extensions to the model.
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Numerous extensions and variations of the model by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994)
have been studied: settings with restrictions on the number of allowable prices or price
changes (Feng and Gallego, 1995, Bitran and Mondschein, 1997, Feng and Xiao, 2000a,b),
extensions to multiple products that share the same finite set of resources (Gallego and
van Ryzin, 1997, Kleywegt, 2001) or multiple stores (Bitran et al., 1998). For a thorough
overview of this literature, we refer to the books Talluri and van Ryzin (2004), Phillips
(2005), Özer and Phillips (2012), and the reviews by Bitran and Caldentey (2003), El-
maghraby and Keskinocak (2003).
Feng and Gallego (2000) and Zhao and Zheng (2000) characterize the optimal pricing
policy in case of time dependent demand intensities; in these models, the price dynam-
ics are caused both by inventory effects and by dynamic demand behavior.
The same holds for models that study strategically behaving customers: customers who,
when arriving at the (online) store, do not immediately decide whether to buy the prod-
uct, but instead wait for a while to anticipate possible decreases in the selling price. In
contrast, so-called myopic customers instantly decide whether to buy the product at the
moment they arrive at the store. In such settings, the demand at a certain moment de-
pends on the past, present, and future selling prices. Dynamic pricing in view of strate-
gic customers has received a considerable amount of research attention in recent years;
a representative sample is Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Elmaghraby et al. (2008), Liu and
van Ryzin (2008), Levin et al. (2009), Cachon and Swinney (2009) and Su (2010). These
studies sometimes have a game-theoretic flavor, since both the firm and the strategic
customers have a decision problem to solve, with contradicting interests.
Jointly determining selling prices and inventory procurement
A main assumption of the literature discussed above is that the initial capacity level is
fixed. In many situations in practice this is a natural condition: the number of seats in
an aircraft, rooms in a hotel, tables in a restaurant, or seats in a concert hall are all fixed
for a considerable time period, and modifications in the capacity occur at a completely
different time scale than dynamic price changes. In many other settings, however, the
initial capacity is a decision variable to the firm; in particular, when the firm can decide
how many items of inventory should be produced or procured. Pricing and inventory
management can then be considered as a simultaneous optimization problem.
This research field bridges the gap between the pricing and inventory management lit-
erature. Many different settings and models are subject to study, with different types
of production, holding and ordering costs, different replenishment policies (periodic
or continuous), finite or infinite production capacity, different models for the demand
function. Extensive reviews of the literature on simultaneous optimization of price
and inventory decisions can be found in Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993), Federgruen
and Heching (1999), Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003, Section 4.1), Yano and Gilbert
(2005), Chan et al. (2004), and Chen and Simchi-Levi (2012).
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2.3 Dynamic pricing and learning
In the static monopoly pricing problem considered by Cournot (1838), the demand func-
tion is deterministic and completely known to the firm. These assumptions are some-
what unrealistic in practice, and eventually it was realized by researchers that demand
uncertainty should be incorporated into the problem. One of the first to pursue this di-
rection is Mills (1959), who assumes that the demand is the sum of a random term with
zero mean and a deterministic function of price. He studies how a monopolist firm that
sells finitely many products in a single time period should optimally set its production
level and selling price. Further extensions of this model and properties of pricing prob-
lems with random demand are studied by Karlin and Carr (1962), Nevins (1966), Zabel
(1970), Baron (1970, 1971), Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972). An important research
question in these studies is how the firm‘s optimal decisions are influenced by the de-
mand uncertainty, and by the firms’ attitude towards risk (risk-neutral, risk-averse, or
risk-preferred).
In the models mentioned above, the expected demand as a function of the selling price is
still assumed to be completely known by the firm, which makes these models somewhat
unrealistic and not usable in practice. The common goal of the literature on dynamic
pricing and learning is to develop pricing policies that take the intrinsic uncertainty on
the price-demand relation into account.
In the next two sections we discuss the literature on dynamic pricing and learning.
Section 2.3.1 considers the literature on the problem of a price-setting firm with infi-
nite inventory and unknown demand function. This basically is the monopoly pricing
problem described in Section 2.1.1, with uncertainty on the demand function. The full-
information case of this problem is static; the price dynamics are completely caused
by the fact that the firm learns about the price-demand relation through accumulat-
ing sales data. Section 2.3.2 discusses literature on pricing policies for firms selling a
fixed, finite amount of inventory, with unknown demand function. For this problem,
the full-information case is already dynamic by itself, as discussed in Section 2.2.2, and
the learning aspect of the problem provides an additional source of the price dynamics.
2.3.1 No inventory restrictions
Early work
The first analytical work on dynamic monopoly pricing with unknown demand curve
seems to have been done by members of the Uppsala Econometric Seminar, in 1953-54.
Billström et al. (1954) contains a mimeographed report of work presented at the 16th
Meeting of the Econometric Society in Uppsala, August 1954. The original report has
not been published, but an English reprint has appeared in Billström and Thore (1964)
and Thore (1964). These two works consider the problem of a monopolist facing a linear
demand curve that depends on two unknown parameters. Thore (1964) proposes to use
a dynamic pricing rules that satisfies sign(pt− pt−1) = sign((pt−1− pt−2)(rt−1− rt−2)),
where pt, rt denote the price and revenue in period t. Put in words, the idea is as
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follows: if a previous price increase led to an increase in revenue, the price will again be
increased; otherwise it will be decreased. Similarly, if a previous price decrease led to an
increase in revenue, the price will again be decreased; otherwise, it will be increased. In
addition, Thore (1964) proposes to let the magnitude of the price adjustment, pt − pt−1,
depend on the magnitude of rt−1 − rt−2. He specifies two pricing rules in detail,
pt − pt−1 = constant ·
√
|rt−1 − rt−2| · sign((pt−1 − pt−2)(rt−1 − rt−2)), (2.1)
and
pt − pt−1 = constant · rt−1 − rt−2pt−1 − pt−2 , (2.2)
and analyzes convergence properties of the resulting dynamical systems. Billström and
Thore (1964) perform simulation experiments for pricing rule (2.1), both in a determin-
istic demand setting and in a setting where a normally distributed disturbance term is
added to the demand. They also extend the model to incorporate inventory replenish-
ment, and provide a rule of thumb for the optimal choice of the constant in (2.1).
These studies emerging from the Uppsala Econometrics Seminar have not received
much research attention in subsequent years. Clower (1959) studies a monopolist firm
facing a linear, deterministic demand function whose parameters may change over time.
He discusses several price-adjustment mechanisms that may be applied by the firm to
adapt its prices to changing situations. Baumol and Quandt (1964) propose rules of
thumb for the monopolist pricing problem, and assess their performance by a set of
numerical experiments. In their Appendix A they propose exactly pricing rule (2.2),
although they are apparently unaware of the work of Thore (1964). They investigate
some convergence and stability properties of the resulting dynamical system, both in
a discrete-time and continuous-time framework. Baetge et al. (1977) extend the simu-
lation results of Billström and Thore (1964) to non-linear demand curves, and further
study the optimal choice of the constant in (2.1). A final study in this line of research is
from Witt (1986). He studies a model where a monopolist has to decide on price, output
level in the current period and capacity (maximum output) in the next period. Expected
demand is linear with unknown coefficients, and may change over time. Three decision
rules are compared to each other via a computer simulation. In addition, their perfor-
mance is compared with a laboratory experiment, where test subjects had to determine
their optimal pricing strategy.
Bayesian approaches
Several authors study the dynamic pricing and learning problem within a Bayesian
framework. On of the first is Aoki (1973), who applies methods from stochastic adaptive
control theory. He considers a setting where the demand function depends on unknown
parameters, which are learned by the decision maker in a Bayesian fashion. The purpose
is to minimize (a function of) the excess demand. He shows how the optimal Bayesian
policy can, in theory, be computed via dynamic programming, but that in many sit-
uations no closed-form analytical expression of the solution exists. He proposes two
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approximation policies. In the first, certainty equivalent pricing (CEP), at each decision
moment the price is chosen that would be optimal if the current parameter estimates
were correct. In the second, called an approximation under static price expectation, the
firm acts at each decision moments as if the chosen price will be maintained throughout
the remainder of the selling period. Aoki (1974) he shows that the prices generated by
these policies converge a.s. to the optimal price.
Similar work is by Chong and Cheng (1975), under more restrictive assumptions of a
linear demand function with two unknown parameters and normally distributed dis-
turbance terms. They show how to calculate the optimal pricing policy using a dynamic
programming approach. If the intercept is known, the optimal price is of the certainty
equivalent type, but this is not the case if both the intercept and slope are unknown.
Three algorithms are proposed to approximate the optimal price, and the performance
of two of these - CEP, and a policy based on adaptive dual control theory - are compared
to each other by means of simulations.
Closely related Bayesian studies are Nguyen (1984, 1997) and Lobo and Boyd (2003).
Nguyen (1984) considers a quantity-setting monopolist firm facing random demand
in multiple periods, where the demand function depends on an unknown parameter
which is learned by the firm in a Bayesian fashion. Structural properties of the opti-
mal policy are derived, and its performance is compared to a myopic one-period policy.
Nguyen (1997, Section 5) discusses these questions in the context of a price-setting mo-
nopolist. Lobo and Boyd (2003) consider the same setting as Chong and Cheng (1975),
and compare by means of a computer simulation the performance of four pricing poli-
cies with each other.
Cope (2007) assumes that the firm only picks prices from a finite set of predetermined
selling prices. This allows for a discretization of the reservation-price distribution of
customers, and the construction of a general Dirichlet prior. Cope mentions that in the-
ory an optimal price strategy can be calculated by dynamic programming, but that in
practice this is computationally intractable. He develops approximations for the value
function in the dynamic program, and numerically compares the performance of the
resulting pricing heuristics with CEP. In addition, he shows that his pricing heuristics
converge to the optimal price if an average-reward criterion is used, and that their per-
formance do not suffer much from a misspecified prior distribution.
Manning (1979) and Venezia (1984) are two related studies that focus on optimal design
of market research. Manning (1979) considers a monopolist firm facing a finite number
of customers. By doing market research, the firm can ask n potential customers about
their demand at some price p. Such market research is not for free, and the main ques-
tion of the paper is to determine the optimal amount of market research. This setting
is closely related to pricing rules that split the selling season in two parts (e.g. the first
pricing rule proposed by Witt (1986)): in the first phase, price experimentation takes
place in order to learn the unknown parameters, and in the second phase of the sell-
ing season, the myopic price is used. Venezia (1984) considers a linear demand model
with unknown parameters, one of which behaves like a random walk. The firm learns
about these parameters using Bayes’ rule. In addition, the firm can learn the true current
value of this random walk by performing market research (which costs money). Using
dynamic programming, the optimal market-research policy is calculated.
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A common theme in the references mentioned above is that it is often intractable to
compute the optimal Bayesian policy, and that therefore approximations are necessary.
Rothschild (1974) points to a more fundamental problem of the Bayesian framework.
He assumes that there are only two prices the firm can choose, with demand for each
price Bernoulli distributed with unknown mean. The dynamic pricing problem is thus
viewed as a two-armed bandit problem. The optimal Bayesian policy can be computed
via the corresponding dynamic programming formulation. The key result of Rothschild
(1974) is that, under the optimal Bayesian strategy, with positive probability the price
sequences converges to a price that (with hindsight) is not the optimal price. McLennan
(1984) derives a similar conclusion in a related setting: the set of admissible prices is
continuous, and the relation between price and expected demand is one of two known
linear demand curves. It turns out that, under an optimal Bayesian policy, the sequence
of prices may converge with positive probability to a price different from the optimal
price. This work is extended by Harrison et al. (2011a), who show that in several in-
stances a myopic Bayesian policy may lead to incomplete learning. They propose two
modifications of the myopic Bayesian policy that avoid incomplete learning, and prove
bounds on their performance.
The economics and econometrics literature also contains several studies on joint pric-
ing and Bayesian learning. Prescott (1972), Grossman et al. (1977), Mirman et al. (1993)
consider simple two-period models, and study the necessity and effects of price exper-
imentation. Trefler (1993) focuses on the direction of experimentation, and applies his
results on several pricing problems. Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) and Keller and
Rady (1999) consider a setting where the market environment changes in a Markovian
fashion between two known demand functions, and study properties of optimal exper-
imentation. Balvers and Cosimano (1990) consider a dynamic pricing model where the
coefficients of a linear demand model change over time. Easley and Kiefer (1988), Kiefer
and Nyarko (1989), Aghion et al. (1991) are concerned with Bayesian learning in general
stochastic control problems with uncertainty. They study the possible limits of Bayesian
belief vectors, and show that in some cases these limits may differ from the true value.
This implies that active experimentation is necessary to obtain strongly consistent con-
trol policies.
Non-Bayesian approaches
Despite the disadvantages of the Bayesian framework outlined above (computational
intractability of the optimal solution, the results by Rothschild (1974) and McLennan
(1984) on incomplete learning), it has taken several decades before pricing policies in a
non-Bayesian setting where studied. An early exception is Aoki (1974), who proposes
a pricing scheme based on stochastic approximation in a non-Bayesian framework. He
proves that the prices converge almost surely to the optimal price, and compares the
policy with Bayesian pricing schemes introduced in Aoki (1973).
More recent work in a non-Bayesian context is Carvalho and Puterman (2005a,b). They
propose a so-called one-step ahead pricing policy: based on a Taylor expansion of the
expected revenue for the next period, the price is chosen that approximately maximizes
the sum of the revenues in the next two periods. This is in contrast to certainty equiva-
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lent pricing, where only the expected revenue of one period is maximized. In Carvalho
and Puterman (2005a), this idea is applied to a binomial demand distribution with ex-
pectation a logit function of the price. By means of a simulation, the performance of the
policy is compared with CEP, and with a variant of CEP where each period with a cer-
tain time-dependent probability a random price is chosen. In Carvalho and Puterman
(2005b), a log-normal demand distribution is assumed, and three more pricing policies
are considered in the simulation.
A disadvantage of the many pricing heuristics that have been proposed in the literature,
both in a Bayesian and a non-Bayesian setting, is that a qualitative statement of their per-
formance is often missing. In many studies the performance of pricing policies is only
evaluated numerically, without any analytical results. This changes with the work of
Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), who suggest to quantify the performance of a pricing
policy by Regret(T): the expected loss in T time periods incurred by not choosing opti-
mal prices. They consider a setting where buyers arrive sequentially to the firm, and buy
only if their willingness-to-pay (WtP) exceeds the posted price. Under some additional
assumptions, they show that if the WtP of the individual buyers is an i.i.d. sample of a
common distribution, then there is no pricing policy that achieves Regret(T) = o(
√
T);
in addition, there is a pricing policy that achieves Regret(T) = O(
√
T log(T))1. In an
adversarial or worst-case setting, where the WtP of individual buyers is not assumed
to be i.i.d., they show that no pricing policy can achieve Regret(T) = o(T2/3), and that
there is a pricing policy with Regret(T) = O(T2/3 log(T)1/3).
The proof that no policy can achieve regret o(
√
T) is quite involved and requires many
assumptions on the demand function. Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) show a
√
T
lower bound on the regret in a different setting, with Bernoulli distributed demand de-
pending on two unknown parameters. The proof makes use of information-theoretic
inequalities and techniques found in Besbes and Zeevi (2011). They also provide a pric-
ing policy that exactly achieves regret
√
T growth rate. If there is only a single unknown
parameter, and in addition the demand curve satisfy a certain “well-separated assump-
tion”, they show that this can be improved to log(T). The key idea of this well-separated
condition is that it excludes uninformative prices: prices at which the expected demand
given a certain parameter estimate is equal to the true expected demand. The existence
of such prices appear to play an important role in the best achievable growth rate of the
regret; see also the discussion on the subject (in a Bayesian setting) in Harrison et al.
(2011a).
Assuming a linear demand function with normally distributed disturbance terms, Har-
rison et al. (2011b) show a similar
√
T lower bound on the regret, using alternative proof
techniques. In addition, extending Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) and Chapter
3 of this thesis, they formulate sufficient conditions for any pricing policy to achieve
regret O(
√
T). They also study dynamic pricing and learning for multiple products, in
a setting comparable to Chapter 4.
Tehrani et al. (2012) assume that the demand model lies in a finite set of known de-
mand functions. This enables them to formulate the dynamic pricing problem as a
1Here f (T) = O(g(T)) means supT∈N f (T)/g(T) < ∞, and f (T) = o(g(t)) means
lim supT→∞ f (T)/g(T) = 0, where f and g are functions onN.
18 Chapter 2
multi-armed bandit with dependent arms. They propose a pricing policy based on the
likelihood-ratio test, and show that its regret is bounded assuming that there are no
uninformative prices.
Eren and Maglaras (2010) study dynamic pricing in a robust optimization setting. They
show that if an infinite number of goods can be sold during a finite time interval, it is
optimal to use a price-skimming strategy. They also study settings where learning of the
demand function occurs, but under the rather strong assumption that observed demand
realizations are without noise. Bergemann and Schlag (2008a,b) also consider pricing in
a robust framework, but their setting is static (there is just a single time period).
2.3.2 Finite inventory
We here discuss the literature on dynamic pricing and learning in presence of a finite
inventory that cannot be replenished. Most of the studies assume a finite selling season,
corresponding to one of the most studied models in the dynamic pricing and revenue
management literature. Some studies however assume an infinite time horizon, and
consider the objective of maximizing total discounted reward.
Early work
Lazear (1986) considers a simplified model where a firm sells one item during at most
two periods. In the first period a number of customers visit the store; if none of them
buys the item, the firm adapts its prior belief on the value of the product, updates the
selling price, and tries to sell the item in the second period. The author shows that the
expected profit increases by having two selling periods instead of one. He extends his
model in several directions, notably by allowing strategic behavior of customers who
may postpone their purchase moment if they anticipate a price decrease.
Bayesian approaches
Aviv and Pazgal (2005b) start a research stream on Bayesian learning in dynamic pricing
with finite inventory. They consider a continuous-time setting where customers arrive
according to a Poisson process with unknown rate. Once arrived, the probability of
purchasing an item is determined by a reservation price distribution. For reasons of
tractability, they assume that the purchase probability is exponentially decreasing in
the selling price, and that this function is known to the seller. The seller has a prior
belief on the arrival rate, given by a gamma distribution, which is updated via Bayes’
rule; the posterior is then also gamma distributed. After explicitly stating the optimal
pricing policy in the full information case, the authors characterize the optimal pricing
scheme in the incomplete-information case by means of a differential equation. This
equation does in general not admit an explicit analytical solution, and therefore three
pricing heuristics are proposed: a certainty equivalent heuristic, a fixed price policy, and
a naive pricing policy that ignores uncertainty on the market. Numerical experiments
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suggest that CEP performs quite well. An almost identical setting is studied by Lin
(2006), who proposes a pricing policy and evaluates its performance via simulations.
Sen and Zhang (2009) extend the model of Aviv and Pazgal (2005b) by assuming that the
purchase probabilities of arriving customers are not known to the firm. They assume
that the demand distribution is an element of a finite known set, and consider a discrete-
time setting with Bayesian learning and a gamma prior on the arrival rate. The optimal
pricing policy can be explicitly calculated, and in an extensive computational study, its
performance is compared to both a perfect-information setting and a setting where no
learning occurs.
Araman and Caldentey (2009) and Farias and van Roy (2010) study a closely related
problem: they consider a firm who sells a finite amount of non-perishable inventory
during an infinite time horizon. The purpose is to maximize cumulative expected dis-
counted revenues. Similar to Aviv and Pazgal (2005a), they both assume that customers
arrive according to a Poisson process with unknown rate, and that arriving customers
buy a product according to their reservation price, the distribution of which is known
to the firm. The unknown arrival rate is learned via Bayesian updates of the prior distri-
bution. Araman and Caldentey (2009) consider a two-point prior distribution, whereas
Farias and van Roy (2010) assume that the prior is a finite mixture of gamma distribu-
tions; in both settings, the posterior distributions are in the same parametric family as
the prior, which makes the problem tractable. Araman and Caldentey (2009) propose
a pricing heuristic based on an asymptotic approximation of the value function of the
corresponding intensity control problem. They compare its performance numerically
with CEP, static pricing, and a two-price policy. Farias and van Roy (2010) propose an-
other heuristic, called decay balancing, and show several numerical experiments that
suggest that it often performs better than both the heuristic proposed by Araman and
Caldentey (2009) and CEP. In addition they prove a performance bound on decay bal-
ancing, showing that the resulting expected discounted revenue is always at least one
third of the optimal value. Furthermore, they consider an extension to a setting with
multiple stores that may use different selling prices.
A slightly different but related setting is studied by Aviv and Pazgal (2005a). They
consider a seller of finite inventory during a finite selling season, where the demand
function changes according to an underlying Markov chain. The finite state space of
this Markov chain, and the demand functions associated with each state, are known to
the firm. The current state of the system is unknown to the seller, but it is learned via
Bayesian learning based on observed demand realizations. By including this Bayesian
belief vector into the state space of the dynamic pricing problem, the authors obtain a
Markov decision problem with full information, which can in theory be solved. Com-
putationally it is intractable, however, and therefore several approximate solutions are
discussed.
Non-Bayesian approaches
Bertsimas and Perakis (2006) consider a non-Bayesian setting. They assume a linear
demand model with normally distributed noise terms and unknown slope, intercept
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and variance. These parameters are estimated using least-squares linear regression.
They formulate a dynamic program that, in theory, can provide the optimal pricing pol-
icy. Due to the large size of the state space, however, it is computationally intractable.
Therefore several approximations are studied, and their performance is compared to
each other in a computational study. The authors also consider a dynamic pricing and
learning problem in a oligopolistic environment, where in addition the price elasticity of
demand is slowly varying over time. They discuss methods for estimating the demand
of the firm and of its competitors, mention several methods of determining the selling
prices, and provide a small computational study.
Besbes and Zeevi (2009) propose a pricing algorithm for both a parametric and non-
parametric setting, and consider the objective of optimizing the minimax regret. They
consider an asymptotic regime, where both initial inventory and demand go to infinity
at equal speed. In both a parametric and non-parametric setting they provide an upper
bound on the minimax regret attained by their proposed pricing policy, and a lower
bound on the minimax regret that is attained by any policy. Wang et al. (2011) improve
some of these bounds, and Besbes and Zeevi (2012) extend Besbes and Zeevi (2009) to a
setting where multiple products share the same finite resources.
Besbes and Maglaras (2012) consider dynamic pricing in a setting where certain finan-
cial milestone constraints in terms of sales and revenues targets are imposed. They
formulate a pricing policy and study its performance in an asymptotic regime, where
inventory, sales horizon, and revenue and sales target grow to infinity at equal speed.
Robust approaches
A number of studies take a robust approach, where the demand function is not learned
over time, but assumed to lie in some known uncertainty set. Lim and Shanthikumar
(2007) and Thiele (2006) study this in a single-product setting, and Lim et al. (2008),
Thiele (2009) in a multi-product setting. A disadvantage of these robust approaches is
that no learning takes place, despite the accumulation of sales data. Lobel and Perakis
(2011) attempt to bridge the gap between robust and data-driven approaches to dy-
namic pricing, by considering a setting where the uncertainty set is deduced from data
samples.
Machine-learning approaches
A considerable stream of literature on dynamic pricing and learning has emerged from
the computer science community. In general, the focus of these papers is not to provide
a mathematical analysis of the performance of pricing policies, but rather to design a
realistic model for electronic markets and subsequently apply machine learning tech-
niques. An advantage of this approach is that one can model many phenomena that
influence the demand, such as competition, fluctuating demand, and strategic buyer
behavior. A disadvantage is that these models are often too complex to analyze analyti-
cally, and insights on the behavior of various pricing strategies can only be obtained by
performing numerical experiments.
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Machine-learning techniques that have been applied to dynamic pricing problems are
evolutionary algorithms (Ramezani et al., 2011), particle swarm optimization (Mullen
et al., 2006), reinforcement learning and Q-learning (Kutschinski et al., 2003, Chinthala-
pati et al., 2006), simulated annealing (Xia and Dube, 2007), Markov chain Monte Carlo
methods (Chung et al., 2012), the aggregating algorithm (Levina et al., 2009) by Vovk
(1990), and goal-directed and derivative-following strategies in simulation (DiMicco
et al., 2003).
2.3.3 Joint pricing and inventory problems
A few studies consider the problem of simultaneously determining an optimal pricing
and inventory replenishment policy under demand uncertainty.
Most of them consider learning in a Bayesian framework. Subrahmanyan and Shoe-
maker (1996) assume that the unknown demand function lies in a finite known set of
demand functions, which is learned over time in a Bayesian fashion. The optimal pol-
icy is determined by a dynamic program. Several numerical experiments are provided
to offer insight in the properties of the pricing policy. Bitran and Wadhwa (1996) and
Bisi and Dada (2007) study a similar type of problem, where an unknown parameter is
learned in a Bayesian manner, and the optimal decisions are determined by a dynamic
program. Bitran and Wadhwa (1996) perform extensive computational experiments,
and Bisi and Dada (2007) derive several properties of the optimal policy. Lariviere and
Porteus (1995) consider the situation of a manufacturer that sells to a retailer. The manu-
facturer decides on a wholesale price offered to the retailer, and the retailer has to choose
an optimal inventory replenishment policy. Both learn about a parametrized demand
function in a Bayesian fashion. Properties of the optimal policy, both for the manufac-
turer and the retailer, are studied. Gaul and Azizi (2010) assume that a product is sold
in different stores. The problem is to determine optimal prices in a finite number of
periods, as well as to decide if and how inventory should be reallocated between stores.
Parameters of the demand function are learned by Bayesian updating, and numerical
experiments are provided to illustrate the method.
Burnetas and Smith (2000) consider a joint pricing and inventory problem in a non-
parametric setting. They propose an adaptive stochastic-approximation policy, and
show that the expected profit per period converges to the optimal profit under complete
information. A robust approach to the dynamic pricing and inventory control problem
with multiple products is studied by Adida and Perakis (2006). The focus of that pa-
per is the formulation of the robust optimization problem, and to study its complexity
properties. Related is the work of Petruzzi and Dada (2002). These authors assume that
there is no demand noise, which means that the unknown parameters that determine
the demand function are completely known once a demand realization is observed that
does not lead to stock-out.
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2.4 Methodologically related areas
Dynamic pricing under uncertainty is closely related to multi-armed bandit problems.
This is a class of problems that capture many essential features of optimization prob-
lems under uncertainty, including the well-known exploration-exploitation trade-off:
the decision maker should properly balance the two objectives of maximizing instant
reward (exploitation of current knowledge) and learning the unknown properties of the
system (exploration). This trade-off between learning and instant optimization is also
frequently observed in dynamic pricing problems. The literature on multi-armed ban-
dit problems is large; some key references are Thompson (1933), Robbins (1952), Lai and
Robbins (1985), Gittins (1989), Auer et al. (2002); see further Vermorel and Mohri (2005),
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), Powell (2010). If in a dynamic pricing problem, the
number of admissible selling prices is finite, the problem can be modeled as a multi-
armed bandit problem. This approach is e.g. taken by Rothschild (1974), Xia and Dube
(2007), and Cope (2007).
Another important area related to dynamic pricing and learning is the study of conver-
gence rates of statistical estimates. Lai and Wei (1982) study how the speed of conver-
gence of least-squares linear regression estimates depend on the amount of dispersion in
the explanatory variables. Their results are applied in several dynamic pricing problems
with linear demand functions, such as Le Guen (2008) and Cooper et al. (2012). Simi-
larly, results on the convergence rate of maximum-likelihood estimators, as in Borovkov
(1998), are crucial in the analysis of pricing policies by Broder and Rusmevichientong
(2012) and Besbes and Zeevi (2011).
Chapter 3
Dynamic pricing and learning for a single
product with infinite inventory
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study dynamic pricing and learning for a monopolist firm that sells
a single type of product with infinite inventory, in a stable market environment. In
some sense, this is the most elementary dynamic-pricing-and-learning problem possi-
ble. The optimal price in the full-information case of this setting, where the firm knows
the relation between demand and price, is namely just a single number. This means that
with full information, static pricing is optimal, and the need for dynamic pricing is only
caused by the uncertainty about the demand distribution.
The term “infinite inventory” here should be interpreted as that the firm always has
sufficient inventory to meet all demand; or that, if stock-outs occur, demand can be
back-logged and satisfied in later periods.
The relation between selling price and demand is assumed to belong to a known and
parametrized family of demand functions. We do not require that the firm has complete
knowledge on these demand distributions; only knowledge on the relation between the
first two moments of demand and the selling price is assumed. This results in a generic
model that includes practically all demand functions used in practice. In addition, the
model is more robust to mis-specification than models where a complete demand distri-
bution is assumed. To estimate the unknown parameters of the model, we deploy max-
imum quasi-likelihood estimation; this is a natural extension of maximum-likelihood
estimation to settings where only the first two moments of the distribution are known.
Based on these estimates, the firm has to determine selling prices for a (discrete but
possibly infinite) sequence of decision moments, with the objective of maximizing the
expected revenue.
An intuitively appealing pricing policy is to set the price at each decision moment equal
to the price that would be optimal if the current parameter estimates were correct. Such
a policy is usually called passive learning, myopic pricing, or certainty equivalent pric-
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ing, for obvious reasons: each decision is made as if the current parameter estimates
are equal to their true values. We show that this policy, although intuitively appeal-
ing, is not suitable: the seller may never learn the value of the optimal price, and the
parameter estimates may converge to a value different from the true parameter values.
The intuition behind this negative result is that certainty equivalent pricing only focuses
on instant revenue maximization, and not on optimizing the quality of the parameter
estimates.
To solve this issue, we propose a new dynamic pricing policy, called Controlled Vari-
ance Pricing (CVP). They key idea is to always choose the price closest to the certainty
equivalent price, but such that a certain amount of price dispersion or price variation is
guaranteed. The price dispersion, measured by the sample variance the selling prices,
influences the quality of the parameter estimates, and by carefully tuning the growth
rate of the price dispersion, we achieve an optimal balance between learning these pa-
rameter values and optimizing revenue.
We show analytically that CVP will eventually provide the correct value of the unknown
parameters, and thus the value of the optimal price. We also provide bounds on the
speed of convergence. Furthermore, we obtain an asymptotic upper bound on the re-
gret, which measures the expected amount of money lost due to not using the optimal
price. In particular, we show that the regret after T time periods is O(T1/2+δ), where
δ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small. This bound is close to O(
√
T), which in sev-
eral settings has been shown to be the best achievable asymptotic upper bound of the
regret (see e.g. Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003, Besbes and Zeevi, 2011, Broder and Rus-
mevichientong, 2012). Apart from this theoretical result, we also numerically compare
the performance of CVP with another existing pricing policy from the literature. These
numerical experiments suggest that CVP performs well for different demand functions
and time scales.
Our pricing algorithm provides several advantages over other policies from the liter-
ature. First, our analysis of Controlled Variance Pricing is valid for a large class of
demand models. This is in contrast to Lobo and Boyd (2003), Carvalho and Puterman
(2005a,b), Bertsimas and Perakis (2006) and Harrison et al. (2011b), where the analysis is
restricted to specific models (e.g. linear) or distributions (e.g. log-normal). In addition,
CVP is the first parametric approach to dynamic pricing with unknown demand where
only knowledge on the first two moments of the demand distribution is required. Fur-
thermore, the expected demand can depend on two unknown parameters, this is more
natural than a single unknown parameter as assumed in the Bayesian approaches Lin
(2006), Araman and Caldentey (2009), Farias and van Roy (2010), Harrison et al. (2011a).
Another feature of CVP is that it balances learning and optimization at each decision
moment, enabling convergence of the prices to the optimal price. This differs from
policies that strictly separate the time horizon in exploration and exploitation phases,
as in Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) or Besbes and Zeevi (2009); here only the
average price converges to the optimal price. Moreover, in this latter type of policies
the number of exploration prices that need to be chosen beforehand increases when the
number of unknown parameters increases. CVP only requires one variable to choose,
independent of the number of unknown parameters This makes the method suitable
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for extensions to models with multiple products, as is elaborated in Chapter 4 of this
thesis. Another difference between CVP and these policies is that CVP uses all available
historical data to form parameter estimates, whereas the analysis of the algorithms by
Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) and Besbes and Zeevi (2009) only uses data from
the exploration phases. In light of the results of den Boer (2012b), it is unclear what
happens if all available data would be used to form estimates.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The demand model is described in Sec-
tion 3.2.1, followed by a short discussion on the model assumptions (Section 3.2.2) and
the method to estimate the unknown parameters (Section 3.2.3). We show in Section
3.3 that certainty equivalent pricing is not consistent, which motivates the introduction
of Controlled Variance Pricing (CVP). We show that under this policy the parameter
estimates converge to the true vale, and show that the regret admits the upper bound
O(T1/2+δ), where T is the number of time periods and δ > 0 is arbitrarily small. Section
3.4 discusses the quality of the regret bound, the relation between regret and price dis-
persion, differences with a related control problem, and applicability of the key ideas
of CVP to other sequential decision problems. In Section 3.5, CVP is numerically com-
pared to another pricing policy from the literature, on different time scales and different
demand functions. All mathematical proofs are contained in Section 3.6.
Notation. With log(t) we denote the natural logarithm. If x1, x2, . . . , xt is a sequence,
then x¯t = 1t ∑
t
i=1 xi denotes the sample mean and Var(x)t =
1
t ∑
t
i=1(xi− x¯t)2 the sample
variance. For a vector x ∈ Rn, xT denotes the transpose and ||x|| denotes the Euclidean
norm of x. For non-random sequences (xn)n∈N and (yn)n∈N, xn = O(yn) means that
there exists a K > 0 such that |xn| ≤ K|yn| for all n ∈N.
3.2 Model, assumptions, and estimation method
3.2.1 Model
We consider a monopolist firm that sells a single product. Time is discretized, and time
periods are denoted by t ∈N. At the beginning of each time period the firm determines
a selling price pt ∈ [pl , ph]. The prices 0 < pl < ph are the minimum and maximum
price that are acceptable to the firm. After setting the price, the firm observes a realiza-
tion dt of the demand Dt(pt), which is a random variable, and collects revenue pt · dt.
We assume that the inventory is sufficient to meet all demand, i.e. stock-outs do not
occur.
The random variable Dt(pt) denotes the demand in period t, against selling price pt.
Given the selling prices, the demand in different time periods is independent, and for
each t ∈ N and pt = p ∈ [pl , ph], Dt(pt) is distributed as D(p), for which we assume
the following parametric model:
E[D(p)] = h(a(0)0 + a
(0)
1 p), (3.1)
Var[D(p)] = σ2v(E[D(p)]).
26 Chapter 3
Here h : R+ → R+ and v : R+ → R++ are both thrice continuously differentiable
known functions, with h˙(x) = ∂h(x)∂x > 0 for all x ≥ 0. Furthermore, σ and a(0) =
(a(0)0 , a
(0)
1 ) are unknown parameters with σ > 0, a
(0)
0 > 0, a
(0)
1 < 0, and a
(0)
0 + a
(0)
1 ph ≥ 0.
Write et = D(pt)− E[D(pt) | p1, . . . , pt−1, d1, . . . , dt−1]. We make the technical assump-
tion on the demand that for some r > 3,
sup
t∈N
E[|et|r | p1, . . . , pt−1, d1, . . . , dt−1] < ∞ a.s. (3.2)
The expected revenue collected in a single time period where price p is used, is denoted
by r(p) = p · h(a(0)0 + a(0)1 p); to emphasize the dependence on the parameter values, we
write r(p, a0, a1) = p · h(a0 + a1 p) as a function of p and (a0, a1).
We assume that there is an open neighborhood U ⊂ R2 of (a(0)0 , a(0)1 ) such that for all
(a0, a1) ∈ U, r(p, a0, a1) has a unique maximizer
p(a0, a1) = arg max
pl<p<ph
p · h(a0 + a1 p),
and such that r′′(p(a0, a1), a0, a1) < 0. This ensures that the optimal price popt =
p(a(0)0 , a
(0)
1 ) is unique and well-defined, and lies strictly between pl and ph.
The marginal costs of the sold product equal zero, therefore maximizing profit is equiv-
alent to maximizing revenue. Note that a situation with positive marginal costs c > 0
can easily be captured by replacing p by p− c.
A pricing policy ψ is a method that for each t generates a price pt ∈ [pl , ph], based on
the previously chosen prices p1, . . . , pt−1 and demand realizations d1, d2, . . . , dt−1. This
pt may be a random variable.
The performance of a pricing policy is measured in terms of regret, which is the expected
revenue loss caused by not using the optimal price popt. For a pricing policy ψ that
generates prices p1, p2, . . . , pT , the regret after T time periods is defined as
Regret(T,ψ) = E
[
T
∑
t=1
r(popt, a(0))− r(pt, a(0))
]
.
The objective of the seller is to find a pricing policy ψ that maximizes the total ex-
pected revenue over a finite number of T time periods. This is equivalent to minimizing
Regret(T,ψ). Note however that the regret can not directly be used by the seller to find
an optimal policy, since its value depends on the unknown parameters a(0).
3.2.2 Discussion of model assumptions
We do not assume complete knowledge about the demand distribution, only about the
first two moments. This makes the demand model a little more robust to misspecifica-
tions.
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In equation (3.1) we assume that the variance of demand is a function of the expectation.
This holds for many common demand models, like Bernoulli (with v(x) = x(1− x), σ =
1), Poisson (v(x) = x, σ = 1) and normal distributions (v(x) = 1 and arbitrary σ > 0).
All these examples also satisfy the moment condition (3.2).
The assumptions on the functions h, v and parameters σ, a(0)0 , a
(0)
1 imply that the ex-
pected demand is strictly decreasing in the price, and that the variance is strictly pos-
itive; i.e. demand is non-deterministic. These are both natural assumptions on the de-
mand distribution.
The assumption on the existence and uniqueness of arg max
pl<p<ph
p · h(a0 + a1 p) for all a0,
a1 in an open neighborhood U of a(0), is satisfied by many functions h that are used
in practice to model the relation between price and expected demand; examples are
h(x) = x, h(x) = exp(x), h(x) = (1+ exp(−x))−1. A sufficient condition to satisfy this
assumption is that the revenue function r(p, a(0)) is strictly concave in p, and attains it
maximum strictly between pl and ph.
3.2.3 Estimation of unknown parameters
The unknown parameters a(0) can be estimated with maximum quasi-likelihood esti-
mation. This is a natural extension of maximum-likelihood estimation to settings where
only the first two moments of the distribution are known; see Wedderburn (1974), Mc-
Cullagh (1983), Godambe and Heyde (1987) and the books by McCullagh and Nelder
(1983), Heyde (1997) and Gill (2001).
Given prices p1, . . . , pt and demand realizations d1, . . . , dt, the maximum quasi-likeli-
hood estimator (MQLE) of (a(0)0 , a
(0)
1 ), denoted by aˆt = (aˆ0t, aˆ1t), is the solution to the
two-dimensional equation
lt(aˆt) =
t
∑
i=1
h˙(aˆ0t + aˆ1t pi)
σ2v(h(aˆ0t + aˆ1t pi))
(
1
pi
)
(di − h(aˆ0t + aˆ1t pi)) = 0. (3.3)
If the probability density function (or probability mass function in case of discrete de-
mand distribution) of D(p) can be written in the form exp(σ−1(dθ − g(θ))), where θ is
some function of h(a0 + a1 p), then (3.3) corresponds to the maximum-likelihood equa-
tions (Wedderburn, 1974). Many demand distributions that are used in practice, such
as Poisson, Bernoulli, and normal distributions, fall in this class (see McCullagh and
Nelder, 1983, Gill, 2001). In case of normally distributed demand with h the identity
function, (3.3) is also equivalent to the normal equations of ordinary least squares, viz.
lt(aˆt) =
t
∑
i=1
(
1
pi
)
(di − aˆ0t − aˆ1t pi) = 0. (3.4)
The solution to the quasi-likelihood equations may in general not always be unique. A
standard way to select the “right” solution is to pick the solution with lowest mean-
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square error, cf. Heyde (1997, Section 13.3). In our numerical results, Section 3.5, we did
not encounter problems with multiple solutions of (3.3).
3.3 Performance of pricing policies
3.3.1 Inconsistency of certainty equivalent pricing
An intuitively natural pricing policy is to estimate after each time period the unknown
parameters, and to set the next price equal to the price that is optimal with respect to
these estimates. More precisely, choose two different initial prices p1, p2 ∈ [pl , ph]; after
t ≥ 2 time periods, calculate the MQLE estimators aˆt with (3.3), and set the next price
pt+1 equal to
pt+1 = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
r(p, aˆ0t, aˆ1t). (3.5)
This pricing policy is known under the name certainty equivalent pricing, myopic pric-
ing, or passive learning.
Under different settings, certainty equivalent policies are known to produce suboptimal
outcomes: see e.g. the simulation results of such policies in Lobo and Boyd (2003) and
Carvalho and Puterman (2005a,b). Anderson and Taylor (1976) studied a linear system
yt = a
(0)
0 + a
(0)
1 xt + et with unknown parameters a
(0)
0 , a
(0)
1 and input variables xt; the
objective is to steer yt to a desired value y∗. The certainty equivalent policy is to set
xt+1 = min
{
xmax, max
{
xmin, (y∗ − aˆ0t)/aˆ1t
}}
,
where aˆ0t, aˆ1t are the least square estimates of a
(0)
0 , a
(0)
1 , based on (x1, y1), . . . , (xt, yt),
and xmin, xmax are the minimum and maximum admissible values for xt. Lai and Rob-
bins (1982) showed that there are parameter values such that using this certainty equiv-
alent policy, the controls xt converge with positive probability to a value different from
the optimal control x = (y∗− a(0)0 )/a(0)1 ; this implies that the certainty equivalent policy
is not strongly consistent. (Interestingly, in a Bayesian setting the certainty equivalence
policy is strongly consistent, as shown by Chen and Hu, 1998). The proof idea of Lai and
Robbins (1982) can easily be extended to our case, when h is the identity and v is con-
stant. In that case the expected demand is a linear function of the price, and the MQLE
equations (3.3) are equivalent to the normal equations for ordinary linear regression. A
difference with Lai and Robbins (1982) is that they posed specific conditions on p1, p2,
pl , ph; in our result these assumptions are left out.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that demand is normally distributed with constant variance and
expected demand a linear function of the price (i.e. h(x) = x, v(x) = 1), and suppose that
certainty equivalent pricing is used. Then with positive probability, pt does not converge to popt.
The idea of the proof, contained in Section 3.6, is to show by induction that with positive
probability, pt = ph > popt for all t ≥ 3. On this event, the price sequence (pt)t∈N is
exactly known, which facilitates analysis of the behavior of the sample path of (aˆt)t∈N.
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Proposition 3.1 shows that certainty equivalent pricing is not strongly consistent for a
linear demand function with constant variance. Its scope however is somewhat limited
in the sense that it does only partially describe the asymptotic behavior of the policy. It
is proven that with a positive, but possibly very small probability, the prices converge
to ph 6= popt. If this would happen in practice, the price manager would simply increase
ph. Moreover, simulations suggest that pt may also converge to a value strictly between
pl and ph, and that the limit price is with probability one different from popt. To provide
a mathematical proof of this is, however, still an open problem.
3.3.2 Controlled Variance Pricing
An intuition for what goes wrong with the certainty equivalent policy is that the prices
pt converge “too quickly” to a certain value. As a result, not enough new information
is obtained to further improve the parameter estimates, and thus they will not converge
to the correct values. The key idea is to control the speed at which the prices converge.
This is done by constructing a lower bound on the sample variance of the chosen prices.
In particular we require that at each time period t, Var(p)t ≥ ctα−1, for some c > 0 and
α ∈ (0, 1).
The pricing policy we propose, called Controlled Variance Pricing, chooses at each time
period the certainty equivalent price (3.5), unless this means that the lower bound on the
sample variance of the prices Var(p)t+1 ≥ c(t + 1)α−1 is not satisfied. In that case, the
next price should be chosen not too close to the average price chosen so far; in particular,
pt+1 is then not allowed to lie in the interval
TI(t) =
(
p¯t −
√
c [(t + 1)α − tα] t + 1
t
, p¯t +
√
c [(t + 1)α − tα] t + 1
t
)
, (3.6)
which is referred to as the taboo interval at time t. Choosing pt+1 outside the taboo
interval creates extra price dispersion, by guaranteeing Var(p)t+1 ≥ c(t + 1)α−1 (see
Proposition 3.2).
Controlled Variance Pricing
Initialization: Choose initial prices p1, p2 ∈ [pl , ph], p1 6= p2.
Choose α ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ (0, 2−α(p1 − p2)2 min{1, (3α)−1}).
For all t ≥ 2:
Estimation: Calculate the MQLE estimates aˆt according to (3.3).
Pricing: If
(a) there is no solution aˆt, or
(b) aˆ0t ≤ 0 or aˆ1t ≥ 0, or
(c) aˆ0t + aˆ1t p < 0 for some p ∈ [pl , ph],
set pt+1 ∈ {p1, p2} such that |pt+1 − p¯t| = max(|p1 − p¯t|, |p2 − p¯t|).
Now assume aˆt exists and aˆ0t > 0, aˆ1t < 0, aˆ0t + aˆ1t p ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [pl , ph].
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Set
pt+1 = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
r(p, aˆt), (3.7)
if this results in Var(p)t+1 ≥ c(t + 1)α−1.
Else, set
pt+1 = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]\TI(t)
r(p, aˆt), (3.8)
where TI(t) is the taboo interval (3.6) at time t.
In cases (a) - (c), we choose one of the initial prices p1, p2, that is most far away from p¯t.
This ensures that the bound on the variance Var(p)t ≥ ctα−1 remains valid. The upper
bound on the constant c ensures that [pl , ph]\TI(t) is nonempty for all t ≥ 2, and that
Var(p)t ≥ ctα−1 is satisfied for t = 2.
A desirable property of a pricing policy is that the price pt converges to the optimal
price popt, and thus the sample variance Var(p)t converges to zero. The speed at which
the sample variance goes to zero turns out to be strongly related to the quality of the
parameter estimates: in particular, the parameter estimates aˆt converge quickly to the
correct values a(0) if the sample variance Var(p)t converges slowly to zero; then the
price however converges slowly, which may be costly. We here observe a trade-off be-
tween exploration (quick convergence of parameter estimates to the correct values) and
exploitation (quick convergence of prices to the optimal price). The balance between ex-
ploration and exploitation is captured in the parameter α of CVP. The following propo-
sition establishes a relation between α and the sample variance of the prices:
Proposition 3.2. With CVP, Var(p)t ≥ ctα−1 for all t ≥ 2.
The results on consistency and convergence rates of parameter estimates that we use
to establish performance bounds for CVP, are stated in terms of the eigenvalues of the
design matrix. The following lemma relates these eigenvalues to the sample variance of
the prices. Its proof is straightforward and contained in Section 3.6.
Lemma 3.1. Let λmax(t),λmin(t) be the largest and smallest eigenvalue of the design matrix
Pt =
(
t ∑ti=1 pi
∑ti=1 pi ∑
t
i=1 p
2
i
)
, (t ≥ 2),
where p1, . . . , pt ∈ [pl , ph] and p1 6= p2. Then λmax(t) ≤ (1 + p2h)t and tVar(p)t ≤ (1 +
p2h)λmin(t).
In the following Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.1, we assume that CVP with α ∈ (1/2, 1)
is used. We show that a solution aˆt to the estimation equations (3.3) eventually exists,
and the parameter estimates aˆt converge to the correct value a(0). In addition we provide
an upper bound on the mean square convergence rate, in terms of the parameter α.
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Proposition 3.3. Let α > 1/2. A solution aˆt to (3.3) eventually exists, and aˆt → a(0) a.s. In
addition, if we define
Tρ = sup{t ∈N | there is no solution aˆt of (3.3) such that
∣∣∣∣∣∣aˆt − a(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ}, (3.9)
then there exists a ρ0 > 0 such that for all 0 < ρ < ρ0, E[T1/2ρ ] < ∞ and
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣aˆt − a(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>Tρ] = O( log(t)tα
)
, (3.10)
where 1t>Tρ denotes the indicator function of the event t > Tρ.
The proposition follows from Chapter 7, where strong consistency and convergence
rates for quasi-likelihood estimates are discussed. Theorem 7.1 implies the assertion
E[T1/2ρ ] < ∞. (Note that there, the required condition 1/2 < rα − 1 is valid for all
1/2 < α ≤ 1, because of our moment condition (3.2), with r > 3). The convergence rates
(3.10) follow from Theorem 7.2 and Remark 7.2 in Chapter 7, together with Lemma 3.1.
Proposition 3.3 enables us to calculate the following upper bound on the regret:
Theorem 3.1.
Regret(T, CVP) = O
(
Tα + T1−α log(T)
)
,
provided α > 1/2.
We use a Taylor series expansion of the revenue function r(p) to show |r(p)− r(popt)| =
O((p − popt)2). The implicit function theorem is invoked to obtain |p(a) − popt| =
O
(
||a− a(0)||
)
. The theorem can then be derived from Proposition 3.3 and the rate
at which the size of the taboo interval converges to zero. The details of the proof are
given in Section 3.6.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Quality of regret bound
The term T1−α log(T) in Theorem 3.1 comes from bounds (3.10) on the quality of the
parameter estimates, the term Tα comes from the length of the taboo interval (3.6). The
parameter α captures the trade-off between learning and optimization. If α is large then
much emphasis is put on learning: the parameters converge quickly to their correct
values, but due to the large size of the taboo interval, the prices converge slowly. If α
is small then the emphasis is on optimizing instant revenue: the taboo interval is then
very small, thus the next-period price is close to the certainty equivalent optimal price;
however, for small α, only a relatively slow convergence of the parameter estimates is
guaranteed by Proposition 3.3. The optimal choice of α in Theorem 3.1 clearly is 1/2,
but since α should be larger than 1/2, we get the following
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Corollary 3.1.
Regret(T, CVP) = O
(
T1/2+δ
)
,
with α = 1/2+ δ, for arbitrarily small δ > 0.
This result would be a little more elegant if the term Tδ, δ > 0, could be removed. The
relevant theorems of Chapter 7 however require α > 1/2 and it appears that in general
this requirement cannot easily be removed.
The bound from Corollary 3.1 is close to O(
√
T). In several settings it has been shown
that this is the best achievable asymptotic upper bound on the regret (see e.g. Kleinberg
and Leighton, 2003, Besbes and Zeevi, 2011, Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012). It
is not completely clear if the “gap” Tδ between Corollary 3.1 and the best achievable
bound
√
T can be removed. By using much technical machinery, one can make this gap
slightly smaller: the multi-product pricing policy from Chapter 4, applied to the single-
product setting, achieves Regret(T) = O(
√
T log(T)). However, here there is still a
“gap” of
√
log(T). A further discussion on this issue is provided in section 4.4.4.
3.4.2 Generality of result
Concerning the generality of the result, we note that Proposition 3.3 holds for any pric-
ing policy that guarantees Var(p)t ≥ ctα−1. The relation between regret and Var(p)t
through the parameter α, as in Theorem 3.1, depends however on the specifics of the
used pricing policy.
A lower bound on Regret(t) in terms of Var(p)t can easily be constructed. For ex-
ample, if the revenue function r(p) is strictly concave in p, then one can show that
Regret(t,ψ) ≥ k∑ti=1(pi − popt)2, for some positive constant k and any policy ψ. Since
arg min
p∈P
t
∑
i=1
(pi − p)2 = p¯t,
this implies tVar(p)t ≤ k−1Regret(t,ψ) a.s. To derive an upper bound on the regret in
terms of the growth rate of Var(p)t, for arbitrary policies ψ, seems much less straight-
forward. It is an interesting direction for future research to completely characterize the
relation between regret and empirical variance.
3.4.3 Differences with the multiperiod control problem
For the multiperiod control problem mentioned in Section 3.3.1, Lai and Robbins (1982)
showed that there is a policy with Regret(T) = O(log(T)). This problem is very much
akin to the dynamic pricing problem with linear demand function: in the first prob-
lem the optimal control x(aˆ0t, aˆ1t) as function of the parameter estimates equals (y∗ −
aˆ0t)/aˆ1t, in the latter problem the optimal price p(aˆ0t, aˆ1t) equals −aˆ0t/(2aˆ1t) (for the
moment neglecting bounds on x, p and assuming aˆ0t, aˆ1t have the correct sign). When
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y∗ = 0, these optimal controls only differ by a factor 2. An intuitive explanation why
we do not achieve Regret(T) = O(log(T)) in the dynamic pricing problem, despite the
similarities with the multiperiod control problem, is the presence of what Harrison et al.
(2011a) call “indeterminate equilibria”. An indeterminate equilibrium occurs if there are
estimates (aˆ0, aˆ1) such that the average observed output at x(aˆ0, aˆ1) “confirms” the cor-
rectness of these estimates, i.e. if (aˆ0, aˆ1) satisfies a
(0)
0 + a
(0)
1 x(aˆ0, aˆ1) = aˆ0 + aˆ1x(aˆ0, aˆ1).
It is not difficult to show that there are infinitely many indeterminate equilibria, both
in the multiperiod control problem and the dynamic pricing problem. In the mul-
tiperiod control problem, each indeterminate equilibrium (aˆ0, aˆ1) 6= (a(0)0 , a(0)1 ) still
gives an optimal control x(aˆ0, aˆ1) = x(a
(0)
0 , a
(0)
1 ), while in the dynamic pricing prob-
lem, each indeterminate equilibrium (aˆ0, aˆ1) 6= (a(0)0 , a(0)1 ) yields a suboptimal price
p(aˆ0, aˆ1) 6= p(a(0)0 , a(0)1 ). This means that in the multiperiod control problem, conver-
gence of the parameter estimates to any arbitrary indeterminate equilibrium implies
convergence of the controls to the optimal control; while in the dynamic pricing prob-
lem, only convergence of the parameter estimates to the “true” indeterminate equilib-
rium a(0) implies convergence of the controls to the optimal control. This makes the
dynamic pricing problem structurally more complex than the multiperiod control prob-
lem.
3.4.4 Applicability to other sequential decision problems
In Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 we discuss inconsistency of certainty equivalent pricing, and
study the performance of Controlled Variance pricing, in the specific context of dynamic
pricing under uncertainty. We believe however that the ideas developed in this paper
can be applied to many other types of sequential decision problems with uncertainty.
We provide a brief sketch of problems for which the controlled variance pricing idea
may be a fruitful approach. At each time instance t ∈ N the decision maker chooses a
control xt ∈ Rd, (d ∈ N), and observes a realization yt of a random variable Y(xt, θ),
whose probability distribution depends on xt and on an unknown parameter θ in a pa-
rameter space Θ ⊂ Rd; subsequently a cost c(xt, yt, θ) is encountered. The decision
maker estimates θ using historical data (xi, yi)i≤t, with an appropriate statistical esti-
mation technique (e.g. maximum-likelihood estimation). A certainty equivalent control
rule then sets the next control to
xt+1 = arg min
x
E[c(x, Y(x, θˆt), θˆt)], (3.11)
where θˆt denotes the estimate of θ at time t. If the quality of the parameter estimates
||θˆt − θ|| depends on some measure of dispersion of the controls, then a controlled vari-
ance rule sets the next control to (3.11), subject to a lower bound on the measure of dis-
persion. The optimal lower bound depends on the problem characteristics, and captures
in some sense the trade-off between estimation and instant optimization, i.e. exploration
and exploitation.
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3.5 Numerical evaluation
We numerically compare the performance of Controlled Variance Pricing to the policy
MLE-cycle, which was introduced by Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012). We test
normally, Poisson, and Bernoulli distributed demand, since these are commonly used
demand models in practice. For each distribution we test two functions h that models
the relation between price and expected demand. The function v need not be specified,
since it is already determined by the demand distribution: v(x) = 1 for normal demand,
v(x) = x for Poisson demand, and v(x) = x(1− x) for Bernoulli demand. All six sets
of demand distribution and the function h are listed in Table 3.1. For each set, we ran-
domly generate 10,000 different instances of parameters a0, a1. For normally distributed
demand we also generate a value for σ; for Poisson and Bernoulli demand, σ = 1. The
parameters are drawn from a uniform distribution. The support of these uniform distri-
butions is chosen such that the optimal price lies between 3 and 8. For normal demand
an additional requirement is that h(a0 + a1 popt) − 3σ > 0 and σh(a0+a1 popt) >
1
20 . This
implies that at the optimal price, the probability that demand is negative is small (less
than 0.135 %), and the coefficient of variation at the optimal price is not extremely small
(at least 120 ). For Bernoulli demand an additional requirement is h(a0 + a1 p) ∈ (0, 1) for
all pl ≤ p ≤ ph. Table 3.2 list summary statistics for the chosen parameter values.
Table 3.1: Problem sets, with parameter range
Distr. h(x) a0 a1 σ
1. Normal x [0.1, 20] [−a011 ,
−a0
16 ] [
1
20 ,
1
3 ] · (a0 + a1 popt)
2. Normal x3/4 [0.1, 20] [−a011 ,
−a0
14 ] [
1
20 ,
1
3 ] · (a0 + a1 popt)3/4
3. Poisson exp(x) [ 113 , 20] [
−1
3 ,
−1
8 ] 1
4. Poisson x [ 113 , 20] [
−a0
11 ,
−a0
16 ] 1
5. Bernoulli (1+ exp(−x))−1 [log(−3a1 − 1)− 3a1, [−1, −49 ] 1
log(−8a1 − 1)− 8a1]
6. Bernoulli x3/4 [0.8, 1.1] [−a011 ,
−a0
14 ] 1
For both policies that we compare, the lowest and highest admissible price are set to
pl = 1, ph = 10. The policy CVP uses α = 0.5001, and initial prices p1 = 4, p2 = 7.
For the constant c in the taboo interval, we try three different values: 1, 3, and 5. The
exploration prices of MLE-cycle are set to p1 = 4, p2 = 7. We vary the number of
exploration phases per cycle. In particular we try 1, 2, and 3 consecutive exploration
phases (n consecutive exploration phases means that during the 2n exploration periods
in each cycle, the price alternates between p1 and p2).
For each set of instances we calculate the average relative regret over 10,000 instances.
Thus, for each instance, corresponding to a choice of parameter values, we measure
the relative regret T−1 ∑Tt=1(ropt − r(pt))/ropt × 100%, and then we average over all
instances:
1
10, 000
10,000
∑
i=1
∑Tt=1 ropt − r(pt)
Tropt
× 100%.
This quantity is measured for T ∈ {10, 50, 100, 500, 1000}. The results are listed in Table
3.3. In these tables, the header CVP(c) denotes the policy CVP with constant c, the
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Table 3.2: Sample statistics of parameters
Problem set 1
a0 a1 σ popt
max 19.9973 -0.0066 3.2775 7.9993
mean 10.0518 -0.7712 0.9652 6.5984
min 0.1050 -1.8004 0.0042 5.5002
std 5.7519 0.4517 0.7246 0.7187
Problem set 2
a0 a1 σ popt
max 19.9989 -0.0075 2.8178 7.9998
mean 10.0050 -0.8125 0.8181 7.0703
min 0.1009 -1.8044 0.0037 6.2860
std 5.7400 0.4704 0.6135 0.4964
Problem set 3
a0 a1 σ popt
max 19.9995 -0.1250 1.0000 7.9991
mean 11.8249 -0.2286 1.0000 4.7182
min 3.6669 -0.3333 1.0000 3.0004
std 4.7345 0.0600 0 1.3508
Problem set 4
a0 a1 σ popt
max 19.9983 -0.2353 1.0000 7.9991
mean 11.8751 -0.9094 1.0000 6.6062
min 3.6687 -1.8095 1.0000 5.5006
std 4.7217 0.3762 0 0.7230
Problem set 5
a0 a1 σ popt
max 9.8596 -0.4445 1.0000 7.9998
mean 4.8056 -0.7255 1.0000 5.3353
min 0.3068 -1.0000 1.0000 3.0006
std 1.9504 0.1606 0 1.4570
Problem set 6
a0 a1 σ popt
max 1.1000 -0.0574 1.0000 8.0000
mean 0.9497 -0.0770 1.0000 7.0780
min 0.8000 -0.0997 1.0000 6.2858
std 0.0866 0.0088 0 0.4952
header MLE-c(n) denotes the policy MLE-cycle with n consecutive exploration phases.
The results from Table 3.3 suggest that CVP performs comparable to MLE-cycle, or even
better. This hold for all tested time scales T = 10, 50, 100, 500 and 1000, and all six sets of
problem instances. If we consider the results for T = 1000, we see that CVP outperforms
MLE-cycle on all problem sets except 1. On a shorter time scale, T = 100, this holds for
all problem sets. One of the reasons for this difference may be that MLE-cycle only uses
the data from the exploration phases to form parameter estimates, whereas CVP uses all
the available historical data. (Note, however, that den Boer (2012b) shows that adding
data does not necessarily improve the quality of parameter estimates).
For some instances, in particular problem set 3, the relative regret decreases very fast:
CVP(1) has regret below 1% already from T = 50. The sets 5 and 6, with Bernoulli
distributed demand, show a more slowly decreasing relative regret. We also see that
the optimal value of the constant c in CVP depends on T. For example in problem
set 6, c = 1 performs best for T = 10, 50, 100, whereas c = 5 is the best choice for
T = 500, 1000.
We wish to emphasize that these results are not meant as an exhaustive comparison
between the numerical performance of CVP and MLE-cycle. In that case we should
also have fine-tuned the value of the exploration prices p1, p2. The simulation results
nevertheless are an indication that CVP may perform well in practical applications.
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Table 3.3: Average relative regret
Problem set 1: Normal demand, h(x) = x
t CVP(1) CVP(3) CVP(5) MLE-c (1) MLE-c (3) MLE-c (5)
10 5.0 % 5.0 % 5.0 % 7.6 % 8.9 % 8.6 %
50 3.2 % 3.1 % 3.2 % 5.0 % 6.7 % 7.2 %
100 2.9 % 2.9 % 2.9 % 3.9 % 5.3 % 6.5 %
500 2.7 % 2.7 % 2.7 % 2.0 % 3.0 % 4.1 %
1000 2.7 % 2.6 % 2.7 % 1.5 % 2.2 % 3.2 %
Problem set 2: Normal demand, h(x) = x3/4
t CVP(1) CVP(3) CVP(5) MLE-c (1) MLE-c (3) MLE-c (5)
10 6.8 % 7.2 % 7.5 % 9.4 % 11.0 % 10.4 %
50 4.0 % 3.7 % 3.8 % 7.0 % 8.6 % 8.9 %
100 3.2 % 2.8 % 2.8 % 5.9 % 7.0 % 8.1 %
500 1.9 % 1.4 % 1.4 % 3.4 % 4.0 % 5.2 %
1000 1.4 % 1.0 % 1.0 % 2.6 % 3.0 % 4.1 %
Problem set 3: Poisson demand, h(x) = exp(x)
t CVP(1) CVP(3) CVP(5) MLE-c (1) MLE-c (3) MLE-c (5)
10 2.3 % 2.7 % 3.3 % 5.8 % 7.7 % 9.1 %
50 0.9 % 1.3 % 1.9 % 3.1 % 6.3 % 7.3 %
100 0.6 % 1.0 % 1.4 % 2.3 % 5.0 % 6.6 %
500 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.7 % 1.2 % 2.9 % 4.2 %
1000 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.5 % 0.8 % 2.2 % 3.3 %
Problem set 4: Poisson demand, h(x) = x
t CVP(1) CVP(3) CVP(5) MLE-c (1) MLE-c (3) MLE-c (5)
10 8.1 % 8.6 % 9.1 % 9.4 % 9.5 % 8.7 %
50 5.5 % 5.5 % 5.6 % 8.5 % 8.1 % 8.0 %
100 4.8 % 4.5 % 4.3 % 7.6 % 6.9 % 7.3 %
500 3.4 % 2.7 % 2.4 % 4.9 % 4.2 % 4.8 %
1000 2.8 % 2.1 % 1.9 % 3.9 % 3.2 % 3.8 %
Problem set 5: Bernoulli demand, h(x) = (1+ exp(−x))−1
t CVP(1) CVP(3) CVP(5) MLE-c (1) MLE-c (3) MLE-c (5)
10 18.4 % 18.5 % 18.3 % 21.0 % 19.2 % 20.7 %
50 9.5 % 10.0 % 10.5 % 15.8 % 17.1 % 18.0 %
100 6.8 % 7.2 % 7.6 % 13.5 % 14.4 % 16.5 %
500 3.6 % 3.5 % 3.5 % 8.6 % 8.9 % 11.0 %
1000 2.8 % 2.5 % 2.5 % 6.8 % 6.9 % 8.7 %
Problem set 6: Bernoulli demand, h(x) = x3/4
t CVP(1) CVP(3) CVP(5) MLE-c (1) MLE-c (3) MLE-c (5)
10 11.3 % 11.5 % 11.6 % 11.4 % 12.3 % 10.4 %
50 9.2 % 9.8 % 10.1 % 11.1 % 10.8 % 10.4 %
100 8.0 % 8.3 % 8.4 % 11.0 % 10.3 % 10.0 %
500 5.8 % 5.4 % 5.0 % 9.9 % 8.1 % 7.9 %
1000 5.0 % 4.4 % 3.9 % 9.0 % 6.8 % 6.5 %
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof is similar to Section 2 of Lai and Robbins (1982), with the difference that we
do not make assumptions on the values of p1, p2, pl , ph.
Without loss of generality assume p1 < p2, define a = ((ph − p1)2 + (ph − p2)2)p−1h ,
and recall that et = D(pt)− E[D(pt) | p1, . . . , pt−1, d1, . . . , dt−1]. Write σ2 = E[e2t ], for all
t ∈N. Let δ > 0, and consider the event
A =

(p2 − 2ph)e1 + (2ph − p1)e2 ≥ −a(0)1 (p2 − p1)2ph
(p1 − ph)e1 + (p2 − ph)e2 ≥ (−2pha(0)1 − a(0)0 + δ)a + (2ph − p1 − p2)δ|e¯t| ≤ δ for all t ≥ 3
 .
We first show that for sufficiently large δ, the event A occurs with strictly positive prob-
ability. The first two inequalities of A are satisfied when(
p2 − 2ph 2ph − p1
p1 − ph p2 − ph
)(
e1
e2
)
≥
(
−a(0)1 (p2 − p1)2ph
a(−2pha(0)1 − a(0)0 + δ) + (2ph − p1 − p2)δ
)
.
(3.12)
The determinant of the coefficient matrix equals (p2 − 2ph)(p2 − ph) + (p1 − ph)(p1 −
2ph), which is strictly positive. A solution to this linear system therefore exists, and
(3.12) happens with positive probability. Let B ⊂ R2 be a bounded subset of the solu-
tions (e1, e2) of (3.12), s.t. P((e1, e2) ∈ B) > 0. Choose δ >
√
8σ+ sup(e1,e2)∈B
1
3 |e1 + e2|.
It follows from the Kolmogorov inequality (see e.g. Chow and Teicher, 2003, Theorem 6,
page 133) that for any e >
√
8σ,
P
(
sup
3≤t
∣∣∣∣∣ 1t− 2 t∑i=3 ei
∣∣∣∣∣ > e
)
≤
∞
∑
j=1
P
(
sup
2j<t≤2j+1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1t− 2 t∑i=3 ei
∣∣∣∣∣ > e
)
≤
∞
∑
j=1
P
(
sup
2j<t≤2j+1
|
t
∑
i=3
ei| > (2j − 1)e
)
≤
∞
∑
j=1
P
(
sup
1≤t≤2j+1
|
t
∑
i=3
ei| > (2j − 1)e
)
≤
∞
∑
j=1
1
(2j − 1)2e2 σ
22j+1 ≤
∞
∑
j=1
8σ2e−22−j
=8σ2e−2 < 1,
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since 2j+1/(2j − 1)2 ≤ 8 · 2−j, j ≥ 1. This implies
P(|e¯t| ≤ δ for all t ≥ 3) = P(sup
t≥3
|e¯t| ≤ δ) = P
(
sup
t≥3
∣∣∣∣∣ e1 + e2t + 1t t∑i=3 ei
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
)
≥ P
(
(e1, e2) ∈ B and sup
t≥3
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=3 ei
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ− sup(e1,e2)∈B
1
3
|e1 + e2|
)
= P ((e1, e2) ∈ B) · P
(
sup
t≥3
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=3 ei
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
(
δ− sup
(e1,e2)∈B
1
3
|e1 + e2|
))
≥ P ((e1, e2) ∈ B) · P
(
sup
t≥3
∣∣∣∣∣ 1t− 2 t∑i=3 ei
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
(
δ− sup
(e1,e2)∈B
1
3
|e1 + e2|
))
> 0.
This proves that for δ sufficiently large, the event A occurs with probability P(A) > 0.
If for some t, aˆ1t ≥ 0 or aˆ0t ≤ 0 then clearly the parameter estimates have the wrong
sign; it would be foolish for a price manager to use the certainty equivalent price
pt+1 = arg max
pl≤p≤ph
p · (aˆ0t + aˆ1t p)
in that case. We therefore assume that pt+1 = ph whenever aˆ1t ≥ 0. (Alternatively one
might impose some extra conditions in the set A, and still use the certainty equivalent
price when the estimates have the wrong sign).
We show by induction that on the event A, pt+1 = ph, for all t ≥ 2.
t=2. The line through the points (pi, a
(0)
0 + a
(0)
1 pi + ei), i = 1, 2 has slope aˆ12 = a
(0)
1 +
(e2 − e1)(p2 − p1)−1 and intercept aˆ02 = (e1 p2 − e2 p1)(p2 − p1)−1. When aˆ12 ≥ 0 then
p3 = ph. If aˆ12 < 0 then p3 =
aˆ02−2aˆ12 ≥ ph is implied by
(e1 p2 − e2 p1)(p2 − p1)−1 ≥ −2(a(0)1 + (e2 − e1)(p2 − p1)−1)ph,
which, by multiplying (p2 − p1) and rearranging terms, is equivalent to the condition
(p2 − 2ph)e1 + (2ph − p1)e2 ≥ −a(0)1 (p2 − p1)2ph.
t ≥ 3. Suppose that for all i = 3, . . . , t, pi = ph. Then p¯i = ph − 2ph−p1−p2i (3 ≤ i ≤ t).
Defining Ct = ∑ti=1(pi − p¯t)ei, and Vt = ∑ti=1(pi − p¯t)2, the least-squares estimates are(
aˆ0t
aˆ1t
)
=
(
a(0)0
a(0)1
)
+
(
e¯t − p¯tCt/Vt
Ct/Vt
)
.
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For all t ≥ 2, Vt and Ct can be rewritten as
Vt =
t
∑
i=2
i− 1
i
(pi − p¯i−1)2, Ct =
t
∑
i=2
i− 1
i
(pi − p¯i−1)(ei − e¯i−1).
and by some algebra and an induction argument, it follows that
Vt = V2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)2(12 − t
−1), Ct = C2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)(e¯t − e¯2).
where V2 = 12 (p2 − p1)2 and C2 = 12 (p2 − p1)(e2 − e1).
If aˆ1t ≥ 0 then pt+1 = ph.
Now suppose aˆ1t < 0. Then
pt+1 = ph
⇔ aˆ0t−2aˆ1t ≥ ph
⇔aˆ0t ≥ −2aˆ1t ph
⇔a(0)0 + e¯t − p¯tCt/Vt ≥ −2pha(0)1 − 2phCt/Vt
⇔e¯t + (2ph − p¯t)Ct/Vt ≥ −2pha(0)1 − a(0)0
⇔(ph + 2ph − p1 − p2t )Ct/Vt ≥ −2pha
(0)
1 − a(0)0 − e¯t.
Observe that on the event A, −e¯t < δ, ph + 2ph−p1−p2t ≥ ph, Vt ≤ V2 + (2ph − p1 −
p2)2 · 12 , Ct = C2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)(e¯t − e¯2) ≥ C2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)(−δ− e¯2) and thus it
suffices to show
C2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)(−δ− e¯2) ≥ (−2pha(0)1 − a(0)0 + δ)(V2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)2 ·
1
2
)p−1h ,
i.e.
1
2
(p2 − p1)(e2 − e1)− (2ph − p1 − p2)e¯2
≥(−2pha(0)1 − a(0)0 + δ)(
1
2
(p2 − p1)2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)2 · 12 )p
−1
h + (2ph − p1 − p2)δ.
Rewriting the lefthandside we get the condition
e1(p1 − ph) + e2(p2 − ph)
≥(−2pha(0)1 − a(0)0 + δ)(
1
2
(p2 − p1)2 + (2ph − p1 − p2)2 · 12 )p
−1
h + (2ph − p1 − p2)δ
=(−2pha(0)1 − a(0)0 + δ)a + (2ph − p1 − p2)δ.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
We proof the assertion by induction. For t = 2, observe that the upper bound c ≤
2−α(p1 − p2)2 on the constant c implies Var(p)2 = (p1−p2)
2
2 ≥ c2α−1. Now let t ≥ 2 and
suppose that Var(p)t ≥ ctα−1. If (3.3) has no solution, aˆ0t ≤ 0, aˆ1t ≥ 0, or aˆ0t + aˆ1t p < 0
for some p ∈ [pl , ph], then |pt+1 − p¯t| = max(|p1 − p¯t|, |p2 − p¯t|) ≥ |p1−p2|2 . Observe
that for all t ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0, 1), (t + 1)α − tα ≤ αtα−1 Together with the bound c ≤
2−α(3α)−1(p1 − p2)2 this implies
(t + 1)Var(p)t+1 = tVar(p)t +
t
t + 1
(pt+1 − p¯t)2 ≥ ctα + c [(t + 1)α − tα] = c(t + 1)α.
If (3.7) is chosen, then automatically Var(p)t+1 ≥ c(t + 1)α−1.
If (3.8) is chosen, then by construction of the taboo interval (3.6) we have
(t + 1)Var(p)t+1 = tVar(p)t +
t
t + 1
(pt+1 − p¯t)2 ≥ ctα + c [(t + 1)α − tα] = c(t + 1)α.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
From λmax(t) + λmin(t) = tr(Pt) = t(1 + p2t) > 0 and λmax(t)λmin(t) = det(Pt) =
t2Var(p)t > 0, it follows that λmin(t) > 0. Together with p2t ≤ ph we thus have
λmax(t) ≤ t(1+ p2t) ≤ t(1+ p2h). Furthermore,
λmin(t) = λmax(t)−1 det(Pt) = λmax(t)−1t2Var(p)t ≥ (1+ p2h)−1tVar(p)t.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Since r(p, a) is twice continuously differentiable in p, it follows from a Taylor series
expansion that, given a, for all p ∈ [pl , ph] there is a p˜ ∈ [pl , ph] on the line segment
between p and popt, such that
r(p, a) = r(popt, a) + r′(popt, a)(p− popt) + 12 r
′′( p˜, a)(p− popt)2,
where r′(p, a) and r′′(p, a) denote the first and second derivatives of r with respect to p.
The assumption pl < popt < ph implies r′(popt) = 0, and with K = supp∈[pl ,ph ] |r′′(p)| <
∞ it follows that
|r(p)− r(popt)| ≤ K2 (p− popt)
2, (p ∈ P). (3.13)
On an open neighborhood of popt in P , popt = p(a(0)) is the unique price that satis-
fies r′(p, a(0)) = 0. Since by assumption r′′(p, a0, a1) exists and is nonzero at the point
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(p(a(0)), a(0)), it follows from the implicit function theorem (see e.g. Duistermaat and
Kolk, 2004) that there are open neighborhoods U of p(a(0)) in R and V of a(0) in R2,
such that for each a ∈ V there is a unique p ∈ U with r′(p, a) = 0. Moreover, the map-
ping V → U, a 7→ p(a), is continuously differentiable in V. Consequently for all a ∈ V
there is a a˜ ∈ V on the line segment between a and a(0), such that
p(a) = p(a(0)) +
∂p(a)
∂aT
∣∣∣∣
a˜
(a− a(0)),
which implies that we can choose V such that for all a ∈ V,
|p(a)− p(a(0))| = O
(
||a− a(0)||
)
. (3.14)
Let ρ ∈ (0, ρ0) be such that {a :
∣∣∣∣∣∣a− a(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ} ⊂ V, and such a0 > 0, a1 < 0 whenever∣∣∣∣∣∣a− a(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ. Let Tρ be as in (3.9). Then for all t ∈N,
E[|pt − popt|2] = E[|pt − popt|2 · 1t>Tρ ] + E[|pt − popt|2 · 1t≤Tρ ]
≤ E[|pt − popt|2 · 1t>Tρ ] + (ph − pl)2P(t ≤ Tρ)
≤ E[|pt − popt|2 · 1t>Tρ ] + (ph − pl)2
E[T1/2ρ ]
t1/2
, (3.15)
where 1A denotes the indicator function of the event A.
Since r′(p(a(0)), a(0)) = 0 and r′′(p(a(0)), a(0)) < 0, it follows from continuity arguments
that r′(p(a), a) = 0 and r′′(p(a), a) < 0 for all a in an open neighborhood of a(0). This im-
plies that if
∣∣∣∣∣∣aˆt − a(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ is sufficiently small and t sufficiently large, arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]\TI(t)
r(p, aˆt)
lies on the boundary of the taboo interval TI(t). It follows that there is a ρ′ ∈ (0, ρ0)
such that for all t > Tρ′ ,
|pt − p(aˆt)| ≤ |TI(t)|, (3.16)
where |TI(t)| denotes the length of the taboo interval TI(t). Combining (3.14), (3.15),
and (3.16),
E[|pt − popt|2] ≤ E[|pt − popt|2 · 1t>Tρ′ ] + (ph − pl)2
E[T1/2ρ′ ]
t1/2
,
≤ 2E[|pt − p(aˆt)|2 · 1t>Tρ′ ] + 2E[|p(aˆt)− p(a(0))|2 · 1t>Tρ′ ] + (ph − pl)2
E[T1/2ρ′ ]
t1/2
,
= O
E[|TI(t)|2] + E [∣∣∣∣∣∣aˆt − a(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 · 1t>Tρ′ ]+ (ph − pl)2 E[T1/2ρ′ ]t1/2
 ,
= O
(
tα−1 + log(t)
tα
)
,
42 Chapter 3
by Proposition 3.3, from which follows
Regret(T) =
T
∑
t=1
E[r(popt)− r(pt)] = O
(
T
∑
t=1
E[(pt − popt)2]
)
= O
(
T
∑
t=1
tα−1 + t−α log(t)
)
= O
(
Tα + T1−α log(T)
)
.
Chapter 4
Dynamic pricing and learning for multiple
products with infinite inventory
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we study pricing policies that are suitable for a firm selling
a single type of product. In practice, firms often sell multiple types of products, and
the demand for one product is influenced by the selling prices of the other products.
This means that learning the demand function and determining optimal prices have to
be considered for all products simultaneously; one can, in general, not simply apply
the methods from Chapter 3 independently for each individual product. We therefore
study in the current chapter dynamic pricing and learning in a setting with multiple
products.
Similar as in the single-product case, we consider a parametric setting where the seller
knows the relation between selling prices and the first two moments of the demand dis-
tributions, up to some unknown parameters. The value of these unknown parameters
can be estimated by maximum quasi-likelihood estimation (MQLE); this is an exten-
sion of classical maximum-likelihood estimation to settings where only the first two
moments of the distribution are known.
We propose an adaptive pricing policy which is based on the following principle: in
each time period, the seller estimates the unknown parameters with MQLE; subse-
quently, he chooses the prices that generate the highest expected revenue, given that
these parameter estimates are correct, and with an additional requirement on a certain
measure of price dispersion. This policy balances at each time step exploration and
exploitation: the requirement on the price dispersion makes sure that the parameter es-
timates converge to the true values, the current knowledge of the parameter estimates
is exploited by choosing the optimal prices w.r.t. these estimates.
We measure price dispersion by the smallest eigenvalue of the design matrix, which is
specified below, and require that it grows with a certain pre-specified rate. This rate
guarantees strong consistency of the MQL estimates. There is no simple recursive rela-
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tion between these smallest eigenvalues in two consecutive time periods. We therefore
work with an expression which grows at the same rate, namely the inverse of the trace
of the inverse design matrix. Using the Sherman-Morrison formula, we show that a
simple quadratic constraint on the chosen prices is sufficient to establish the desired
growth rate of the smallest eigenvalue of the design matrix.
The performance of pricing policies is measured in terms of Regret(T), which is the
expected amount of revenue loss after T time periods, caused by not using the optimal
price. We provide two conditions - one assuring a sufficient amount of price dispersion,
the other bounding the cumulative deviation from the certainty equivalence prices -
such that any pricing policy satisfying these conditions admits an upper bound on the
regret in terms of the amount of price dispersion. We show that our proposed adaptive
pricing policy satisfies these conditions, and by optimally choosing the price dispersion
rate, we obtain the bound Regret(T) = O(T2/3).
In many demand models that are used in practice, the demand functions are so-called
canonical link functions. For this important class of demand functions, we show that
Regret(T) = O(
√
T log(T)) can be achieved. This bound is close to O(
√
T), which in
several (single product) settings has been shown to be the lowest provable asymptotic
upper bound on the regret (see e.g. Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003, Besbes and Zeevi,
2011, Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012). Our upper bound on the regret is based
on new sufficient conditions that guarantee strong consistency of MQLE. The proof of
this result is based on an extension of a theorem by Lai (1974) to martingale difference
sequences, which may be of independent interest.
One of the strengths of our approach to dynamic pricing and learning for multiple prod-
ucts, is that our results are valid for a very large class of demand functions and distribu-
tions. Other works, such as Le Guen (2008) or Harrison et al. (2011b), restrict to linear
demand functions or sub-Gaussian demand distributions. In addition, we construct
a pricing policy that facilitates learning of the unknown parameters; in contrast, in a
robust approach as Lim et al. (2008), no learning takes place.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model
and notation, discusses some of the assumptions we make, and introduces the maxi-
mum quasi-likelihood estimator. Section 4.3 describes the proposed adaptive pricing
policy. In Section 4.4.1 we provide an upper bound on the regret of a pricing policy, in
terms of the amount of price dispersion. Section 4.4.2 shows that in case of canonical
link functions these bounds can be improved. Some auxiliary results needed to prove
these regret bounds are contained in Section 4.4.3, and the quality of the regret bounds
is discussed in Section 4.4.4. Numerical illustrations are provided in Section 4.5, and all
mathematical proofs are contained in Section 4.6.
4.2 Model, assumptions, and estimation method 45
4.2 Model, assumptions, and estimation method
4.2.1 Model and notation
In this section, we consecutively discuss the dynamic pricing setting under considera-
tion, the parametric demand model deployed by the seller, assumptions on the revenue
function, the definition of a policy, and the definition of the regret. Subsequently we
explain some notation used in this paper.
We consider a firm that sells n ∈N different types of products. Time is discretized, and
time periods are denoted by t ∈ N. A time period can represent a day or a week, but
also say five minutes. At the beginning of each time period t ∈ N, the firm determines
for each product k = 1, . . . , n a selling price pk(t) > 0. After setting the prices the
firm observes a realization of the demand dkt for each product k = 1, . . . , n, and collects
revenue ∑nk=1 pk(t)dkt. We assume that all demand can be met, thus stock-outs do not
occur.
Write p(t) = (p0(t), p1(t), . . . , pn(t))T , where p0(t) = 1 for all t, and pk(t) is the selling
price of product k in period t, (1 ≤ k ≤ n). The term p0(t) = 1 is convenient for
notational reasons. We assume that the prices lie in a compact, convex, non-empty set
P ⊂ {1} × Rn>0. The set P is called the set of admissible prices. A common choice
is P = {1} ×∏nk=1[plk, phk] where 0 < plk < phk denote the lowest and highest price
for product k that is acceptable to the firm. Our assumptions on P are more flexible,
allowing joint price constraints e.g. of the form p1 ≤ p2.
The random variable Dkt(p(t)) denotes the demand for product k in period t, given
selling price vector p(t). Given the selling prices, the demand in different time periods
and for different products are independent of each other, and for each t ∈ N, k =
1, . . . , n and p(t) ∈ P , the demand dkt is a realization of a random variable Dk(p(t)).
The seller assumes the following parametric model:
E[Dk(p)] = hk(pTβ
(0)
k ), (p ∈ P), (4.1)
Var[Dk(p)] = σ2k vk(E[Dk(p)]), (p ∈ P). (4.2)
Here for all k = 1, . . . , n, the functions hk : R≥0 → R≥0 and vk : R≥0 → R>0 are both
thrice continuously differentiable, with h˙k(x) =
∂hk(x)
∂x > 0, vk(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0,
σ2k are unknown positive scalars, and β
(0)
k = (β
(0)
k0 , . . . , β
(0)
kn )
T ∈ Rn+1 are unknown
parameter vectors. The functions hk are called link functions. With β(0) we denote the
n× (n + 1) matrix whose k-th row equals (β(0)k0 , . . . , β
(0)
kn ).
Let (Ft)t∈N be the filtration generated by {dki, pki : k = 1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . , t}, i.e. by all
prices and demand realizations up to and including time t, for t ∈ N, and let F0 be the
trivial σ-algebra. A technical assumption on the demand is
sup
p∈P ,k=1,...,n
E[|Dk(p)− E[Dk(p) | Ft−1]|γ] < ∞ a.s., for some γ > 3. (4.3)
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The expected revenue collected in a single time period by product k against price p, is
denoted by rk(p) = E[pkDk(p)] = pkh(pTβ
(0)
k ). The total expected revenue in a single
time period t against selling price p is r(p) = ∑nk=1 rk(p). We also write rk(p, βk) and
r(p, β) as a function of both the price vector p and the parameter values βk ∈ Rn+1 resp.
β ∈ R(n+1)×n.
We assume there is an open, bounded neighborhood V ∈ Rn×(n+1) around β(0), such
that for all β ∈ V, the function P → R, p 7→ r(p, β) has a unique maximizer
p(β) = arg max
p∈P
r(p, β) ∈ int(P), (4.4)
such that the matrix of all second derivatives of r w.r.t. p (excluding the first component
p0 = 1),
H(p, β) =
(
∂2r(p, β)
∂pi∂pj
)
1≤i,j≤n
, (4.5)
is negative definite at the point p(β). In (4.4), and throughout this chapter, int(P) is
defined as {1} × int({(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn | (1, p1, . . . , pn) ∈ P}). The correct optimal
price p(β(0)) is also denoted by popt.
A pricing policy ψ is a method that for each t ∈N generates a price p(t) ∈ P . This price
may depend on the previously chosen prices p(1), . . . , p(t− 1) and demand realizations
{dki : k = 1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . , t− 1}, i.e. p(t) is Ft−1-measurable.
The performance of a pricing policy is measured by the regret, which is the expected
revenue loss caused by not using the optimal price popt. For a pricing policy ψ that
generates prices p(1), p(2), . . . , p(T), the regret after T time periods is defined as
Regret(T,ψ) = E
[
T
∑
t=1
r(popt, β(0))− r(p(t), β(0))
]
.
The objective of the seller is to find a pricing policy ψ that gives the highest expected
revenue over T time periods. This is equivalent to minimizing Regret(T,ψ). Note that
this objective cannot directly be used by the seller to find a policy, since it depends on
the unknown parameters β(0).
Notation. With tr(A) and det(A) we denote the trace and determinant of a matrix A,
with λmax(A) and λmin(A) its largest and smallest eigenvalue (when these are real-
valued). The transpose of a (column) vector v is denoted by vT . Given price vectors
p(1), . . . , p(t), the design matrix P(t) is defined as
P(t) =
t
∑
i=1
p(i)pT(i). (4.6)
Since the largest and smallest eigenvalue of P(t) play an important role in the analysis,
we use shorthand notation λmax(t) = λmax(P(t)) and λmin(t) = λmin(P(t)). The natu-
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ral logarithm of x > 0 is denoted by log(x). If it is clear from the context which pricing
policy ψ is used, we sometimes write Regret(T) instead of Regret(T,ψ).
4.2.2 Discussion of model assumptions
We only assume knowledge on the first two moments of the demand, not on the com-
plete distribution. This makes the demand model a little more robust. The assumption
that the variance is a function of the first moment is valid for several demand distri-
butions that are commonly used in practice, for example, if the distribution of Dk(p)
is normal (vk(h) = 1), Bernoulli (vk(h) = h(1− h)), or Poisson (vk(h) = h). The mo-
ment assumption (4.3) is not common in the literature on dynamic pricing, and allows
for heavy-tailed demand distributions. The conditions on the uniqueness of the opti-
mal price p(β) and on the Hessian matrix (4.5) are satisfied when the revenue function
r(p, β(0)) is strictly concave in p. This is for example the case if the demand functions are
linear (hk(x) = x for each k = 1, . . . , n) and the matrix
(
β
(0)
kl + β
(0)
lk
)
k,l=1,...,n
is negative
definite.
4.2.3 Estimation of unknown parameters
The unknown parameters β(0) can be estimated with maximum quasi-likelihood esti-
mation. This is a natural extension of ordinary maximum-likelihood estimation to set-
tings where only the first two moments of the distribution are known. For more details
we refer to Wedderburn (1974), McCullagh (1983), Godambe and Heyde (1987), McCul-
lagh and Nelder (1983), Heyde (1997) and Gill (2001).
Given price vectors p(1), . . . , p(t) and demand realizations {dki | k = 1, . . . , n, i =
1, . . . , t}, the maximum quasi-likelihood estimate (MQLE) of β(0)k , denoted by βˆk(t) ∈
Rn+1, is defined as a solution to the (n + 1)-dimensional equation
lkt(βk) =
t
∑
i=1
h˙k(pT(i)βk)
σ2k vk(hk(p
T(i)βk))
p(i)(dki − hk(pT(i)βk) = 0. (4.7)
4.3 Adaptive pricing policy
A natural and intuitive pricing policy is to set at each time period the selling prices
equal to the prices that are optimal, given that the current parameter estimates are cor-
rect. This pricing policy is usually called myopic pricing or certainty equivalent pricing.
At each step, the firm acts as if it is certain about its parameter estimates. Although
this policy is very intuitive and easy to understand, its performance is very poor: in
Chapter 3, we show for a single product with normally distributed demand function
whose expectation depends linearly on the selling price, that with certainty equivalent
pricing, the parameter estimates may converge to the wrong value, and the price may
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converge to a limit price which is not equal to the optimal price. There we propose an
alternative pricing policy, called Controlled Variance Pricing, and show that under this
policy the price converges to the optimal price. The key idea of this policy is to use at
each time period the optimal price given the current parameter estimates, with an addi-
tional constraint on the price dispersion. In this single product case, the price dispersion
at time t is measured by the sample variance of the prices chosen up to time t, and is
required to satisfy a carefully chosen, time-dependent lower bound. This pricing rule
balances at each time step learning of the parameters and instant revenue optimization,
i.e. exploration and exploitation.
We now introduce an adaptive pricing policy for multiple products, which is inspired
by the same principles as Controlled Variance Pricing. The key idea is to choose the
optimal price given the current parameter estimates, with the additional requirement
that λmin(t), the smallest eigenvalue of the design matrix (4.6), grows with a certain
rate. More precisely we require that λmin(t) ≥ L1(t), where L1(t) is a positive monotone
increasing non-random function onN. As we will show, a proper choice of the function
L1(t) implies sufficient price dispersion for the parameter estimates βˆ(t) to converge to
the true value β(0).
Since there is no simple explicit expression relating two consecutive smallest eigenval-
ues λmin(t) and λmin(t+ 1), we instead work with the trace of the inverse design matrix,
tr(P(t)−1). This can be justified by the fact that for any positive definite n× n matrix A,
tr(A−1)−1 ≤ λmin(A) ≤ ntr(A−1)−1. (4.8)
Thus, tr(P(t)−1) = O
(
L1(t)−1
)
is equivalent to λmin(P(t)) = Ω(L1(t)). The expression
tr(P(t)−1) admits a recursive form via the Sherman-Morrison formula (Bartlett (1951),
see Hager (1989) for a historical treatment of these type of formulas). In particular, one
can show
tr(P(t + 1)−1)− tr(P(t)−1) = −
∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p(t + 1)∣∣∣∣2
1+ pT(t + 1)P(t)−1p(t + 1)
. (4.9)
If tr(P(t)−1) ≤ 1L1(t) and p(t+ 1) is chosen such that the right hand side of (4.9) satisfies
a carefully chosen constraint, we can make sure that tr(P(t + 1)−1) ≤ 1L1(t+1) .
Let L be the class of non-decreasing differentiable functions L : N → R>0 such that
L˙(t) = o(1), and t 7→ 1L(t) is convex. Examples of functions contained in L are t 7→
c
√
t log(t) or t 7→ cta, (c > 0, 0 < a < 1). It is not difficult to derive that for any L ∈ L,
L(t) = o(t), and there exists a CL ∈N such that L1(CLt) ≤ CLL1(t) for all t ∈N.
The details of the adaptive pricing policy, named ΦA, are outlined below:
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Adaptive pricing policy ΦA for n products
Initialization: Choose L1 ∈ L.
Choose n + 1 linearly independent initial price vectors p(1), p(2), . . . , p(n + 1) in P .
For all t ≥ n + 2:
Estimation: For each k = 1, . . . , n, calculate the MQLE βˆk(t) using the MQL equations
(4.7).
Pricing:
I) If for some k, βˆk(t) does not exist, or tr(P(t)−1)−1  L1(t), then set p(t + 1) = p(1),
p(t + 2) = p(2), . . ., p(t + j) = p(j), where j is the smallest integer such that tr(P(t +
j)−1)−1 ≥ L1(t + j).
II) If for all k, βˆk(t) exists, and tr(P(t)−1)−1 ≥ L1(t), let pceqp = p(βˆ(t)), and consider
the following cases:
IIa) If
tr
((
P(t) + pceqppTceqp
)−1)−1 ≥ L1(t + 1), (4.10)
then choose p(t + 1) = pceqp.
IIb) If (4.10) does not hold, then choose p(t + 1) that maximizes
max
p∈P
r(p, βˆ(t)) s.t.
∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p∣∣∣∣2
1+ pT P(t)−1p
≥ L˙1(t)
L1(t)2
, (4.11)
provided there is a feasible solution.
IIc) If (4.10) does not hold, and (4.11) has no feasible solution, then set p(t + 1) =
p(1), p(t + 2) = p(2), . . ., p(t + j) = p(j), where j is the smallest integer such that∣∣∣∣P(t + j)−1p∣∣∣∣2 [1 + pT P(t + j)−1p]−1 ≥ L˙1(t + j)L1(t + j)−2 is satisfied by some p ∈
P .
Ad I) and IIc) in the policy description deal with possible non-existence of the MQLE
βˆk(t) and other short-timescale effects: in that case, all previously chosen prices are
repeated until the MQLE exists and there is sufficient price dispersion. In the proof of
Proposition 4.2 we show that the term “j” in I) and IIc) is always finite.
Ad IIa) describes the situation where the certainty equivalent price p(βˆ(t)) induces suf-
ficient price dispersion; in that case, the next price is equal to the certainty equivalent
price.
Ad IIb) shows which price to choose when the certainty equivalent price induces insuf-
ficient price dispersion. In that case, an additional constraint in (4.11) has to be satisfied.
Computational methods to solve the MQL equations (4.7) are discussed in Osborne
(1992) and Heyde and Morton (1996). The value of pceqp = p(βˆ(t)) is the solution in
P of a maximization problem in n variables. The maximization problem (4.11) has one
additional constraint, which can be written as g(p) ≥ 0, where g is a quadratic polyno-
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mial in p. Both these problems can be solved using standard techniques for constrained
optimization (see e.g. Bertsekas, 1982, 1999, Fletcher, 2000).
For sufficiently large t, the maximization problem (4.11) always has a feasible solution:
Proposition 4.1 (Feasibility of (4.11)). There is a T0 ∈N, depending only on P and L1, such
that for all t ≥ T0: if
tr
(
P(t)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t), (4.12)
tr
((
P(t) + p(βˆ(t))p(βˆ(t))T
)−1)−1
< L1(t + 1), (4.13)
then the set {
p ∈ P |
∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p∣∣∣∣2
1+ pT P(t)−1p
≥ L˙1(t)
L1(t)2
}
is nonempty.
The following proposition states that for sufficiently large t, the adaptive pricing policy
ΦA induces a lower bound on tr(P(t)−1)−1, and thus by (4.8) also on λmin(t).
Proposition 4.2 (Growth rate of tr(P(t)−1)−1). There are T1, CL ∈ N, depending only on
T0, L1, and P(n + 1), such that for all t ≥ T1,
tr(P(t)−1)−1 ≥ C−1L L1(t). (4.14)
4.4 Bounds on the regret
In this section, we provide upper bounds on the regret induced by pricing policies. The
bounds depends on two characteristics of a pricing policy: the first is a lower bound L1
on the smallest eigenvalue λmin(t) of the design matrix P(t); this bound quantifies the
amount of emphasis on learning the unknown parameters. The second characteristic
is the cumulative difference between the chosen prices and the certainty equivalence
prices. Theorem 4.1 in Section 4.4.1 states an upper bound on the regret, in terms of these
two characteristics. We apply this result on the pricing policy introduced in Section 4.3,
and show that it can achieve Regret(T) = O(T2/3).
In Section 4.4.2, we consider the case of canonical link functions hk, which means that
a certain relation between the functions hk and vk is satisfied (the details are in Section
4.4.2). Canonical link functions are encountered in several demand models of practical
interest. We extend existing statistical results on the strong consistency of MQLE, and
show that Regret(T) = O(
√
T log(T) can be achieved. As intermediate result we obtain
an extension of Theorem 3 of Lai (1974) to martingale difference sequences.
Section 4.4.4 discusses the quality of the upper bounds derived in Sections 4.4.1 and
4.4.2.
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4.4.1 General link functions
In order to state the main results of this section, we develop some notation that deals
with possible non-existence of solutions to the quasi-likelihood equations. In particular,
for ρ > 0 and k = 1, . . . , n, we define
Tρ,k = sup{n ∈N : there is no β ∈ Bρ,k such that lkt(β) = 0}, (4.15)
where Bρ,k =
{
β ∈ Rn+1 |
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)k ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ}, and
Tρ = max{Tρ,1, . . . , Tρ,n}. (4.16)
The importance of Tρ becomes clear from following proposition, which relates L1 to
the rate at which the parameter estimate βˆ(t) converges to the true value β(0), and in
addition provides moment bounds on Tρ.
Proposition 4.3 (Strong consistency and convergence rates). Let L1 ∈ L, and suppose
there are t0 ∈ N, c > 0 and α ∈ ( 12 , 1) such that λmin(t) ≥ L1(t) ≥ ctα a.s. for all t ≥ t0.
Then there is a ρ0 > 0 such that Tρ < ∞ a.s. and E
[
Tηρ
]
< ∞, for all 0 < η < γα− 1 and
0 < ρ ≤ ρ0. In addition, for all k = 1, . . . , n and t > Tρ, there exists a solution βˆk(t) to (4.7),
limt→∞ βˆk(t) = β
(0)
k a.s., and
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆk(t)− β(0)k ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>Tρ] = O (L1(t)−1 log(t) + tL1(t)−2) .
The assertions about Tρ follow from applying Theorem 7.1 (Chapter 7) for each Tρ,k,
k = 1, . . . , n, and noting that Tρ ≤ ∑nk=1 Tρ,k a.s. The other statements follow from
Theorem 7.2.
The following theorem provides an upper bound on the regret, in terms of the function
L1. Let ρ1 ∈ (0, ρ0) such that {(β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Rn×(n+1) | βk ∈ Bρ,k, k = 1, . . . , n} ⊂ V,
where V is defined in Section 4.2.
Theorem 4.1. Let t0 ∈ N, L1 ∈ L such that L1(t) ≥ ctα for all t ≥ t0 and some c > 0,
α ∈ ( 12 , 1). Let 0 < ρ ≤ ρ1, and let T2 be a random variable on N such that T2 ≥ Tρ a.s. and
E[T1/22 ] < ∞. If ψ is a pricing policy that satisfies
(i) λmin(t) ≥ L1(t) a.s., for all t ≥ t0,
(ii) ∑Tt=1
∣∣∣∣p(t)− p(βˆ(t− 1))∣∣∣∣2 1t>T2 ≤ K2L1(T) a.s., for all T ≥ t0 and some K2 > 0,
then Regret(ψ, T) = O
(
L1(T) +∑Tt=1
(
log(t)
L1(t)
+ tL1(t)2
))
.
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Note that if L1(t) = O(t/ log(t)), the bound in Theorem 4.1 equals
Regret(ψ, T) = O
(
L1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
t
L1(t)2
)
. (4.17)
In the formulation of the theorem, one naturally can set T2 just equal to Tρ. With the
current formulation we allow for a little more flexibility, e.g., we allow to set T2 =
max{Tρ, T}, for a non-random T ∈ N. Furthermore, note that the theorem bears re-
semblance with Theorem 6 of Harrison et al. (2011b). A difference is that they restrict
to a linear demand function, Gaussian distributed noise terms, and a special class of
policies called “orthogonal policies”.
In Theorem 4.1, the choice L1(t) = ct2/3, for some c > 0, yields Regret(ψ, T) = O(T2/3).
This choice is optimal in the sense that for this choice of L1,
L1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
( log(t)
L1(t)
+
t
L1(t)2
)
= o
(
L˜1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
( log(t)
L˜1(t)
+
t
L˜1(t)2
))
,
for all L˜1 ∈ L such that L1 = o(L˜1) or L˜1 = o(L1).
The following theorem shows that the adaptive pricing policy ΦA from Section 4.3 sat-
isfies the conditions of Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the adaptive pricing policy ΦA, with L1(t) ≥ ctα for all t ≥ t0 and
some c > 0, α ∈ ( 12 , 1). There exist K2 ∈ N, ρ ∈ (0, ρ1] and a random variable T2, that satisfy
the conditions of Theorem 4.1.
4.4.2 Canonical link functions
The terms ∑Tt=1
(
log(t)
L1(t)
+ tL1(t)2
)
in the regret bound of Theorem 4.1, come from the
convergence rates in Proposition 4.3. These rates are valid for general functions hk and
vk. However, in several special cases, which are of particular practical interest, Theorem
7.3 shows that Proposition 4.3 can be improved to
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆk(t)− β(0)k ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>Tρ] = O (L1(t)−1 log(t)) . (4.18)
This is the case when the functions hk are canonical, which means h˙k(x) = vk(hk(x)), for
all x ∈ R, k = 1, . . . , n. Some examples where this occurs, are normally distributed de-
mand with hk(x) = x, Poisson distributed demand with hk(x) = exp(x), and Bernoulli
distributed demand with hk(x) =
exp(x)
1+exp(x) .
It is easy to see that, by slightly altering the proof of Theorem 4.1, these improved
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bounds (4.18) for canonical link functions imply
Regret(ψ, T) = O
(
L1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
L1(t)−1 log(t)
)
, (4.19)
assuming exactly the same conditions as in Theorem 4.1. The choice L1(t) = ct
1
2+δ,
for some c > 0 and small δ > 0, then implies Regret(ψ, T) = O(T
1
2+δ), which is a
substantial improvement to the rate T2/3 derived in Section 4.4.1.
However, one can show that the optimal choice that minimizes the right hand side of
(4.19), is L1(t) = c
√
t log(t), (c > 0). This choice is optimal in the following sense: if
L1(t) = c
√
t log(t) and L˜1 ∈ L is such that L1 = o(L˜1) or L˜1 = o(L1), then
L1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
L1(t)−1 log(t) = o
(
L˜1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
L˜1(t)−1 log(t)
)
.
The choice L1(t) = c
√
t log(t) does not satisfy the requirement in Proposition 4.3 that
L1 should grow at least as tα, for some α ∈ ( 12 , 1). This raises the question whether
this requirement can be weakened. We show that this is indeed the case; in particular,
we show that Proposition 4.3 is still valid if L1(t) ≥ c
√
t log(t), for a sufficiently large
c > 0. It then immediately follows that in Theorem 4.1, the choice L1(t) = c
√
t log(t)
with sufficiently large c, leads to Regret(T) = O(
√
T log(T)), when the link functions
are canonical.
Proposition 4.4 (Strong consistency and convergence rates). Suppose there are t0 ∈ N,
c > 0 such that L1(t) ≥ c
√
t log(t)) a.s. for all t ≥ t0. Then, for all sufficiently small ρ > 0
there exists a c∗ρ > 0, such that for all 0 < η <
γ−1
2 : Tρ < ∞ a.s. and E
[
Tηρ
]
< ∞, provided
c > c∗ρ . In addition, for all k = 1, . . . , n and t > Tρ, there exists a solution βˆk(t) to (4.7),
limt→∞ βˆk(t) = β
(0)
k a.s., and
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆk(t)− β(0)k ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>Tρ] = O (L1(t)−1 log(t)) .
The proof is based on Theorems 7.1 and 7.3, and on Proposition 4.5 contained in the next
section.
4.4.3 Auxiliary results
This section contains a number of auxiliary results that are needed to prove the regret
bounds in Section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
Proposition 4.5. Let (Xi)i∈N be a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. a filtration {Fi}i∈N.
Write Sn = ∑ni=1 Xi and suppose supi∈N E[X2i | Fi−1] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s. for some σ > 0. Let
η > 0, r > 2(η + 1), c > 2σ
√
η, and define the random variable T = sup{n ∈ N | |Sn| ≥
54 Chapter 4
c
√
n log(n)}, where T takes values in N ∪ {∞}. If supi∈N E [|Xi|r] ≤ C < ∞ for some
C > 0, then
T < ∞ a.s., and E [Tη ] < ∞.
A key ingredient to Proposition 4.5 is the following theorem. This was proven in Lai
(1974, Theorem 3) for i.i.d. random variables; we extend it to martingale difference se-
quences.
Theorem 4.3. Let (Xi)i∈N be a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. a filtration {Fi}i∈N.
Write Sn = ∑ni=1 Xi, and suppose supi∈N E[X2i | Fi−1] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s., for some σ > 0. Let
a > −1, p > 2(a + 2) and δ > σ√1+ a. If supi∈N E|Xi|p ≤ C < ∞ for some C > 0, then
∞
∑
n=1
naP
(
|Sn| > δ
√
2n log(n)
)
< ∞, (4.20)
∞
∑
n=1
naP
(
sup
1≤i≤n
|Si| > δ
√
2n log(n)
)
< ∞. (4.21)
The proof makes use of the following result, which is based on Stout (1970).
Lemma 4.1. Let (Xi)i∈N, Sn and σ2 be as in Theorem 4.3. If max1≤i≤n |Xi|/(σ
√
n) ≤ c a.s.,
for some c > 0, then for all 0 ≤ e ≤ c−1,
P
(
Sn > eσ
√
n
) ≤ exp(−(e2/2)(1− ec/2)).
The proof of Theorem 4.3 is not valid when δ < σ
√
1+ a. The method to proof Proposi-
tion 4.4 can therefore not easily be extended for all c∗ρ > 0.
4.4.4 Quality of regret bounds
The results from Section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 show that the adaptive pricing policy ΦA can
achieve a regret bound Regret(T) = O(T2/3) in the case of general link functions, and
Regret(T) = O(
√
T log(T)) in the case of canonical link functions. In this section, we
address the question how good these bounds are.
For canonical link functions, the rate
√
T log(T) is close to
√
T. In several (single prod-
uct) settings, it has been shown that
√
T is the best achievable upper bound on the
regret, (see e.g. Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003, Besbes and Zeevi, 2011, Broder and Rus-
mevichientong, 2012). Thus, apart from the
√
log(T) term, the adaptive pricing policy
achieves the optimal asymptotic growth rate of the regret. This raises the question if the√
log(T) term is only a result from the used proof-techniques, or that the regret really
grows at rate
√
T log(T).
The term
√
log(T) can be traced back to two sources: Proposition 4.5 and Proposition
7.2. Proposition 4.5 is a building block to prove that for sufficiently large t, a solution to
the likelihood equations exists in a neighborhood of β(0). It considers random variables
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of the form T = sup{n ∈ N | |Sn| ≥ c
√
n log(n)}, where Sn is a martingale and c > 0,
and discusses finiteness of moments of T. Clearly, the
√
log(n) term cannot be removed
here, since martingales Sn for which sup{n ∈ N | |Sn| ≥ c
√
n} = ∞ a.s. are easily
constructed. The second source of the
√
log(T) term is Proposition 7.2, where bounds
are derived on the expected squared norm of the difference between a least-squares
estimate and the true parameter. Similar to Lai and Wei (1982), a log(t) term appears
in the equations. An example provided by Nassiri-Toussi and Ren (1994) shows that
at least in some instances, the log(t) term is present in the asymptotic behavior of the
estimates. This implies that Proposition 7.2 is sharp, in the sense that the log(t)-term
cannot be removed. However, in this chapter we deal with a particular pricing policy,
and it is unclear if this log(t)-term plays a role in the convergence rates of the estimators
induced by our pricing policy.
For general link functions, our adaptive pricing policy ΦA can achieve Regret(T2/3).
The gap with
√
T is caused by the bounds on the estimation error in Proposition 4.3.
These bounds are based on Theorem 7.2, where for maximum quasi-likelihood estima-
tion with general link functions and adaptive design, mean square error bounds are
derived of the form
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆ(t)− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2] = O( log(t)
L1(t)
+
t
L1(t)L2(t)
)
. (4.22)
Here L2(t) is a non-random lower bound on the one-but-smallest eigenvalue of P(t).
The term tL1(t)L2(t) is not present if the link functions are canonical, cf. Proposition 4.4,
and essentially causes the difference between the regret bounds for general and for
canonical link functions. It is not clear if the bounds (4.22) are tight. But, a notewor-
thy recent study by Yin et al. (2008) considering maximum quasi-likelihood estimation
with adaptive design, general link functions, and multivariate response data, provides
convergence rates that, in case of bounded design, imply∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆ(t)− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 = o( t
λmin(t)2
log(t)(log(log(t)))1+2δ
)
a.s., for any δ > 0,
where λmin(t) denotes the smallest eigenvalue of P(t). These bounds are even slightly
worse than the (4.22). The question on tight bounds on the convergence rates of max-
imum quasi-likelihood estimates with general link functions and adaptive design, re-
mains an open question.
4.5 Numerical illustration
In this section we provide two numerical illustrations of the proposed adaptive pricing
policyΦA. The first considers two products with Poisson distributed demand, and non-
canonical link functions. The second is a larger instance, with ten products, normally
distributed demand, and canonical link functions.
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4.5.1 Two products, Poisson distributed demand
Consider two products with Poisson distributed demand, with expectation
E[D1(p1, p2)] = 11.5− 1.25p1 + 0.34p2,
E[D2(p1, p2)] = 10.22+ 0.25p1 − 1.55p2.
The lowest and highest admissible price are set to pl = (1, 3, 3)T and ph = (1, 7, 7)T , and
the three linearly independent initial prices are p1 = (1, 3.0, 6.7)T , p2 = (1, 3.3, 3.1)T ,
p3 = (1, 6.7, 6.8)T . The optimal price is popt = (1, 5.63, 4.37)T , with expected revenue
54.7. We apply the adaptive pricing policy ΦA with L1(t) = 0.2 · t2/3.
The plots in Figure 4.1 show a sample path of the price dispersion tr(P(t)−1)−1 di-
vided by t2/3, the squared norm ||βˆ(t) − β(0)||2 of the difference between the param-
eter estimates and the true parameter, Regret(t), and Regret(t)/t2/3. These pictures
illustrate our analytical results that tr(P(t)−1)−1 ≥ 0.2t2/3 for all sufficiently large t,
limt→∞ ||βˆ(t)− β(0)||2 = 0, and Regret(t) = O(t2/3).
Figure 4.1: Numerical results for Section 4.5.1
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4.5.2 Ten products, normally distributed demand
We here consider a large instance, with ten products. The demand for each product k is
normally distributed with expectation and variance given by
E[Dk(p)] = β
(0)
k0 + β
(0)
k1 p1 + . . . + β
(0)
kn pn, (k = 1, . . . , n),
Var[Dk(p)] = σ2k , (k = 1, . . . , n),
where β(0) is equal to
(β
(0)
kl )k=1..n,l=0..n =

16.32 −3.10 0.10 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.16
19.57 0.11 −3.40 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03
17.10 0.03 0.09 −2.49 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.17
17.70 0.10 0.02 0.10 −2.37 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.15
18.04 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.11 −2.22 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.16
19.13 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.01 −2.55 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.11
18.12 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.07 −2.02 0.07 0.13 0.04
15.88 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.00 −3.26 0.13 0.18
17.96 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.19 −2.59 0.12
17.45 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.18 −2.37

and
(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
10)
T =

0.55
0.64
0.61
0.64
0.74
0.77
0.92
0.99
0.52
0.62

.
The eleven linearly independent initial prices p(1), . . . , p(11) are set to
p(1) =

1
18.59
1.81
13.09
6.11
19.32
4.23
10.65
13.27
15.64
1.76

,p(2) =

1
4.48
1.33
5.34
9.26
10.75
14.18
1.23
14.06
18.87
8.36

, p(3) =

1
19.04
18.34
19.61
18.98
11.24
10.47
6.34
14.4
18.44
18.63

,p(4) =

1
15.04
3.17
14.61
5.79
16.51
17.67
1.49
9.14
17.78
14.32

, p(5) =

1
14.3
4.99
11.79
2.33
3.02
8.18
4.65
7.45
1.31
2.81

,p(6) =

1
9.7
7.76
4.82
5.46
11.88
16.83
17.51
2.94
10.28
5.81

,
p(7) =

1
13.06
1.47
2.86
12.06
16.61
5.18
10.57
4.46
5.67
6.66

,p(8) =

1
19.74
6.61
2.92
16.96
17.55
16.34
19.51
14.3
19.51
10.18

, p(9) =

1
9.45
18.81
2.26
2.28
4.1
12.21
1.62
11.14
19.42
10.5

,p(10) =

1
2.1
17.23
10.77
7.21
10.89
13.56
7.34
11.81
9.82
13.74

, p(11) =

1
3.8
7.1
3.15
6.73
2.26
9.05
6.5
5.31
12.12
7.51

.
The lowest and highest admissible price are set to pl = (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1)T and ph =
(1, 20, 20, . . . , 20)T . The optimal expected revenue equals 381.9, and the optimal price
is equal to popt = (1.00, 5.09, 3.73, 5.23, 3.68, 3.63, 6.90, 3.89, 3.58, 3.51, 4.56)T . We apply
the adaptive pricing policy ΦA with L1(t) = 0.05
√
t log(t).
The plots in Figure 4.2 illustrate our results that tr(P(t)−1)−1 ≥ 0.05√t log(t) for all
sufficiently large t, limt→∞ ||βˆ(t)− β(0)||2 = 0, and Regret(t) = O(
√
t log(t)).
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Figure 4.2: Numerical results for Section 4.5.2
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4.6 Proofs
4.6.1 Proofs of Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Let t > n + 1 and assume (4.12) and (4.13). Let λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λn+1 > 0 be the eigenvalues
of P(t), and let v1, . . . , vn+1 be associated eigenvectors. Since P(t) is symmetric, we can
assume that v1, . . . , vn+1 form an orthonormal basis of Rn+1.
Choose some φ = (φ0, φ1, . . . , φn) ∈ int(P) and r ∈ (0, 1), such that {(p0, p1, . . . , pn) ∈
Rn+1 | p0 = 1, supk=1,...,n |pk − φk| ≤ r} ⊂ P , and let φ = ∑n+1i=1 αivi expressed in the
basis induced by the eigenvectors. Define q = φ+ e(vn+1,1φ− vn+1), where e is chosen
such that
|e| = min
k=1,...,n
r(1+ φk)−1,
and
e ≥ 0 if αn+1 ≤ 0, e < 0 if αn+1 > 0.
Note that e2 is independent of t (but sign(e) is not). We choose T0 ∈N such that
L˙1(t) ≤ e2(n + 1)−2
(
1+ L1(n + 1)−1 max
p∈P
||p||2
)−1
,
for all t ≥ T0. The existence of such a T0 follows from L˙1(t) = o(1).
Now q0 = 1, and for all k = 1, . . . , n,
|qk − φk| = |e||(vn+1,1φk − vn+1,k)| ≤ |e|(φk + 1) ≤ r,
since |vn+1,i| ≤ 1 for all i. By construction of φ and r, this implies q ∈ P .
Observe
qT P(t)−1q ≤ λmax(P(t)−1) ||q||2 = λmin(P(t))−1 ||q||2
≤ L1(t)−1 ||q||2 ≤ L1(n + 1)−1 max
p∈P
||p||2 .
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Furthermore,∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1q∣∣∣∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1
(
n
∑
i=1
(1+ evn+1,1)αivi + ((1+ evn+1,1)αn+1 − e)vn+1
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑i=1(1+ evn+1,1)αiλ−1i vi + ((1+ evn+1,1)αn+1 − e)λ−1n+1vn+1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
n
∑
i=1
(1+ evn+1,1)2α2i λ
−2
i + ((1+ evn+1,1)αn+1 − e)2λ−2n+1
≥ ((1+ evn+1,1)αn+1 − e)2λ−2n+1
≥ ((1+ evn+1,1)αn+1 − e)2(n + 1)−2L1(t + 1)−2,
since
λn+1 ≤ (n + 1)tr(P(t)−1)−1 ≤ (n + 1)tr
((
P(t) + p(βˆ(t))p(βˆ(t))T
)−1)−1
< (n + 1)L1(t + 1).
Note that |e| < 1 and thus 1+ evn+1,1 ≥ 0. By choice of the sign of e it follows that
((1+ evn+1,1)αn+1 − e)2 ≥ (1+ evn+1,1)2α2n+1 + e2 ≥ e2,
and thus ∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1q∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≥ e2(n + 1)−2L1(t + 1)−2. (4.23)
The definition of T0 implies that for t ≥ T0,∣∣∣∣P(t)−1q∣∣∣∣2
1+ qT P(t)−1q
≥ e
2(n + 1)−2L1(t + 1)−2
1+ L1(n + 1)−1 maxp∈P ||p||2
≥ L˙1(t)
L1(t + 1)2
.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
In IIa) and IIb) of the pricing policy, a decision is made only for the next price p(t+ 1). In
I) and IIc), decisions are made for a number of forthcoming periods: prices p(1), p(2), . . .
are repeated in periods t+ 1, t+ 2, . . ., until tr(P(t+ j)−1) ≥ L1(t+ j), in I), or until (4.11)
has a feasible solution, in IIc). By Proposition 4.1, IIc) does not occur for t ≥ T0.
In addition, since prices are merely repeated in I), and tr(P(ct)−1)−1 = ctr(P(t)−1)−1
for all c ∈ N, and L(t) = o(t), it follows that the j in I) has to be finite. This implies the
existence of a T1 ≥ T0 such that tr(P(T1)−1)−1 ≥ L1(T1).
4.6 Proofs 61
From the assumption limt→∞ L˙1(t) = 0 one can derive that there exists a CL ∈ N such
that L1(CLt) ≤ CLL1(t) for all t ∈N.
We now show for all t ≥ T1 that if tr
(
P(t)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t), then the following holds:
1) If βˆk(t) does not exist for some k, then
tr
(
P(t + j)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t + j) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ (CL − 1)t,
and
tr
(
P(t + i)−1
)−1 ≥ C−1L L1(t + i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j;
2) If βˆk(t) exists for all k, then
tr
(
P(t + 1)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t + 1). (4.24)
1) First suppose that tr
(
P(t)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t), and βˆk(t) does not exist for some k. Then
by I) in the adaptive pricing policy ΦA, p(t + i) = p(i), for i = 1, . . . , j, for some j ∈ N,
where j is the smallest number such that tr
(
P(t + j)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t + j). From
tr
(
P(CLt)−1
)−1
= CLtr
(
P(t)−1
)−1 ≥ CLL1(t) ≥ L1(CLt)
follows that j ≤ (CL − 1)t. Moreover, for all t + i, i = 1, . . . , j it holds that
tr
(
P(t + i)−1
)−1 ≥ tr (P(t)−1)−1 ≥ L1(t) ≥ C−1L L1(CLt) ≥ C−1L L1(t + i).
Thus, if tr
(
P(t)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t), then there is a 1 ≤ j ≤ (CL − 1)t such that for all
1 ≤ i < j, tr (P(t + j)−1)−1 ≥ L1(t + j) and tr (P(t + i)−1)−1 ≥ C−1L L1(t + i).
2) Now suppose that tr
(
P(t)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t), and βˆk(t) does exist for all k. The case (4.10)
is trivial; suppose that (4.10) does not hold. Then p(t + 1) is determined by IIb). The
Sherman-Morrison formula (Bartlett, 1951),
(A + uvT)−1 = A−1 − A
−1uvT A−1
1+ vT A−1u
,
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applied to A = P(t), u = v = p(t + 1), implies
tr
(
P(t) + p(t + 1)pT(t + 1)
)−1
)
=tr(P(t)−1)− tr((P(t)
−1p(t + 1))(P(t)−1p(t + 1))T)
1+ p(t + 1)P(t)−1p(t + 1)
=tr(P(t)−1)−
∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p(t + 1)∣∣∣∣2
1+ p(t + 1)P(t)−1p(t + 1)
≤ 1
L1(t)
+
∂
∂t
1
L1(t)
.
By a Taylor expansion it follows that 1L1(t+1) =
1
L1(t)
+ ∂∂t
1
L1(t)
∣∣∣
t=t˜
, for some t˜ between t
and t + 1. Since t 7→ 1L1(t) is convex,
1
L1(t)
+ ∂∂t
1
L1(t)
≤ 1L1(t+1) and thus
tr
(
P(t) + p(t + 1)pT(t + 1)
)−1
)−1 ≥ L1(t + 1).
4.6.2 Proofs of Section 4.4.1
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Since p(β(0)) ∈ int(P), it follows that ∂r(p,β(0))∂pk = 0 in the point popt, for all k = 1, . . . , n.
A Taylor series expansion of p 7→ r(p, β(0)) then implies
r(popt, β(0))− r(p, β(0)) ≤
(
sup
p∈P
|λmax(∇2r(p, β(0))|
)
· ∣∣∣∣popt − p∣∣∣∣2 , (4.25)
for all p ∈ P .
By assumption, there exists an open neighborhood V of β(0) in Rn×(n+1), such that for
all β ∈ V, there is a unique optimal price p(β), for which the matrix (4.5) of second
partial derivatives w.r.t. p1, . . . , pn exists and is negative definite in the point (p(β), β).
It follows from the implicit function theorem (see e.g. Duistermaat and Kolk, 2004) that
V can be chosen such that the function β 7→ p(β) is continuously differentiable with
bounded derivatives. Then, by a Taylor expansion,∣∣∣∣∣∣p(β)− p(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K1 ∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
for all β ∈ V and some non-random constant K1 > 0. By choice of ρ1, βˆ(t) ∈ V for all
t > Tρ, and since T2 ≥ Tρ a.s. we obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣p(β(0))− p(βˆ(t))∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>T2 ≤ K1 ∣∣∣∣∣∣β(0) − βˆ(t)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>T2 a.s.
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We have
E
[
T
∑
t=t0
∣∣∣∣p(t)− popt∣∣∣∣2]
≤E
[
T
∑
t=t0
∣∣∣∣p(t)− popt∣∣∣∣2 1t>T2
]
+ E
[
T
∑
t=t0
∣∣∣∣p(t)− popt∣∣∣∣2 1t≤T2
]
≤2E
[
T
∑
t=t0
∣∣∣∣p(t)− p(βˆ(t− 1))∣∣∣∣2 1t>T2
]
+ 2E
[
T
∑
t=t0
∣∣∣∣p(βˆ(t− 1))− popt∣∣∣∣2 1t>T2
]
+E
[
T
∑
t=t0
∣∣∣∣p(t)− popt∣∣∣∣2 1t≤T2
]
≤2K2L1(T) + 2K1E
[
T
∑
t=t0
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆ(t− 1)− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>T2
]
+
T
∑
t=t0
max
q,q′∈P
∣∣∣∣q− q′∣∣∣∣2 P (t ≤ T2)
=O
(
L1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
(
L1(t)−1 log(t) + tL1(t)−2 + E
[
T1/22
]
t−1/2
))
.
Since ∑Tt=1 E
[
T1/22
]
t−1/2 = O(T1/2) = o(L1(T)), it follows by (4.25) that
Regret(T) = O
(
L1(T) +
T
∑
t=1
(
L1(t)−1 log(t) + tL1(t)−2
))
.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Since (i) of Theorem 4.1 follows from Proposition 4.2 and (4.8), it suffices to show
||p(t)− p(βˆ(t− 1))||21t>T2 ≤ K2 L˙1(t)1t>T2 a.s., for appropriately chosen K2 and T2 and
all t ∈N. Because ∑Tt=1 L˙1(t) = O(L1(T)), this implies (ii).
Choose any ρ ∈ (0, ρ1), let CL, T1 be as in Proposition 4.2, and set
T2 = max{CLTρ, T1, T3, T4},
where T3, T4 are non-random constants specified below. Clearly, E
[
Tη2
]
< ∞ if and only
if E
[
Tηρ
]
< ∞, for all η > 0, and thus E
[
Tη2
]
< ∞ for all 0 < η < γα− 1. In particular,
α > 12 and γ > 3 implies E
[
T1/22
]
< ∞.
T2 is chosen such that I) and IIc) of the pricing policy, do not occur for t ≥ T2. For
IIc) this follows from T2 ≥ T1 ≥ T0, together with Proposition 4.1. For I), note that
since tr(P(T1)−1)−1 ≥ L1(T1) is shown in the proof of Proposition 4.2, and since T2 ≥
max{CLTρ, T1}, it suffices to show tr(P(CLTρ)−1)−1 ≥ L1(CLTρ). This follows since
tr(P(Tρ + j)−1)−1 ≥ L1(Tρ + j) must hold for some 1 ≤ j ≤ (CL − 1)Tρ, cf. the proof of
Proposition 4.2.
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Let β ∈ V be arbitrary. The uniqueness of the maximum p(β), together with compact-
ness of P , imply that there is a neighborhood Uβ ⊂ P of p(β), such that r(p1, β) >
r(p2, β) for all p1 ∈ Uβ, p2 ∈ P\Uβ. For all β ∈ V, choose Uβ such that
l = inf
β∈V
inf
p∈Uβ
λmin(∇2r(p)) > 0,
L = sup
β∈V
sup
p∈Uβ
λmax(∇2r(p)) < ∞;
in view of (4.5), this is always possible.
Now, fix t > T2; then βˆ(t) ∈ V. For any p′ ∈ Uβˆ(t) that is a feasible solution of (4.11), we
have r(p(t + 1), βˆ(t)) ≥ r(p′(βˆ(t)), βˆ(t)), both in case IIa) and IIb), and thus p(t + 1) ∈
Uβˆ(t). A Taylor expansion yields
r(p(βˆ(t)), βˆ(t))− r(p(t + 1), βˆ(t))
=
1
2
(p(t + 1)− p(βˆ(t)))T∇2r(p˜1, βˆ(t))(p(t + 1)− p(βˆ(t)))
≥ l
2
∣∣∣∣p(t + 1)− p(βˆ(t))∣∣∣∣2
and
r(p(βˆ(t)), βˆ(t))− r(p′, βˆ(t)) = 1
2
(p′ − p(βˆ(t)))T∇2r(p˜2, βˆ(t))(p′ − p(βˆ(t)))
≤ L
2
∣∣∣∣p′ − p(βˆ(t))∣∣∣∣2 ,
for some p˜1, p˜2 ∈ Uβˆ(t), and consequently,∣∣∣∣p(t + 1)− p(βˆ(t))∣∣∣∣2 ≤ 2l−1 [r(p(βˆ(t)), βˆ(t))− r(p(t + 1), βˆ(t))]
≤ 2l−1 [r(p(βˆ(t)), βˆ(t))− r(p′, βˆ(t))]
≤ l−1L ∣∣∣∣p′ − p(βˆ(t))∣∣∣∣2 .
Assertion (ii) of Theorem 4.1 thus follows if for all t > T2, there exists a p′ ∈ Uβˆ(t)
which is a feasible solution of (4.11), such that ||p′ − p(βˆ(t))||2 ≤ K3 L˙1(t) for some
K3 > 0 independent of βˆt, t. If p(t + 1) = p(βˆ(t)), then this holds trivially by choosing
p′ = p(βˆ(t)); assume therefore that p(t + 1) is determined by (4.11).
Let C0 > 2, and
T3 = sup
{
t ∈N | there exists a β ∈ V and p ∈ R
n+1\Uβ,
such that ||p(β)− p||2 ≤ C20 L˙1(t)(1+maxp∈P ||p||2)
}
,
T4 = sup{t ∈N | C20 L˙1(t) > 1 or L1(t + 1) >
C0
2
L1(t)}.
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It follows from L˙1(t) = o(1) that T3 and T4 are finite.
Let λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λn+1 be the eigenvalues of P(t), and v1, . . . , vn+1 the corresponding
normalized eigenvectors. Note that all eigenvalues are real and positive. Since P(t) is
symmetric we can choose the eigenvectors such that they form an orthonormal basis.
Let p(βˆ(t)) = ∑n+1i=1 αivi be p(βˆ(t)) expressed in the orthonormal basis of eigenvectors.
Choose C such that |C| = C0, and
sign(C) =
{
1 if αn+1(vn+1,1αn+1 − 1) = 0,
sign
(
αn+1
vn+1,1αn+1−1
)
otherwise,
where vn+1,1 is the first component of vn+1. Let
p′ = p(βˆ(t)) +
√
L˙1(t)C(vn+1,1p(βˆ(t))− vn+1)
Suppose p′ /∈ Uβˆ(t). Note that since ||vn+1|| ≤ 1 and
∣∣∣∣p(βˆ(t))∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxp∈P ||p||,∣∣∣∣p(βˆ(t))− p′∣∣∣∣2 = C20 L˙1(t) ∣∣∣∣vn+1,1p(βˆ(t))− vn+1∣∣∣∣2 ≤ C20 L˙1(t)(1+maxp∈P ||p||2).
Since t > T3, this is a contradiction, and thus p′ ∈ Uβˆ(t).
We now show that p′ satisfies the constraint in (4.11). Observe that
p′T P(t)−1p′ ≤ λmax(P(t)−1)
∣∣∣∣p′∣∣∣∣2 ≤ λmin(P(t))−1 max
p∈P
||p||2
≤ tr(P(t)−1)max
p∈P
||p||2
≤ L1(n + 1)−1 max
p∈P
||p||2 (4.26)
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and ∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p′∣∣∣∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1
(
n+1
∑
i=1
αivi +
√
L˙1(t)Cvn+1,1
(
n+1
∑
i=1
αivi
)
−
√
L˙1(t)Cvn+1
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1
 (αn+1 +√L˙1(t)Cvn+1,1αn+1 −√L˙1(t)C)vn+1
+∑ni=1(1+
√
L˙1(t)Cvn+1,1)αivi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (αn+1 +
√
L˙1(t)Cvn+1,1αn+1 −
√
L˙1(t)C)λ−1n+1vn+1
+∑ni=1(1+
√
L˙1(t)Cvn+1,1)αiλ−1i vi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= (αn+1 +
√
L˙1(t)Cvn+1,1αn+1 −
√
L˙1(t)C)2λ−2n+1
+
n
∑
i=1
(1+
√
L˙1(t)Cvn+1,1)2α2i λ
−2
i
≥ (αn+1 + C
√
L˙1(t)(vn+1,1αn+1 − 1))2λ−2n+1
≥ (αn+1 + C
√
L˙1(t)(vn+1,1αn+1 − 1))2tr(P(t)−1)2,
and thus ∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p′∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≥ (αn+1 + C√L˙1(t)(vn+1,1αn+1 − 1))2L1(t + 1)−2. (4.27)
By construction of C,∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p′∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≥ (α2n+1 + C2 L˙1(t)(vn+1,1αn+1 − 1)2)L1(t + 1)−2. (4.28)
If |vn+1,1αn+1 − 1| ≥ 1/2, then∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p′∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≥ 1
4
C2 L˙1(t)L1(t + 1)−2.
If |vn+1,1αn+1 − 1| < 1/2, then vn+1,1 6= 0, and vn+1,1αn+1 > 1/2; since vn+1,1 ≤ 1 it
then follows that α2n+1 > (1/4)v
−2
n+1,1 ≥ 1/4 . We then also have∣∣∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p′∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≥ α2n+1L1(t + 1)−2 ≥ 14 C20 L˙1(t)L1(t + 1)−2, (4.29)
since C20 L˙1(t) ≤ 1 for t > T2 ≥ T4.
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Using L1(t + 1) ≤ C02 L1(t) for t > T4, we have∣∣∣∣P(t)−1p′∣∣∣∣2
1+ p′T P(t)−1p′
≥
1
4 C
2
0 L˙1(t)L1(t + 1)
−2
1+ L1(n + 1)−1 maxp∈P ||p||2
≥ L˙1(t)
L1(t)2
.
4.6.3 Proofs of Section 4.4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.4
The assertions on Tρ are proven in Theorem 7.1, under the assumption L1(n) ≥ cnα, for
some c > 0, 12 < α ≤ 1, n0 ∈ N and all n ≥ n0. The proof of that theorem considers
last-time variables of the form
TA[i] = sup{n ≥ n0 | ρ−1 An[i]− 1d+2d2 (c2/2)L1(n)},
TB[i,j] = sup{n ≥ n0 | Bn[i, j]− 1d+2d2 (c2/2)L1(n)},
TJ[i,j] = sup{n ≥ n0 | ρJn[i, j]− 1d+2d2 (c2/2)L1(n)},
(4.30)
where (An[i])n∈N, (Bn[i, j])n∈N, and (Jn[i, j])n∈N are martingales with square-integrable
differences. It is shown that these last-times are a.s. finite and have finite η-moments,
using Proposition 7.1 which considers these properties for general last-times of the form
T = sup{n ∈N | |Sn| ≥ cnα},
for a martingale Sn and constants c > 0, 12 < α ≤ 1.
In the current Proposition, the assertions Tρ < ∞ a.s. and E
[
Tηρ
]
< ∞ follow exactly as
in Theorem 7.1, with the difference that we apply Proposition 4.5 instead of Proposition
7.1 on the last-times (4.30). In particular, for fixed ρ > 0, let σC > 0 such that
σC ≥ ρ−1 max
1≤i≤d
{sup
n∈N
E
[
(An[i]− An−1[i])2 | Fn−1
]
},
σC ≥ max
1≤i,j≤d
{sup
n∈N
E
[
(Bn[i, j]− Bn−1[i, j])2 | Fn−1
]
},
σC ≥ ρ max
1≤i,j≤d
{sup
n∈N
E
[
(Jn[i, j]− Jn−1[i, j])2 | Fn−1
]
}.
Furthermore, define c2 = infp∈P ,β∈Bρ h˙(pTβ) (cf. the definition of c2 in (7.7)), and let
c∗ρ = d+2d
2
(c2/2)
· 2σC√η.
Proposition 4.5 implies that the last-times
TA[i] = sup{n ≥ n0 | ρ−1 An[i]− 1d+2d2 (c2/2)c
√
n log(n)},
TB[i,j] = sup{n ≥ n0 | Bn[i, j]− 1d+2d2 (c2/2)c
√
n log(n)},
TJ[i,j] = sup{n ≥ n0 | ρJn[i, j]− 1d+2d2 (c2/2)c
√
n log(n)},
(4.31)
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are all finite a.s., with finite η-th moment, provided c > c∗ρ and 0 < η <
γ−1
2 .
The asymptotic existence, strong consistency, and mean square bounds for βˆk(t), follow
directly from Theorems 7.2 and 7.3.
4.6.4 Proofs of Section 4.4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Let 0 < c′ < c such that c′ > 2σ√η. There exists an n′ ∈N such that for all n > n′,
c
√
(n/2) log(n/2)−
√
2σ2n ≥ c′
√
(n/2) log(n/2).
For all n > n′,
P (T > n) = P
(
∃k > n : |Sk| ≥ c
√
k log(k)
)
≤ ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
∃2j−1 ≤ k < 2j : |Sk| ≥ c
√
k log(k)
)
≤ ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
sup
1≤k≤2j
|Sk| ≥ c
√
2j−1 log(2j−1)
)
(1)
≤ 2 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c
√
2j−1 log(2j−1)−
√
2σ22j
)
(2)
≤ 2 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c′
√
2j−1 log(2j−1)
)
,
where (1) follows from Lemma 7.4, and (2) from the definition of n′.
By Chebyshev’s and Rosenthal’s inequality (see e.g. Hall and Heyde, 1980, Theorem
2.12), there is a C2 > 0 such that for all k > e, c > 0,
P
(
|Sk| ≥ c
√
k log(k)
)
≤ E [|Sk|r] c−rk−r/2(log(k))−r/2
≤ C2
(
(σ2k)r/2 + k sup
i∈N
E [|Xi|r]
)
c−rk−r/2(log(k))−r/2
≤ (C2σp + C2C) c−r(log(k))−r/2.
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Consequently,
2 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c′
√
2j−1 log(2j−1)
)
≤2 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|S2j | ≥
√
j− 1√
2j
c′
√
2j log(2j)
)
≤2 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
Kj−r/2 < ∞,
for some K > 0, and thus P (T = ∞) ≤ lim infn→∞ P(T > n) = 0. This proves T < ∞
a.s.
For t ∈ R+ write St = Sbtc. Then
∑
j≥log2(n)
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c′
√
2j−1 log(2j−1)
)
(4.32)
=
∫
j≥log2(n)
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c′
√
j− 1√
2j
√
2j log(2j)
)
dj (4.33)
=
∫
k≥n
P
(
|Sk| ≥ c′
√
1
2
− log(2)
2 log(k)
√
k log(k)
)
1
k log(2)
dk (4.34)
≤ ∑
k≥n
P
(
|Sk| ≥ c′
√
1
2
− log(2)
2 log(n′)
√
k log(k)
)
1
k log(2)
, (4.35)
using a variable substitution k = 2j. Since
E[Tη ] ≤ η
[
1+ ∑
n≥1
nη−1P(T > n)
]
≤ η
[
1+ n′max{1, (n′)η−1}+ ∑
n>n′
nη−1P(T > n)
]
≤ M ∑
n>n′
nη−1 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|Sk| ≥ c′
√
1
2
− log(2)
2 log(n′)
√
k log(k)
)
k−1,
for some constant M > 0, it follows that E[Tη ] < ∞ if
∑
n≥1
nη−1 ∑
k≥n
P
(
|Sk| ≥ δ
√
2k log(k)
)
k−1 < ∞,
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where we write δ = c′
√
1
4 − log(2)4 log(n′) . By interchanging the sums, it suffices to show
∑
k≥1
kη−1P
(
|Sk| ≥ δ
√
2k log(k)
)
< ∞. (4.36)
We can choose n′ sufficiently large such that δ > σ√η. Then (4.36) follows from Theo-
rem 4.3 with a = η − 1
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Apply Lemma 1 of Stout (1970) on the sequence
(
Xi
σ
√
n
)
1≤i≤n
, with l = 0. Then for all
0 ≤ λc ≤ 1,
1 ≥ E[exp(λSn/(σ
√
n)) exp(−(λ2/2)(1+ λc/2)
[
n
∑
i=1
E[X2i | Fi−1]
]
/(σ2n))]
≥ E[exp(λSn/(σ
√
n)) exp(−(λ2/2)(1+ λc/2)].
For 0 ≤ e ≤ c−1, we thus have
P
(
Sn/(σ
√
n) ≥ e) ≤ E [exp(λSn/(σ√n))]
exp(λe)
≤ exp((λ2/2)(1+ λc/2)− λe).
Take λ = e to prove the assertion.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
The proof of Theorem 4.3 uses the concepts median and symmetrization. For a random
variable Y, the symmetrization Ys of Y is defined as Ys = Y − Y′, where Y′ is indepen-
dent of Y and has the same distribution. A median med(Y) of Y is a scalar m ∈ R such
that P(Y ≥ m) ≥ 12 ≤ P(Y ≤ m). A median always exists, but is not necessarily unique.
Moreover, if E[Y] < ∞ then |med(Y)− E[Y]| ≤ √2Var(Y) (Loève, 1977a, 18.1.a).
The first step in the proof is to bound the tail-probabilities P(Sn > δ
√
2n log(n)) in
terms of symmetrized random variables. To this end, choose δ1 ∈ (σ
√
1+ a, δ) and
n1 ∈ N such that δ
√
2n log(n) −
√
2σ2n ≥ δ1
√
2n log(n) for all n ≥ n1. The weak
symmetrization inequalities (Loève, 1977a, 18.1.A(i)) state that P(Y −med(Y) ≥ e) ≤
2P(Ys ≥ e) for any random variable Y and all e > 0. Since E [Sn] = 0 and Var(Sn) ≤ σ2n
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for all n ∈N, it follows that for all n ≥ n1,
P(Sn > δ
√
2n log(n)) ≤ P(Sn −med(Sn) > δ
√
2n log(n)−
√
2σ2n)
≤ 2P(Ssn > δ
√
2n log(n)−
√
2σ2n)
≤ 2P(Ssn > δ1
√
2n log(n)). (4.37)
As a next step, we consider a truncation of Ssn. In particular, for all i ∈ N, write X˜si =
Xsi 1|Xsi |≤g(i), where g(i) = σ
2κδ−11
√
i/
√
2 log(i) and 0 < κ < 1 is specified below, and
write S˜sn = ∑
n
i=1 X˜
s
i . Define T6= = sup{i ∈ N | Xsi 6= X˜si } = sup{i ∈ N | |Xsi | > g(i)}.
Then
∞
∑
n=1
naP
(
Ssn > δ1
√
2n log(n)
)
(4.38)
≤
∞
∑
n=1
naP
(
Ssn > δ1
√
2n log(n), n > T6=
)
+
∞
∑
n=1
naP
(
n ≤ T6=
)
. (4.39)
If n > T6= then Ssn = S˜sn + (SsT6= − S˜sT6=). Let δ2 ∈ (σ
√
1+ a, δ1) and n2 ∈ N such that
δ1
√
2n log(n)− (SsT − S˜sT) ≥ δ2
√
2n log(n) for all n ≥ max{T, n2}. Then
P(Ssn > δ1
√
2n log(n), n > T6=) = P(S˜sn > δ1
√
2n log(n)− (SsT − S˜sT), n > T6=)
≤ P(S˜sn > δ2
√
2n log(n)).
Note that (X˜si )i∈N is a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. {Fi}i∈N, with
supi∈N E[(X˜si )
2 | Fi−1] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s.
Let en = σ−1δ2
√
2 log(n), choose κ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ2 > (1− κ2 )−1/2σ
√
1+ a, and
set cn = κe−1n . Then 0 ≤ encn = κ ≤ 1 and max1≤i≤n |X˜si | ≤ g(n) ≤ σ
√
ncn, using
δ−11 ≤ δ−12 . By Lemma 4.1,
P
(
S˜sn > δ2
√
2n log(n)
)
= P
(
S˜sn > enσ
√
n
) ≤ exp(−(e2n/2)(1− encn/2))
= exp
(
− δ
2
2
σ2
(
1− κ
2
)
log(n)
)
.
Since δ2 > (1− κ2 )−1/2σ
√
1+ a, we have −1 > a− δ22σ−2(1− κ2 ) and thus
∞
∑
n=1
naP
(
S˜sn > δ2
√
2n log(n))
)
= O
(
∞
∑
n=1
na−δ
2
2σ
−2(1−κ/2)
)
< ∞ a.s. (4.40)
This proves that the first term of the right hand side of (4.38) is finite a.s.
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For the second term, we have
∞
∑
n=1
naP(T6= ≥ n) =
∞
∑
n=1
naP (∃k ≥ n : |Xk|/g(k) > 1)
≤
∞
∑
n=1
na ∑
j≥blog(2)(n)c
P
(
∃2j ≤ k < 2j+1 : |Xk|/g(k) > 1
)
≤
∞
∑
n=1
na ∑
j≥blog(2)(n)c
P
(
sup
1≤k≤2j+1
|Xk| > g(2j+1)
)
≤
∞
∑
n=1
na ∑
j≥blog(2)(n)c
C
g(2j+1)p
, (4.41)
by Doob’s inequality for martingales. Furthermore,
∑
j≥blog2(n)c
1
g(2j+1)p
= O
(∫ ∞
log(2)(n)
1
(σ2δ−11 κ)p(2j+1)p/2(log(2j+1))−p/2
dj
)
= O
(∫ ∞
2n
1
kp/2(log(k))−p/2
· 1
k
dk
)
= O
(
n1−p/2(log(n))p/2
)
.
where we applied a change of variables k = 2j+1. Combining this with (4.41), it follows
from the assumption p > 2(a + 2) that
∞
∑
n=1
naP(T6= ≥ n) = O
(
∞
∑
n=1
na+1−p/2(log(n))p/2
)
< ∞. (4.42)
It follows from (4.37), (4.38), (4.40) and (4.42) that
∞
∑
n=1
naP(Sn > δ
√
2n log(n)) < ∞.
By replacing Xi and Si with −Xi and −Si in the proof, (4.20) follows. For (4.21), choose
δ3 ∈ (σ
√
1+ a, δ), and let n3 ∈ N such that δ3
√
2n log(n) ≤ δ√2n log(n)−√2σ2n for
all n ≥ n3. Then for all n ≥ n3,
P
(
sup
1≤i≤n
|Si| > δ
√
2n log(n)
)
≤ 2P
(
|Sn| ≥ δ
√
2n log(n)−
√
2σ2n
)
≤ 2P
(
|Sn| ≥ 12δ3
√
2n log(n)
)
,
using Lemma 7.4. Now (4.21) follows from (4.20).
Chapter 5
Dynamic pricing and learning for a single
product with finite inventory
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study dynamic pricing and learning in a setting where finitely many
products are sold during finite selling periods, and where unsold inventory perishes
at the end of each selling season. This setting is applicable for airline tickets, hotel
rooms, concert tickets, car rental reservations, and many other products. The key feature
that distinguishes this setting from the situation with infinite inventory is the nature of
the optimal selling prices. In the single-product infinite-inventory setting, studied in
Chapter 3, the optimal selling price is a single value that remains constant over time. In
the current setting things are different: the optimal selling price is not a single value,
but it changes over time, depending on the inventory level and the remaining length
of the selling season (see, for example, Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994). It turns out that
these price fluctuations drastically change the structural properties of dynamic pricing
and learning problems.
Existing literature on dynamic pricing and learning with a finite inventory focuses on
results for a single selling season, cf. Besbes and Zeevi (2009) or Wang et al. (2011).
To assess the performance of proposed pricing strategies, they consider an asymptotic
regime where the demand rate and the initial amount of inventory grow to infinity.
Such an asymptotic regime may have practical value if demand, initial inventory, and
the length of the selling season are relatively large. In many situations, however, this
is not the case. For example, in the hotel rooms industry, a product may be modeled
as a combination of arrival date and length-of-stay (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004, section
10.2, Weatherford and Kimes, 2003). Different products may have different, overlapping
selling periods, and similar demand characteristics. It would therefore be unwise to
learn the consumer behavior for each product and selling period separately. In addition,
the average demand, initial capacity and length of a selling period may be quite low,
which makes the asymptotic regime not a suitable setting to study the performance of
pricing strategies. This motivates the present chapter on dynamic pricing of perishable
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products with finite initial inventory, during multiple consecutive selling seasons of finite
duration.
Similar to Chapters 3 and 4, we assume a parametric demand model with unknown
parameters which can be estimated with maximum-likelihood estimation. We then pro-
pose a pricing policy that, apart from a finite number of time periods, essentially is a
certainty equivalent policy: at each decision moment the price is chosen that is optimal
w.r.t. the available parameter estimates. Somewhat surprisingly, the certainty equiv-
alent policy has a very good performance. The parameter estimates converge to the
correct values, and the selling prices converge to the optimal prices. The regret, which
measures the expected amount of revenue loss due to not using the optimal prices, is
O(log2(T)), where T denotes the number of selling seasons. This is considerably better
than
√
T, which is the best achievable bound on the regret when inventory is infinite.
This difference in qualitative behavior of the regret can be explained as follows. In the
infinite inventory model, prices and parameter estimates can get stuck in what Harrison
et al. (2011a) call an “indeterminate equilibrium”. This means that for some values of the
parameter estimates, the expected observed demand at the certainty equivalent price is
equal to what the parameter estimates predict; in other words, the observations confirm
the correctness of the (incorrect) parameter estimates. As a result, certainty equivalent
pricing induces insufficient dispersion in the chosen selling prices to eventually learn
the true value of the parameters. Such cannot occur in the setting with finite inventories
and finite selling seasons. An optimal price - optimal w.r.t. certain parameter estimates
- is namely not a fixed number, but changes depending on the remaining inventory
and the remaining length of the selling season. As a result, an optimal policy naturally
induces endogenous price dispersion, and prices cannot get stuck in an “indeterminate
equilibrium”. On the contrary, the large amount of price dispersion implies that the
unknown parameters are learned quite fast and that Regret(T) is only O(log2(T)).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the mathematical
model, the structure of the demand distribution, the full-information optimal solution,
and the regret measure. Section 5.3 shows how the unknown parameters of the model
can be estimated, and contains a result concerning the speed at which parameter es-
timates converge to the true value. The endogenous-learning property of the system
is described in Section 5.4; our pricing policy and its performance bound in terms of
the regret is contained in Section 5.5. A numerical illustration of the policy and its per-
formance is provided in Section 5.6. All mathematical proofs are contained in Section
5.7.
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section we subsequently introduce the model, describe the characteristics of the
demand distribution, discuss the optimal pricing policy under full information, and
introduce the regret as quality measure of pricing policies.
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5.2.1 Model formulation
We consider a monopolist seller of perishable products which are sold during consecu-
tive selling seasons. Each selling season consists of S ∈N discrete time periods: the i-th
selling season starts at time period 1 + (i− 1)S, and lasts until period iS, for all i ∈ N.
We write SSt = 1 + b(t − 1)/Sc to denote the selling season corresponding to period
t, and st = t− (SSt − 1)S to denote the relative time in the selling period. At the start
of each selling season, the seller has C ∈ N discrete units of inventory at his disposal,
which can only be sold during that particular selling season. At the end of a selling
season, all unsold inventory perishes.
In each time period t ∈ N the seller has to determine a selling price pt ∈ [pl , ph].
Here 0 < pl < ph denote the lowest and highest price admissible to the firm. After
setting the price the seller observes a realization of demand, which takes values in {0, 1},
and collects revenue. We let ct, (t ∈ N), denote the capacity or inventory level at the
beginning of period t ∈ N, and dt the demand in period t. The dynamics of (ct)t∈N are
given by
ct = C, if st = 1,
ct = max{ct−1 − dt−1, 0}, if st 6= 1.
The pricing decisions of the seller are allowed to depend on previous prices and demand
realizations, but not on future ones. More precisely, for each t ∈ N we define the set of
possible historiesHt as
Ht = {(p1, . . . , pt, d1, . . . , dt) ∈ [pl , ph]t × {0, 1}t},
withH0 = {∅}. A pricing strategy ψ = (ψt)t∈N is a collection of functions ψt : Ht−1 →
[pl , ph], such that p1 = ψ1(∅), and for each t ≥ 2 the seller chooses the price pt =
ψt(p1, . . . , pt−1, d1, . . . , dt−1).
The revenue collected in period t equals pt min{ct, dt}. The purpose of the seller is
to find a pricing strategy ψ that maximizes the cumulative expected revenue earned
after T selling seasons, ∑TSi=1 Eψ[pi min{di, ci}]. Here we write Eψ to emphasize that this
expectation depends on the pricing strategy ψ.
5.2.2 Demand distribution
The demand in a single time period against selling price p is a realization of the random
variable D(p). We assume that D(p) is Bernoulli distributed with mean E[D(p)] =
h(β0 + β1 p), for all p ∈ [pl , ph], some (β0, β1) ∈ R2, and some function h. The true
value of β is denoted by β(0), and is unknown to the seller. If we wish to emphasize the
dependence of the demand on the unknown parameters β, we write D(p, β). Condition-
ally on selling prices, the demand in any two different time periods are independent.
To ensure existence and uniqueness of revenue-maximizing selling prices, we make a
number of assumptions on h and β. First, we assume that β(0) lies in the interior of a
76 Chapter 5
compact known set B ⊂ R2, and assume that β1 < 0 for all β ∈ B. Second, we assume
that h is three times continuously differentiable, log-concave, h(β0 + β1 p) ∈ (0, 1) for
all β ∈ B and p ∈ [pl , ph], and the derivative h˙(z) of h(z) is strictly positive. This
last assumption, together with β1 < 0 for all β ∈ B, implies that expected demand is
decreasing in p, for all β ∈ B.
Write r∗ = maxp∈[pl ,ph ] p · h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p), and for (a, β, p) ∈ R× B× [pl , ph], define
ga,β(p) = −(p− a)β1 h˙(β0 + β1 p)h(β0 + β1 p) .
We assume that ga,β(0)(pl) < 1, ga,β(0)(ph) > 1, and ga,β(0)(p) is strictly increasing in
p, for all 0 ≤ a ≤ r∗. These conditions, which for a = 0 coincide with the assump-
tions in Lariviere (2006, page 602), ensure that p 7→ (p− a)h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) has a unique
maximizer in (pl , ph).
Examples of functions h that satisfy the assumptions (with appropriate conditions on B
and [pl , ph]), are h(z) = exp(z), h(z) = z, and h(z) = logit(z) = exp(z)/(1+ exp(z)).
5.2.3 Full-information optimal solution
If the value of β is known, the optimal prices can be determined by solving a Markov
decision problem (MDP). Since each selling season corresponds to the same MDP, the
optimal pricing strategy for the infinite-horizon average reward criterion is to repeat-
edly use the optimal policy for a single selling season. The state space of this MDP
is X = {(c, s) | c = 0, . . . , C, s = 1, . . . , S}, where (c, s) means that there are c units
of remaining inventory at the beginning of the s-th period of the selling season, and
the action space is the interval [pl , ph]. If action p is used in state (c, s), s < S, then
with probability h(β0 + β1 p) a state transition (c, s) → ((c − 1)+, s + 1) occurs and
reward ph(β0 + β1 p)1c>0 is obtained; with probability 1− h(β0 + β1 p) a state transi-
tion (c, s) → (c, s + 1) occurs and zero reward is obtained. If action p is used in state
(c, S), then with probability one a state transition (c, s) 7→ (C, 1) occurs; the obtained re-
ward equals ph(β0 + β1 p)1c>0 with probability h(β0 + β1 p), and zero with probability
1− h(β0 + β1 p).
A (stationary deterministic) policy pi is a matrix (pi(c, s))0≤c≤C,1≤s≤S in the policy space
Π = [pl , ph](C+1)×S. Given a policy pi ∈ Π, let Vpiβ (c, s) be the expected revenue-to-go
function starting in state (c, s) ∈ X and using the actions of pi. Then Vpiβ (c, s) satisfies
the following recursion:
Vpiβ (c, s) = P(D(pi(c, s), β) = 0) ·Vpiβ (c, s + 1)
+ P(D(pi(c, s), β) = 1) · (pi(c, s) +Vpiβ (c− 1, s + 1)), (c ≥ 1), (5.1)
Vpiβ (0, s) = 0, (5.2)
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S, where we write Vpiβ (c, S + 1) = 0 for all 0 ≤ c ≤ C.
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By Proposition 4.4.3 of Puterman (1994), for each β ∈ B there is a corresponding op-
timal policy pi∗β ∈ Π. This policy can be calculated using backward induction. Write
Vβ(c, s) = V
pi∗β
β (c, s) for the optimal revenue-to-go function. Then Vβ(c, s) and pi
∗
β(c, s),
for (c, s) ∈ X , satisfy the following recursion:
Vβ(c, s) = max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
[
p− ∆Vβ(c, s + 1)
]
h(β0 + β1 p) +Vβ(c, s + 1),
pi∗β(c, s) ∈ arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
[
p− ∆Vβ(c, s + 1)
]
h(β0 + β1 p),
(5.3)
where we define ∆Vβ(c, s) = Vβ(c, s)−Vβ(c− 1, s), and ∆Vβ(0, s) = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S.
The optimal average reward of the MDP is equal to Vβ(C, 1), and the true optimal aver-
age reward is equal to Vβ(0)(C, 1).
5.2.4 Regret measure
To assess the quality of the pricing decisions of the seller, we define the regret. This
quantity measures the expected amount of money lost due to not using the optimal
prices. The regret of pricing strategy ψ after the first T selling seasons is defined as
Regret(ψ, T) = T ·Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
TS
∑
i=1
Eψ[pi min{di, ci}], (5.4)
where (pi)i∈N denote the prices generated by the pricing strategy ψ.
Maximizing the cumulative expected revenue is equivalent to minimizing the regret,
but observe that the regret cannot directly be used by the seller to find the optimal
strategy, since it depends on the unknown β(0). Also note that we calculate the regret
over a number of selling seasons, and not over a number of time periods. The reason
is that the optimal policy pi∗
β(0)
is optimized over an entire selling season, and not over
each individual state of the underlying MDP: a chosen price pt may induce a higher
instant reward in a certain state (ct, st) than the optimal price pi∗β(0)(ct, st). This effect is
averaged out by looking at the optimal expected reward in an entire selling season.
5.3 Parameter estimation
5.3.1 Maximum-likelihood estimation
The value of β(0) can be estimated with maximum-likelihood estimation. In particular,
given a sample of prices p1, . . . , pt and demand realizations d1, . . . dt, the log-likelihood
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function Lt(β) equals
Lt(β) =
t
∑
i=1
log
[
h(β0 + β1 pi)di (1− h(β0 + β1 pi))1−di
]
.
The score function, the derivative of Lt(β) with respect to β, equals
lt(β) =
t
∑
i=1
h˙(β0 + β1 pi)
h(β0 + β1 pi)(1− h(β0 + β1 pi))
(
1
pi
)
(di − h(β0 + β1 pi)). (5.5)
We let βˆt be a solution to lt(β) = 0. If no solution exists, we define βˆt = β(1), for some
predefined β(1) ∈ B. If a solution to lt(β) = 0 exists but lies outside B, we define βˆt as
the projection of this solution on B. For most choices of h there is no explicit formula for
the solution of lt(β) = 0, and numerical methods have to be deployed to calculate it.
5.3.2 Convergence rates of parameter estimates
Define the design matrix
Pt =
t
∑
i=1
(
1
pi
)
(1, pi), (t ∈N). (5.6)
The smallest eigenvalue of Pt, denoted by λmin(Pt), is a measure for the amount of
price dispersion in p1, . . . , pt. The growth rate of λmin(Pt) plays an important role in
establishing bounds on the speed at which the parameter estimates βˆt converge to the
true value β(0). In particular, the higher the growth rate of λmin(Pt), the faster E[||βˆt −
β(0)||2] converges to zero. This is formalized in the next proposition. To state the result,
we define the last-time random variable
Tρ = sup
{
t ∈N | there is no β ∈ B with
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ and lt(β) = 0} , (5.7)
for ρ > 0.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose L is a non-random function on N such that λmin(Pt) ≥ L(t) > 0
a.s., for all t ≥ t0 and some non-random t0 ∈ N, and such that inft≥t0 L(t)t−α > 0, for some
α > 1/2. Then there exists a ρ1 > 0 such that for all 0 < ρ ≤ ρ1 we have Tρ < ∞ a.s.,
E
[
Tρ
]
< ∞, and E
[
||βˆt − β(0)||21t>Tρ
]
= O (log(t)/L(t)).
This follows directly from Theorem 7.1, Theorem 7.2, and Remark 7.2 in Chapter 7.
5.4 Endogenous learning
Proposition 5.1 shows that the growth rate of λmin(Pt) influences the speed at which
the parameter estimates converge to the true value. The main result of this section
5.4 Endogenous learning 79
is that λmin(Pt) strictly increases if, during a selling season, prices are used that are
close to that prescribed by pi∗
β(0)
. This means that a continuous use of prices close to
pi∗
β(0)
leads to a linear growth rate of λmin(Pt), which by Proposition 5.1 implies that
the parameter estimates converges very fast to the true value, in particular with rate
E
[
||βˆt − β(0)||21t>Tρ
]
= O (log(t)/t).
This result can be interpreted as the system having an endogenous learning property:
the unknown parameters are learned very fast when a policy close to the optimal policy
is used.
Theorem 5.1. Let 1 < C < S and k ∈ N. There exist a constant v0 > 0, depending on β(0),
and an open neighborhood U ⊂ B containing β(0), such that, if
ps+(k−1)S = pi∗β(s)(cs+(k−1)S, s)
for all s = 1, . . . , S and some sequence β(1), . . . , β(S) ∈ U , then
λmin(PkS)− λmin(P(k−1)S) ≥
1
8
v20(1+ p
2
h)
−1,
and
min
1≤s,s′≤S
|ps+(k−1)S − ps′+(k−1)S| ≥ v0/2.
In Theorem 5.1, the requirement C < S is crucial. If C > S, then clearly C − S items
cannot be sold during the selling season. The selling of the remaining S items can be
interpreted as that each item can be sold only in a single, dedicated period. There is
then no interaction between individual items, and the pricing problem is equivalent to
S repeated problems with a single item and a single selling period. This setting does not
satisfy an endogenous learning property. On the contrary, the seller needs to actively
experiment with selling prices in order to learn the unknown parameters. A pricing
strategy for this setting is elaborated in Chapter 3.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 makes use of the following auxiliary lemmas. Lemma 5.1
shows that the assumptions we impose on ga,β(p) do not only hold for a ∈ [0, r∗] and
β = β(0), but also on an open neighborhood around [0, r∗]× {β(0)}. This result, which
follows directly from the continuity assumptions on h, enables us in later proofs to apply
the implicit function theorem. Lemma 5.2 considers the optimization problem under-
lying (5.3), and shows uniqueness, differentiability, and sensitivity properties. These
results are applied in Lemma 5.3 to conclude that (pi∗β)1≤c≤C,1≤s≤S is uniquely defined
and continuous in β, on an open neighborhood around β(0). Lemma 5.4 relates price
differences to the growth of λmin(Pt) during a selling season.
Lemma 5.1. There are open sets Ua ⊂ R containing [0, r∗], and UB ⊂ B containing β(0), with
sup
β∈UB
max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
p · h(β0 + β1 p) ∈ Ua, (5.8)
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and such that
ga,β(pl) < 1, ga,β(ph) > 1 and ga,β(p) strictly increasing in p, (5.9)
holds for all (a, β) ∈ Ua ×UB.
Lemma 5.2. Let Ua and UB be as in Lemma 5.1, and for all (a, β) ∈ Ua × UB define the
function fa,β(p) = (p − a)h(β0 + β1 p). Write f˙a,β(p) and f¨a,β(p) for the first and second
derivative of fa,β(p) with respect to p, and let p∗a,β = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
fa,β(p). Then:
(i) p∗a,β is the unique solution to f˙a,β(p) = 0, lies in (pl , ph), and in addition satisfies
f¨a,β(p∗a,β) < 0.
(ii) p∗a,β is continuously differentiable in a and β, strictly increasing in a, and fa,β(p
∗
a,β) is
strictly decreasing in a.
(iii) There is a K0 > 0 such that for all (a, β) ∈ Ua ×UB and p ∈ [pl , ph],
fa,β(p∗a,β)− fa,β(p) ≤ K0(p− p∗a,β)2.
Lemma 5.3. Let UB be as in Lemma 5.1. For each β ∈ UB and (c, s) ∈ X with c > 0, pi∗β(c, s)
is uniquely defined and continuous in β.
Lemma 5.4. Let k ∈N. If there are s, s′ ∈ {1, . . . , S} such that |ps+(k−1)S − ps′+(k−1)S| ≥ δ,
then λmin(PkS) ≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) + 12δ2(1+ p2h)−1.
5.5 Pricing strategy
We propose a pricing strategy based on the following principle: in each period, esti-
mate the unknown parameters, and subsequently use the action from the policy that is
optimal with respect to this estimate.
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Pricing strategy Φ(e)
Initialization: Choose 0 < e < (ph − pl)/4, and initial prices p1, p2 ∈ [pl , ph], with
p1 6= p2.
For all t ≥ 2: if ct+1 = 0, set pt+1 ∈ [pl , ph] arbitrary. If ct+1 > 0:
Estimation: Determine βˆt, and let pceqp = pi∗ˆβt(ct+1, st+1).
Pricing:
I) If
(a) |pi − pj| < e for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ t with SSi = SSt+1, and
(b) |pi − pceqp| < e for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t with SSi = SSt+1, and
(c) ct+1 = 1 or st+1 = S,
then choose pt+1 ∈
({pceqp + 2e, pceqp − 2e} ∩ [pl , ph]).
II) Else, set pt+1 = pceqp.
Given a positive inventory level, the pricing strategy Φ(e) sets the price pt+1 equal to
the price that is optimal according to the available parameter estimates βˆt, except pos-
sibly when the state (ct+1, st+1) is in the set {(c, s) | c = 1 or s = S}. This set contains
all states that, with positive probability, are the last states in the selling season in which
products are sold (either because the selling season almost finishes, or because the in-
ventory consists of only a single product). In these states, the price pt+1 deviates from
the certainty equivalent price pceqp if otherwise max{|pi − pj| | SSi = SSt+1} < e.
The endogenous learning property described in Section 5.4 implies that if βˆt is suffi-
ciently close to β(0) and e is sufficiently small, then I) does not occur. As βˆt converges to
β(0), the pricing strategy Φ(e) eventually acts as a certainty equivalent pricing strategy.
The pricing decisions in II) are driven by optimizing instant revenue, and do not reckon
with the objective of optimizing the quality of the parameter estimates βˆt. The endoge-
nous learning property makes sure that learning the parameter values happens on the
fly, without active effort.
As a result, the parameter estimates converge quickly to their true values, and the pric-
ing decisions quickly to the optimal pricing decisions. The following theorem shows
that the regret of the strategy Φ(e) is O(log2(T)) in the number of selling seasons T.
Theorem 5.2. Let 1 < C < S, v0 as in Theorem 5.1, and assume e < v0/2. Then
Regret(Φ(e), T · S) = O(log2(T)).
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5.6 Numerical illustration
To illustrate the analytical results that we have derived, we provide a small numerical
illustration. We let C = 10, S = 20, pl = 1, ph = 20, β
(0)
0 = 2, β
(0)
1 = −0.4, and
h(z) = logit(z). The optimal expected revenue per selling season, Vβ(0)(C, 1), is equal to
47.79. We consider a time span of 100 selling periods. Figure 5.1 shows a sample path
of ||βˆt − β(0)|| for t = 1, . . . , 100S, Regret(T), and the relative regret Regret(T)T·V
β(0)
(C,1) × 100%,
for T = 1, . . . , 100.
Figure 5.1: Sample path of estimation error, regret, and relative regret
5.7 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Consider the k-th selling season, and write c(1) = c1+(k−1)S, c(2) = c2+(k−1)S, . . ., c(S) =
ckS. First we show that there is a v0 > 0 such that if prices pi∗β(0)(c(s), s) are used in
state (c(s), s), for all s = 1, . . . , S, then there are 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ S with |pi∗
β(0)
(c(s), s) −
pi∗
β(0)
(c(s′), s′)| > v0. Since pi∗β is continuous in β around β(0) (Lemma 5.3), this implies
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that there is an open neighborhood U ⊂ UB around β(0) such that, if price pi∗β(s)(c(s), s)
is used in state (c(s), s), for all s = 1, . . . , S, then there are 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ S such that
|pi∗
β(s)(c(s), s)− pi∗β(s′)(c(s′), s′)| > v0/2.
Application of Lemma 5.4 with K1 = (1+ p2h)
−1 v20
8 proves the theorem.
Define
/ = {(c, s) | S + 1− C ≤ s ≤ S, S + 1− s ≤ c ≤ C}. (5.10)
See Figure 5.2 for an illustration of / in the state space X . Notice that since (C, 1) /∈ /
(by the assumption C < S), the path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S may or may not hit /. We show that
in both cases, at least two different selling prices occur on the path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S.
Case 1. The path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S hits /. Then there is an s such that (c(s), s) ∈ / and
(c(s), s − 1) /∈ /. In particular, (c(s), s − 1) ∈ (L/) = {(1, S − 1), (2, S − 2), . . . , (C −
1, S− C + 1), (C, S− C)}, where (L/) denotes the points (c, s) immediately left to / in
Figure 5.2. The sets / and (L/) satisfy the following properties:
(P.1) If (c, s) ∈ / then ∆Vβ(0)(c, s + 1) = 0, pi∗β(0)(c, s) = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
ph(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 p), and
Vβ(0)(c, s) = (S− s + 1) ·Vβ(0)(1, S).
(P.2) If (c, s) ∈ (L/), then pi∗
β(0)
(c, s) 6= pi∗
β(0)
(c, s + 1) and ∆Vβ(0)(c + 1, S− c) 6= 0 (pro-
vided c < C).
Proof of (P.1): Backward induction on s. If s = S and (c, s) ∈ /, then the assertions follow
immediately. Let s < S. Then ∆Vβ(0)(c, s + 1) = Vβ(0)(c, s + 1)− Vβ(0)(c− 1, s + 1) = 0,
pi∗
β(0)
(c, s) = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
ph(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 p) and Vβ(0)(c, s) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ] ph(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p) +
Vβ(0)(c, s + 1) = (S − s + 1) · Vβ(0)(1, S), by (5.3) and the induction hypothesis. This
proves (P.1).
Proof of (P.2). Induction on c. If c = 1 and (c, s) ∈ (L/), then (c, s) = (1, S− 1). Since
∆Vβ(0)(1, S) = Vβ(0)(1, S) > 0, Lemma 5.2 and equation (5.3) imply pi
∗
β(0)
(1, S − 1) 6=
pi∗
β(0)
(1, S). In addition,
Vβ(0)(2, S− 1) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ]
(
(p− ∆Vβ(0)(2, S))h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p) +Vβ(0)(2, S)
)
, (5.11)
Vβ(0)(1, S− 1) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ]
(
(p− ∆Vβ(0)(1, S))h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p) +Vβ(0)(1, S)
)
. (5.12)
Property (P.1) implies Vβ(0)(2, S) = Vβ(0)(1, S) and ∆Vβ(0)(2, S) = 0. Furthermore,
∆Vβ(0)(1, S) = Vβ(0)(1, S) > 0, and thus by Lemma 5.2, ∆Vβ(0)(2, S − 1) = Vβ(0)(2, S −
1)−Vβ(0)(1, S− 1) 6= 0.
Let c > 1 and (c, s) ∈ (L/). Then (c, s) = (c, S − c). By the induction hypothesis we
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Figure 5.2: Schematic picture of /
have ∆Vβ(0)(c, S− c + 1) 6= 0, and thus
pi∗
β(0)
(c, S− c) = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
(
p− ∆Vβ(0)(c, S− c + 1)
)
· h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) (5.13)
6= arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
ph(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 p) = pi
∗
β(0)
(c, S− c + 1), (5.14)
where we used Lemma 5.2 for the first inequality, and (P.1) for the second equality. It
remains to show ∆Vβ(0)(c + 1, S− c) 6= 0, when c < C. Note that
Vβ(0)(c + 1, S− c) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ]
(p− ∆Vβ(0)(c + 1, S− c + 1)) · h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p)
+Vβ(0)(c + 1, S− c + 1),
and
Vβ(0)(c, S− c) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ]
(
p− ∆Vβ(0)(c, S− c + 1)
)
· h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) +Vβ(0)(c, S− c + 1).
Since (c + 1, S− c + 1) ∈ / and (c, S− c + 1) ∈ /, (P.1) implies Vβ(0)(c + 1, S− c + 1) =
Vβ(0)(c, S − c + 1). In addition, c < C implies (c + 1, S − c) ∈ /, and thus ∆Vβ(0)(c +
1, S − c + 1) = 0 by (P.1). The induction hypothesis implies ∆Vβ(0)(c, S − c + 1) 6= 0.
Then Lemma 5.2 implies Vβ(0)(c + 1, S − c) 6= Vβ(0)(c, S − c). This proves (P.2), and
shows that a price-change occurs when / is entered.
This concludes case 1.
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Case 2. The path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S does not hit /. Then there is an s such that c(s) = 2 and
c(s + 1) = 1. We show pi∗
β(0)
(2, s) 6= pi∗
β(0)
(1, s + 1), for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S− 2.
pi∗
β(0)
(2, s) = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
(
p− ∆Vβ(0)(2, s + 1)
)
· h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p), (5.15)
pi∗
β(0)
(1, s + 1) = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
(
p− ∆Vβ(0)(1, s + 2)
)
· h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p), (5.16)
By Lemma 5.2, and the fact that pi∗
β(0)
(2, s) and pi∗
β(0)
(1, s + 1) are both contained in
(pl , ph), it suffices to show ∆Vβ(0)(2, s + 1) 6= ∆Vβ(0)(1, s + 2). We show by backward
induction that Vβ(0)(2, s) − Vβ(0)(1, s) 6= Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) for all 2 ≤ s ≤ S − 1. Let
2 ≤ s ≤ S− 1.
Vβ(0)(2, s) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ]
(
p− ∆Vβ(0)(2, s + 1)
)
· h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) +Vβ(0)(2, s + 1), (5.17)
Vβ(0)(1, s) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ]
(
p− ∆Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)
)
· h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) +Vβ(0)(1, s + 1), (5.18)
Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ]
(
p− ∆Vβ(0)(1, s + 2)
)
· h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) +Vβ(0)(1, s + 2). (5.19)
Using
Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1) ≥
[
(pi∗
β(0)
(2, s)−∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2))h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(2, s)) +Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2)
]
,
we have
Vβ(0)(2, s)−Vβ(0)(1, s)−Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)
≤(pi∗
β(0)
(2, s)− ∆Vβ(0)(2, s + 1))h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(2, s)) +Vβ(0)(2, s + 1)
−
[
(pi∗
β(0)
(1, s)− ∆Vβ(0)(1, s + 1))h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(1, s)) +Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)
]
−
[
(pi∗
β(0)
(2, s)− ∆Vβ(0)(1, s + 2))h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(2, s)) +Vβ(0)(1, s + 2)
]
=− pi∗
β(0)
(1, s)h(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(1, s))
+
[
Vβ(0)(2, s + 1)−Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)−Vβ(0)(1, s + 2)
][
1− h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 (pi∗β(0)(2, s))
]
+Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(1, s))
≤− pi∗
β(0)
(1, s)h(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(1, s)) +Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 pi
∗
β(0)
(1, s))
=Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)−Vβ(0)(1, s).
The last inequality is implied by Vβ(0)(2, s + 1) − Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) − Vβ(0)(1, s + 2) ≤ 0,
which for s = S − 1 follows from (P.1), and for s < S − 1 follows from the induc-
tion hypothesis. The proof of Lemma 5.3 implies ph − Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) > 0, and thus
86 Chapter 5
Vβ(0)(1, s) ≥ (ph − Vβ(0)(1, s + 1)) · h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 ph) + Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) > Vβ(0)(1, s + 1).
This proves Vβ(0)(2, s)−Vβ(0)(1, s)−Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) < 0.
This concludes case 2.
We have shown that in case 1 we have pi∗
β(0)
(c, S− c) 6= pi∗
β(0)
(c, S− c + 1), and in case
2 we have pi∗
β(0)
(2, s) 6= pi∗
β(0)
(1, s + 1). This implies that on any path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S in
X , starting at (C, 1), the policy pi∗
β(0)
induces a price-change somewhere along the path
(c(s), s)1≤s≤S. Since the number of possible paths is finite, it follows that there exists a
v0 > 0 such that for all paths (c(s), s)1≤s≤S,
|pi∗
β(0)
(c(s), s)− pi∗
β(0)
(c(s′), s′)| ≥ v0.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
Consider the k-th selling season, for some arbitrary fixed k ∈ N. The prices generated
by Φ(e) are based on the estimates βˆt, which are determined by the historical prices
and demand realizations. Now, different demand realizations can lead to the same state
(c, s) of the MDP. For example, a sale in the first period of a selling season and no sale
in the second period leads to state (C− 2, 3), but this state is also reached if there is no
sale in the first period and a sale in the second period of the selling season. These two
“routes” may lead to different estimates βˆt, and to different pricing decisions in state
(C− 2, 3). Thus, with Φ(e), the prices in the k-th selling season are not determined by a
stationary policy for the Markov decision problem described in Section 5.2.3.
To be able to compare the optimal revenue in a selling season with that obtained by
Φ(e), we define a new Markov decision problem, in which the states are sequences
of demand realizations in the selling season. Conditional on all prices and demand
realizations from before the selling season, the policy Φ(e) is then a stationary policy
for this new MDP: each state is associated with a unique price prescribed by Φ(e). This
enables us to calculate bounds on the regret obtained in a single selling season.
We define this new MDP for any β ∈ B. The state space X˜ consists of all sequences of
possible demand realizations in the selling season:
X˜ = {(x1, . . . , xs) ∈ {0, 1}s | 0 ≤ s ≤ S},
where we denote the empty sequence by (∅). The action space is [pl , ph]. Using ac-
tion p in state (x1, . . . , xs), for 0 ≤ s < S, induces a state transition from (x1, . . . xs)
to (x1, . . . , xs, 1) with probability h(β0 + β1 p) (corresponding to a sale, and inducing
immediate reward ph(β0 + β1 p)1∑si=1 xi<C), and from (x1, . . . xs) to (x1, . . . , xs, 0) with
probability 1− h(β0 + β1 p) (corresponding to no sale, and inducing zero reward). There
are no state transitions in the terminal states (x1, . . . , xS) ∈ X˜ .
It is easily seen that the MDP described in section 5.2.3 is the same as the one described
here, except that there states are aggregated: all states (x1, . . . , xs) and (x′1, . . . , x
′
s′) with
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s = s′ and ∑si=1 xi = ∑
s′
i=1 x
′
i are there taken together.
Let p˜i = (p˜i(x))x∈X˜ be a stationary deterministic policy for this MDP with augmented
state space, and let V˜p˜iβ (x) be the corresponding value function, for β ∈ B. For x =
(x1, . . . , xs) ∈ X˜ with s < S we write (x; 1) = (x1, . . . , xs, 1) and (x; 0) = (x1, . . . , xs, 0).
Then, for any x = (x1, . . . , xs) ∈ X˜ and β ∈ B, V˜p˜iβ (x) satisfies the backward recursion
V˜p˜iβ (x) = (p˜i(x)1∑si=1 xi<C + V˜
p˜i
β (x; 1))h(β0 + β1p˜i(x)) + V˜
p˜i
β (x; 0)(1− h(β0 + β1p˜i(x))),
where we write V˜p˜iβ (x; 1) = V˜
p˜i
β (x; 0) = 0 for all terminal states (x1, . . . , xS) ∈ X˜ .
Let p˜i∗β be the optimal policy corresponding to β ∈ B, and write V˜β(x) = V˜
p˜i∗β
β (x). Then
V˜β(x) = max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
[
p1∑si=1 xi<C −
(
V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1 p) + V˜β(x; 0), (5.20)
p˜i∗β(x) = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
[
p1∑si=1 xi<C −
(
V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1 p). (5.21)
Using the same line of reasoning as Lemma 5.2 and 5.3, it can easily be shown that
p˜i∗β((x1, . . . , xs)) is unique if and only if ∑
s
i=1 xi < C. For all x with ∑
s
i=1 xi ≥ C, choose
p˜i∗β(x) = ph. In this way p˜i
∗
β(x) is uniquely defined for all x ∈ X˜ .
Let U and v0 be as in Theorem 5.1, ρ1 as in Proposition 5.1, and choose ρ ∈ (0, ρ1) such
that β ∈ U whenever ||β− β(0)|| ≤ ρ.
If (k − 1)S > Tρ, then βˆt ∈ U for all t = 1 + (k − 1)S, . . . , S(k − 1)S, and Theorem
5.1 implies λmin(PkS) − λmin(P(k−1)S) ≥ 18 v20(1 + p2h)−1. If (k − 1)S ≤ Tρ, then I) of
the pricing strategy Φ(e) guarantees that there are 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ S such that |ps+(k−1)S −
ps′+(k−1)S| ≥ e. By Lemma 5.4 this implies λmin(PkS)− λmin(P(k−1)S) ≥ 12e2(1+ p2h)−1.
Since e2 ≤ v20/4, this means that λmin(PkS) ≥ k · 12e2(1 + p2h)−1 for all k ∈ N, and thus
for all t > S,
λmin(Pt) ≥ λmin(P(SSt−1)S) ≥ (SSt − 1) ·
1
2
e2(1+ p2h)
−1 ≥ t · 1
4S
e2(1+ p2h)
−1,
using SSt − 1 ≥ t (SSt−1)S·SSt ≥ t2S . By application of Proposition 5.1 with t0 = S and L(t) =
t · 14S e2(1+ p2h)−1, we have Tρ < ∞ a.s., EΦ(e)[Tρ] < ∞, and EΦ(e)[||βˆt − β(0)||21t>Tρ ] =
O (log(t)/t).
In addition, v0/2 > e implies that I) of the pricing strategy Φ(e) does not occur for all t
with (SSt − 1)S > Tρ. In particular, if (k− 1)S > Tρ, then
p1+s+(k−1)S = p˜i∗ˆβs+(k−1)S(d1+(k−1)S, d2+(k−1)S, . . . , ds+(k−1)S), (5.22)
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for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S− 1, and
p1+(k−1)S = p˜i∗ˆβ(k−1)S(∅). (5.23)
Let H = (p1, . . . , p(k−1)S, d1, . . . , d(k−1)S) denote the history of prices and demand up to
and including time period (k − 1)S. Conditional on H, and given that (k − 1)S > Tρ,
the parameter estimates βˆs+(k−1)S in (5.22) and (5.23) are completely determined by the
state
(d1+(k−1)S, d2+(k−1)S, . . . , ds+(k−1)S). Thus, for each state x ∈ X˜ there is a uniquely asso-
ciated price prescribed byΦ(e). Consequently, there is a stationary deterministic policy,
denoted by p˜iH , such that
p1+s+(k−1)S = p˜iH(x), when x = (d1+(k−1)S, d2+(k−1)S, . . . , ds+(k−1)S), 1 ≤ s ≤ S− 1,
p1+(k−1)S = p˜iH(∅).
This enables us to bound the regret in the k-th selling season:
Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
kS
∑
i=1+(k−1)S
E[pi min{di, ci}]
=EΦ(e)
V˜β(0)(∅)− kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
pi min{di, ci}
 1(k−1)S≤Tρ

+EΦ(e)
V˜β(0)(∅)− kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
pi min{di, ci}
 1(k−1)S>Tρ

≤V˜β(0)(∅)P((k− 1)S ≤ Tρ)
+EΦ(e)
EΦ(e)
V˜β(0)(∅)− kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
pi min{di, ci}
 1(k−1)S>Tρ | H

≤V˜β(0)(∅)
EΦ(e)[Tρ]
(k− 1)S (5.24)
+EΦ(e)
[
EΦ(e)
[(
V˜β(0)(∅)− V˜p˜i
H
β(0)
(∅)
)
1(k−1)S>Tρ | H
]]
. (5.25)
The term (5.24) is finite because E[Tρ] < ∞. To obtain an upper bound on the term (5.25),
we need a number of sensitivity results:
(S.0) For all β ∈ UB and x such that (x; 0), (x; 1) ∈ X˜ , we have
0 ≤ V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1) ≤ max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
p · h(β0 + β1 p). (5.26)
(S.1) Write Ys = (d1+(k−1)S, . . . , ds+(k−1)S) for 1 ≤ s ≤ S− 1, and Y0 = (∅). Let K0 be as
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in Lemma 5.3(iii). Then for all stationary deterministic policies p˜i and all 0 ≤ s ≤ S− 1,
(V˜β(0)(Ys)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys))1(k−1)S>Tρ ≤ K0
S−1
∑
σ=s
(p˜i∗
β(0)
(Yσ)− p˜i(Yσ))21(k−1)S>Tρ a.s. (5.27)
(S.2) There is a K3 > 0 such that for all β with ||β− β(0)|| ≤ ρ, and all x ∈ X˜ ,
|p˜i∗β(x)− p˜i∗β(0)(x)| ≤ K3||β− β(0)||. (5.28)
The proof of these three sensitivity properties is given below.
Application of (S.1), (S.2), and Proposition 5.1 now gives
EΦ(e)
[
EΦ(e)
[(
V˜β(0)(∅)− V˜p˜i
H
β(0)
(∅)
)
1(k−1)S>Tρ | H
]]
≤EΦ(e)
[
EΦ(e)
[
K0
S−1
∑
σ=0
(p˜i∗
β(0)
(Yσ)− p˜iH(Yσ))21(k−1)S>Tρ | H
]]
=EΦ(e)
[
K0
S−1
∑
σ=0
(p˜i∗
β(0)
(Yσ)− p˜i∗ˆβσ+(k−1)S(Yσ))
21(k−1)S>Tρ
]
≤EΦ(e)
[
K0K23
S−1
∑
σ=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣β(0) − βˆσ+(k−1)S∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1(k−1)S>Tρ
]
≤K4
S−1
∑
σ=0
log(σ+ (k− 1)S)
σ+ (k− 1)S ,
for some K4 independent of k and S.
We then have
Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
kS
∑
i=1+(k−1)S
EΦ(e)[pi min{di, ci}]
≤V˜β(0)(∅)EΦ(e)[Tρ]
1
(k− 1)S + K4
S−1
∑
σ=0
log(σ+ (k− 1)S)
σ+ (k− 1)S
≤K5
kS
∑
t=1+(k−1)S
log(t)
t
,
for some K5 > 0, independent of k and S.
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The proof of the theorem is complete by observing
Regret(Φ(e), T · S) =
T
∑
k=1
[
Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
kS
∑
i=1+(k−1)S
EΦ(e)[pi min{di, ci}]
]
≤
T
∑
k=1
K5
kS
∑
t=1+(k−1)S
log(t)
t
= K5
TS
∑
t=1
log(t)
t
= O(log2(T)).
Proof of (S.0)
We prove the assertion for all (x1, . . . , xs−1) ∈ X˜ , s = 1, . . . , S, by backward induction
on s. If x = (x1, . . . , xS−1) ∈ X˜ then V˜β(x; 0) = V˜β(x; 1) = 0.
Let x ∈ X . If ∑si=1 xi ≥ C then V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1) = 0. If ∑si=1 xi < C then the induction
hypothesis implies
V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1)
=
[
pi∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 0)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
pi∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 1))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
≥
[
pi∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 1)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
pi∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 1))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
=
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)
(1− h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 1)))
+
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 1))
≥ 0,
and
V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1)
=
[
pi∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 0)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
pi∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 1))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
≤
[
pi∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 0)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
pi∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 0))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
=
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)
(1− h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 0)))
+
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)
h(β0 + β1pi∗β(x; 0))
≤ max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
p · h(β0 + β1 p).
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Proof of (S.1)
Backward induction on s. If s = S− 1 then Lemma 5.3(iii) implies
V˜β(0)(YS−1)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(YS−1)
= max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
p1∑S−1i=1 Yi<C
h(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 p)− p˜i(YS−1)1∑S−1i=1 Yi<Ch(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p˜i(YS−1))
≤K0(p˜i∗β(0)(Ys)− p˜i(YS−1))2 a.s.,
and thus
(V˜β(0)(YS−1)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(YS−1)) · 1(k−1)S>Tρ ≤ K0(p˜i∗β(0)(Ys)− p˜i(YS−1))2 · 1(k−1)S>Tρ a.s.
If 0 ≤ s < S− 1, then
V˜β(0)(Ys)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys)
= max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
[
p1∑si=1 Yi<C − (V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1))
]
h(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 p)
−[p˜i(Ys)1∑si=1 Yi<C − (V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1))]h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p˜i(Ys))
+
[
p˜i(Ys)1∑si=1 Yi<C − (V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1))
]
h(β(0)0 + β
(0)
1 p˜i(Ys))
−[p˜i(Ys)1∑si=1 Yi<C − (V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 1))]h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p˜i(Ys))
+V˜(Ys; 0)− V˜p˜i(Ys; 0)
≤K0(p˜i∗β(0)(Ys)− p˜i(Ys))2
+
(
V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 0)
) · (1− h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p˜i(Ys)))
+
(
V˜β(0)(Ys; 1)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 1)
) · (h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p˜i(Ys))
=K0(p˜i∗β(0)(Ys)− p˜i(Ys))2 +
[
V˜β(0)(Ys+1)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys+1)
]
a.s.
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 5.3(iii), observing that (S.0) implies
V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1) ∈ Ua. The induction hypothesis now implies
(V˜β(0)(Ys)− V˜p˜iβ(0)(Ys))1(k−1)S>Tρ ≤ K0
S−1
∑
σ=s
(p˜i∗
β(0)
(Yσ)− p˜i(Yσ))21(k−1)S>Tρ a.s.
Proof of (S.2)
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If ∑si=1 xi ≥ C then p˜i∗β(x)− p˜i∗β(0)(x) = ph − ph = 0. If ∑
s
i=1 xi < C, then
p˜i∗β(x)− p˜i∗β(0)(x) = p∗˜Vβ(x;0)−V˜β(x;1),β − p
∗
V˜
β(0)
(x;0)−V˜
β(0)
(x;1),β(0)
= p∗a,β − p∗a(0),β(0) , (5.29)
in the notation of Lemma 5.2, with a = V˜β(x; 0) − V˜β(x; 1) and a(0) = V˜β(0)(x; 0) −
V˜β(0)(x; 1).
By (S.0) we have a, a(0) ∈ Ua and β ∈ UB, and thus by Lemma 5.2, p˜i∗β(x) is continuously
differentiable. The set {β ∈ B | ||β− β(0)|| ≤ ρ} is compact, and so is the set {V˜β(x; 0)−
V˜β(x; 1) | ||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ, β ∈ B}. As a result, the derivative of p∗a,β w.r.t. (a, β) is
bounded on the set (a, β) ∈ {V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1) | ||β− β(0)|| ≤ ρ, β ∈ B} × {β ∈ B |
||β− β(0)|| ≤ ρ}. It follows by a first-order Taylor expansion that there is a K6 > 0 such
that for all such (a, β),
|p∗a,β − p∗a(0),β(0) | ≤ K6(|a− a(0)|+ ||β− β(0)||). (5.30)
It is not difficult to show by backward induction that for all x ∈ X˜ there is a Kx > 0
such that, for all β with ||β− β(0)|| ≤ ρ,∣∣∣V˜β(x)− V˜β(0)(x)∣∣∣ ≤ Kx ∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (5.31)
Combining (5.29), (5.30), and (5.31), we obtain
|p˜i∗β(x)− p˜i∗β(0)(x)|
≤K6(|a− a(0)|+ ||β− β(0)||)
≤K6(|V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(0)(x; 0)|+ |V˜β(x; 1)− V˜β(0)(x; 1)|+ ||β− β(0)||)
≤K6(1+ 2 max
x∈X˜
Kx)||β− β(0)||.
This proves (S.2).
5.8 Proofs of auxiliary lemmas
Proof of Lemma 5.2
Since
f˙a,β(p) = h(β0 + β1 p)
[
1+ (p− a)β1 h˙(β0 + β1 p)h(β0 + β1 p)
]
= h(β0 + β1 p)
[
1− ga,β(p)
]
,
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and h(β0 + β1 p) > 0 for all β ∈ UB, p ∈ [pl , ph], we have f˙a,β(p) = 0 if and only if
ga,β(p) = 1. By Lemma 5.1, for all (a, β) ∈ Ua ×UB there is a unique p∗a,β ∈ (pl , ph) such
that ga,β(p∗a,β) = 1. From
f¨a,β(p) =
∂
∂p
[
h(β0 + β1 p)(1− ga,β(p))
]
= β1h˙(β0 + β1 p)(1− ga,β(p))− h(β0 + β1 p) ∂∂p ga,β(p)
follows
f¨a,β(p∗a,β) = −h(β0 + β1 p∗a,β)
∂
∂p
ga,β(p∗a,β) < 0,
since by Lemma 5.1, ga,β is strictly increasing in p. This proves (i).
For all (a, β) ∈ Ua ×UB, p∗a,β is the unique solution in (pl , ph) to ga,β(p)− 1 = 0, and
∂ga,β(p)
∂p
∣∣∣
p=p∗a,β
> 0.
The implicit function theorem (see e.g. Duistermaat and Kolk, 2004) then implies that
p∗a,β is continuously differentiable at every (a, β) ∈ Ua ×UB.
Furthermore, for all (a, β) ∈ Ua ×UB and p ∈ [pl , ph] we have
∂ga,β(p)
∂a
= β1
h˙(β0 + β1 p)
h(β0 + β1 p)
< 0.
This implies that for all a ∈ Ua, a′ ∈ Ua, with a < a′, and all p ∈ [pl , ph] with p ≤ p∗a,β,
we have ga′ ,β(p) ≤ ga,β(p) ≤ 1. Therefore p∗a′ ,β > p∗a,β for all a < a′, and thus p∗a,β is
strictly monotone increasing in a.
Using ga,β(p∗a,β) = 1 and thus (p
∗
a,β − a) = (−β−11 )
h(β0+β1 p∗a,β)
h˙(β0+β1 p∗a,β)
, we have
fa,β(p∗a,β) = (p
∗
a,β − a)h(β0 + β1 p∗a,β) = (−β−11 )
h(β0 + β1 p∗a,β)
2
h˙(β0 + β1 p∗a,β)
,
and thus
∂
∂a
fa,β(p∗a,β)) = (−β−11 )
 ∂
∂z
h(z)2
h˙(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=β0+β1 p∗a,β
 β1 ∂∂a p∗a,β. (5.32)
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Log-concavity of h implies ∂
2 log(h(z))
∂z2 =
h(z)h¨(z)−h˙(z)2
h(z)2 ≤ 0, and thus
∂
∂z
h(z)2
h˙(z)
=
2h(z)h˙(z)2 − h(z)2h¨(z)
h˙(z)2
= h(z)
[
2− h(z)h¨(z)
h(z)2
h(z)2
h˙(z)2
]
≥ h(z)
[
2− h˙(z)
2
h(z)2
h(z)2
h˙(z)2
]
= h(z).
Since ∂∂a p
∗
a,β > 0, it follows that fa,β(p
∗
a,β) is strictly decreasing in a. This completes the
proof of (ii).
Let K0 = sup(a,β,p)∈Ua×UB×[pl ,ph ]− f¨a,β(p)/2. Since (a, β, p) 7→ fa,β(p) is twice continu-
ously differentiable on R× B× [pl , ph] and f¨a,β(p∗a,β) < 0, it follows that 0 < K0 < ∞.
By a Taylor expansion, there is a p˜a,β on the line segment between p and p∗a,β, such that
fa,β(p) = fa,β(p∗a,β) + f˙a,β(p
∗
a,β)(p− p∗a,β) +
1
2
f¨a,β( p˜a,β)(p− p∗a,β)2
≥ fa,β(p∗a,β)− K0(p− p∗a,β)2,
using f˙a,β(p∗a,β) = 0. This proves (iii).
Proof of Lemma 5.3
Let β ∈ UB. We show 0 ≤ ∆Vβ(c, s) ≤ maxp∈[pl ,ph ] ph(β0 + β1 p), for all (c, s) ∈ X . By
(5.8), this implies ∆Vβ(c, s) ∈ Ua. In view of (5.3), uniqueness and continuity of pi∗β then
follow from repeated application of Lemma 5.2(i, ii), for each (c, s) ∈ X .
If s = S then ∆Vβ(c, S) = 0 for c > 1 or c = 0, and Vβ(1, S) = maxp∈[pl ,ph ] ph(β0 + β1 p).
If s < S, then by backward induction,
∆Vβ(c, s) = (pi∗β(c, s)− ∆Vβ(c, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c, s)) +Vβ(c, s + 1)
− (pi∗β(c− 1, s)− ∆Vβ(c− 1, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c− 1, s))−Vβ(c− 1, s + 1)
≥ (pi∗β(c− 1, s)− ∆Vβ(c, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c− 1, s)) +Vβ(c, s + 1)
− (pi∗β(c− 1, s)− ∆Vβ(c− 1, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c− 1, s))−Vβ(c− 1, s + 1)
= ∆Vβ(c, s + 1))(1− h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c− 1, s)))
+ ∆Vβ(c− 1, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c− 1, s))
≥ 0,
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and
∆Vβ(c, s) = (pi∗β(c, s)− ∆Vβ(c, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c, s)) +Vβ(c, s + 1)
− (pi∗β(c− 1, s)− ∆Vβ(c− 1, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c− 1, s))−Vβ(c− 1, s + 1)
≤ (pi∗β(c, s)− ∆Vβ(c, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c, s)) +Vβ(c, s + 1)
− (pi∗β(c, s)− ∆Vβ(c− 1, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c, s))−Vβ(c− 1, s + 1)
= ∆Vβ(c, s + 1))(1− h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c, s)))
+ ∆Vβ(c− 1, s + 1))h(β0 + β1pi∗β(c, s))
≤ max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
ph(β0 + β1 p).
Proof of Lemma 5.4
For any 2 × 2 positive definite matrix A with eigenvalues 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2, we have
λ2 ≤ λ1 + λ2 = tr(A), det(A) = λ1λ2, and consequentially λ1 = det(A)/λ2 ≥
det(A)/tr(A). For a, b ≤ ph we thus have
λmin
(
2 a + b
a + b a2 + b2
)
≥ 2a
2 + 2b2 − (a + b)2
2+ a2 + b2
≥ (a− b)
2
2(1+ p2h)
.
Since λmin(Pt) ≥ λmin(Pr) + λmin(Pr′) for all r, r′, t ∈ N with r + r′ = t (Bhatia, 1997,
Corollary III.2.2, page 63), we have
λmin(PkS) ≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) + λmin
 ∑
1≤i≤S,i/∈{s,s′}
(
1
pi+(k−1)S
)
(1, pi+(k−1)S)

+ λmin
((
1
ps+(k−1)S
)
(1, ps+(k−1)S) +
(
1
ps′+(k−1)S
)
(1, ps′+(k−1)S)
)
≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) +
(ps+(k−1)S − ps′+(k−1)S)2
2(1+ p2h)
≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) +
δ2
2(1+ p2h)
.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic pricing and learning in a changing
environment
6.1 Introduction
The preceding Chapters 3, 4 and 5 study dynamic pricing and learning in a stationary
environment: the parameters that describe the market behavior do not change over
time. These chapters study in different pricing-and-learning settings the question if
price experimentation is necessary, and how that should be conducted in an optimal
manner.
The assumption of a stationary environment is a strong condition. Markets are generally
not stable, but may vary over time, without the seller immediately being aware of it (cf.
Dolan and Jeuland (1981), Wildt and Winer (1983), and Section 2 of Elmaghraby and
Keskinocak (2003)). These changes may have various causes: shifts in consumer tastes,
competition (Wildt and Winer, 1983), appearance of technological innovations (Chen
and Jain, 1992), market saturation and product diffusion effects, which are related to the
life cycle of a product (Bass, 1969, Dolan and Jeuland, 1981, Raman and Chatterjee, 1995),
marketing and advertisement efforts (Horsky and Simon 1983), competitors entering or
exiting the market, appearance of new sales channels, and many more.
Wildt and Winer (1983, page 365) argued already in 1983 that “constant-parameter
models are not capable of adequately reflecting such changing market environments”.
In fact, the historical literature on statistical economics show that this issue has been
known since longtime, as illustrated by the following quotation of Schultz (1925) on the
law of demand:
“The validity of the theoretical law [of demand] is limited to a point in
time. But in order to derive concrete, statistical laws our observations must be
numerous; and in order to obtain the requisite number of observations, data
covering a considerable period must be used. During the interval, however,
important dynamic changes take place in the condition of the market. In the
case of a commodity like sugar, the principal dynamic changes that need be
97
98 Chapter 6
considered are the changes in our sugar-consuming habits, fluctuations in
the purchasing power of money, and the increase of population.” (page 409
of Schultz, 1925).
Although the literature on dynamic pricing and learning has increased rapidly in re-
cent years, cf. Chapter 2, models with a varying market have hardly been considered.
This motivates the current study of dynamic pricing and learning in a changing envi-
ronment.
The combination of dynamic pricing and learning in a changing market, is a rather un-
explored area. Besbes and Zeevi (2011) study a pricing problem where the willingness-
to-pay (WtP) distribution of the customers changes at some unknown point in time.
They do however assume that the WtP distribution before and after the change is fully
known to the firm. Chen and Jain (1992) consider optimal pricing policies in models
where the demand not only depends on the selling price, but also on the cumulative
amount of sales; in this way diffusion effects are modeled. In addition, the demand
is influenced by an observable state variable, which models unpredictable events that
change the demand function, and whose dynamics are driven by a Poisson process.
Apart from these random events, the demand again is fully deterministic and known to
the firm, and learning by the firm is not considered. Hanssens et al. (2001) and Leeflang
et al. (2009, Section 2.3) discuss several dynamic market models, as well as estimation
methods, but do not integrate this with the problem of optimal dynamic pricing. A rel-
evant study from the control literature is from Godoy et al. (2009). They consider an es-
timation problem in a linear system, where the parameters are subject to shock changes,
and analyze the performance of a sliding-window linear regression method. A major
assumption is that the controls are deterministic. This differs from pricing problems,
where the prices (the controls) usually depend in a non-trivial way on all previously
observed sales realizations.
In the present chapter, we study the problem of dynamic pricing and learning in a
changing environment. We consider an additive demand model, where the expected
demand is the sum of a stochastic process and a known function depending on the sell-
ing price. This stochastic process models the size of the market, and its characteristics
are initially unknown to the firm. Its value at a certain point in time may be estimated
from accumulated sales data; however, since the market may be changing over time,
estimation methods are needed that are designed for time-varying systems. We deploy
two such estimators, namely estimating with a forgetting factor, and estimation based
on a “sliding window” approach. For both estimators we derive an upper bound on the
expected estimation error.
Next, we propose a simple, intuitive pricing policy: at each decision moment, the firm
estimates the market size with one of the just mentioned estimators, and subsequently
sets the next selling price equal to the optimal price, given that the current market esti-
mate is correct. This is a so-called myopic or certainty equivalent policy, since at each
decision moment the firm acts as if being certain about its estimates. To measure the
quality of this pricing policy, we define AverageRegret(T), which measures the expected
costs of not choosing optimal prices in the first T periods, and LongRunAverageRegret,
which equals the limit superior of AverageRegret(T) as T grows large. We derive up-
per bounds on AverageRegret(T) and LongRunAverageRegret. These bounds are not
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only stated in terms of the variables associated with the used estimation method (the
forgetting factor, or the size of the sliding window), but also in terms of a measure of
the impact that market fluctuations have on the estimation error. Clearly, if the market is
very unstable and inhibits very large and frequent fluctuations, the impact may become
extremely large, which negatively affects the obtained revenue.
The novel, key idea of this study is that (i) this impact can be bounded, using assump-
tions on the market process that the firm makes a priori, (ii) the resulting upper bounds
on AverageRegret(T) and LongRunAverageRegret can be used by the firm to deter-
mine the optimal estimator of the market (i.e. the optimal value of the forgetting factor
or window size), (iii) this provides the firm explicit guarantees on the maximum ex-
pected revenue loss. This framework enables the firm to hedge against change: the firm
is certain that the expected regret does not exceed a certain known value, provided
the market process satisfies the posed assumptions. These assumptions may be very
general, and cover many important cases; for example, bounds on the probability that
the market value changes in a certain period, bounds on the maximum difference be-
tween two consecutive market values, or bounds on the maximum and minimum value
that the market process may attain. We provide numerical examples to illustrate the
methodology, in three practically relevant settings: in the first we assume that the mar-
ket value is continuously changing; in the second, we make use of the well-known Bass
model to model the diffusion of an innovative products; and in the third, we consider
an oligopoly, where price changes by competitors causes occasional changes in the mar-
ket. The application of our methodology on the Bass model makes this the first study
that incorporates learning with this widely used product-diffusion model; so-far, only
deterministic settings (Robinson and Lakhani, 1975, Dolan and Jeuland, 1981, Kalish,
1983), or random settings where no learning is present (Chen and Jain, 1992, Raman
and Chatterjee, 1995, Kamrad et al., 2005) have been considered in the literature.
Summarizing, in one of the first studies on dynamic pricing and learning in a changing
environment, our contributions are as follows:
(i) We introduce a model of dynamic pricing and learning in a changing market en-
vironment, using a very generic description of the market process.
(ii) We discuss two estimators of time-varying processes, and prove upper bounds on
the estimation error.
(iii) We propose a methodology that enables a decision maker to hedge against changes.
This results in explicit guarantees on the regret, and guides the choice of the opti-
mal estimator.
(iv) We show the application of the methodology in several concrete cases, and offer
several numerical examples to illustrate its use and performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 6.2.
In Section 6.3 we discuss estimation with forgetting factor or with sliding window, and
provide upper bounds on the expected estimation error. The myopic pricing policy is
described in Section 6.4, together with upper bounds on the regret. Section 6.5 discusses
our proposed methodology of hedging against change, and examines its use in several
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concrete cases. Numerical illustrations are provided in Section 6.6. All mathematical
proofs are contained in Section 6.7.
6.2 Model
We consider a monopolist firm selling a single type of product. In each time period
t ∈ N, the firm decides on a selling price pt ∈ [pl , ph], where 0 ≤ pl < ph < ∞
denote the lowest and highest admissible price. After choosing the price, the seller
observes demand dt, which is a realization of the random variable Dt(pt). Conditional
on the selling prices, the demand in different time periods is independent. The expected
demand in period t, against a price p, is of the form
E [Dt(p)] = M(t) + g(p). (6.1)
Here (M(t))t∈N is a nonnegative stochastic process called the market process. The dy-
namics of this process are unknown to the seller, and may be quite general: trends,
seasonal effects, and shock changes, can all be captured by the market process. The
process may even depend on historical sales data. In particular, let Ft be the σ-algebra
generated by d1, p1, M(1), . . . , dt, pt, M(t), F0 the trivial σ-algebra, and write et = dt −
g(pt)−M(t); then we assume that M(t), et and pt are allFt−1-measurable, for all t ∈N.
In addition we impose the following mild conditions on the moments of M(t) and et:
there are positive constants σM and σ, such that
sup
t∈N
E
[
M(t)2 | Ft−1
]
≤ σ2M a.s. and sup
t∈N
E
[
e2t | Ft−1
]
≤ σ2 a.s. (6.2)
The function g in (6.1) models the dependence of expected demand on selling price. It
is assumed to be known by the seller. A typical example that is widely used in practice
is the linear demand function g(p) = −bp for some b > 0. After observing demand, the
seller collects revenue ptdt, and proceeds to the next period. The purpose of the seller is
to maximize expected revenue.
Let r(p, M) = p · (M + g(p)) denote the expected revenue in a single period, when
the market size equals M and the selling price is set at p. The price that generates the
highest amount of expected revenue, given that the current market size equals M, is
denoted by p∗(M) = arg max
p∈[pl ,ph ]
r(p, M).
We impose some mild conditions to ensure that this optimal price exists and is uniquely
defined. In particular, we assume that for all admissible prices p, g(p) is decreasing in p,
and twice continuously differentiable with first and second derivative denoted by g′(p)
and g′′(p). These two properties immediately carry over to the expected demand, and in
fact are quite natural conditions for demand functions to hold. In addition, we assume
that for all M ≥ 0 the revenue function r(p, M) is unimodal with unique optimum
p#(M) ≥ 0 satisfying r′(p#(M), M) = 0, and in addition
supM≥0:p#(M)∈[pl ,ph ] r
′′(p#(M), M) < 0; here r′(p, M) and r′′(p, M) denote the first and
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second derivative of r(p, M) w.r.t. p. These assumptions on g and r are fairly standard
conditions of demand and revenue functions, and ensure that the revenue function is
locally strictly concave around the optimum. Clearly, if p#(M) lies in the interval [pl , ph]
then p∗(M) = p#(M), and if p#(M) /∈ [pl , ph], then p∗(M) is the projection of p#(M) on
the interval [pl , ph].
Remark 6.1. It is not difficult to show that the conditions on g are satisfied for the linear
demand model g(p) = −bp, b > 0. For nonlinear demand functions like g(p) = −bpc
with b > 0, c > 0, c 6= 1, or g(p) = −b log(p), b > 0, the conditions are satisfied if
the market process is bounded: supt∈N M(t) ≤ Mmax a.s. for some Mmax > 0. This
additional condition ensures that the condition supM≥0:p#(M)∈P r′′(p#(M), M) < 0 is
satisfied. Note that for practical applications, it is generally not restrictive to assume a
bound on the market.
Remark 6.2. In (6.1) we assume an additive demand model: the expected demand is
the sum of a known and an unknown part. Another approach is to assume a multi-
plicative demand model, where the expected demand is the product of the two parts:
E [Dt(p)] = M(t) · g(p). However, such a demand model has a remarkable property. By
differentiating the revenue function w.r.t. p, one can easily show that the optimal price
is the solution to the equation pg′(p)/g(p) = −1. This equation is independent of the
market process, and as a result, the firm does not need to know or estimate the mar-
ket in order to determine the optimal selling price. Intuitively it is clear that for many
products such a model does not accurately reflect reality.
The value of the market process and the corresponding optimal price are unknown
to the seller. As a result, the decision maker might choose sub-optimal prices, which
incurs a loss of revenue relative to someone who would know the market process and
the optimal price. The goal of the seller is to determine a pricing policy that minimizes
this loss of revenue. With a pricing policy we here mean a sequence of prices (pt)t∈N in
[pl , ph] which is predictable w.r.t. (Ft)t∈N; in other words, each price pt may depend on
all previously chosen prices p1, . . . , pt−1, demand realizations d1, . . . , dt−1, and market
values M(1), . . . , M(t− 1).
To assess the quality of a pricing policy Φ, we define the following two quantities.
AverageRegret(Φ, T) =
1
T − 1
T
∑
t=2
E [r(p∗(M(t)), M(t))− r(pt, M(t))] , (6.3)
LongRunAverageRegret(Φ) = lim sup
T→∞
AverageRegret(Φ, T). (6.4)
Each term in the summand of (6.3) measures the expected revenue loss caused by not us-
ing the optimal price in period t. The expectation operator is because both pt and M(t)
may be random variables. We start “measuring” the average regret from the second
period. This simplifies several expressions that appear in further sections; in addition,
in the first period, no data is available to estimate M(1), and minimizing the instan-
taneous regret encountered in the first period is not possible. Furthermore, note that
AverageRegret(Φ, T) and LongRunAverageRegret(Φ) are not observed by the seller,
and thus can not directly be used to determine an optimal pricing policy.
102 Chapter 6
6.3 Estimation of market process
Estimating the value of the market process gives vital information that is needed to
determine the selling price. Since the market may change over time, the firm needs
an estimation method that can handle such changes. In this section we describe two
such methods: (I) estimation with forgetting factor, and (II) estimation with a sliding
window.
(I) Estimation of M(t) with forgetting factor. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be the forgetting factor, to be
determined by the decision maker. The estimate Mˆλ(t), with forgetting factor λ, based
on demand realizations d1, . . . , dt and prices p1, . . . , pt, is equal to
Mˆλ(t) = arg min
M>0
t
∑
i=1
(di −M− g(pi))2λt−i. (6.5)
The factor λt−i acts as a weight on the data (pi, di)1≤i≤t. Data that lies further in the past
gets a lower weight; data from the recent past receives more weight (unless λ = 1, in
which case all available data gets equal weight, or λ = 0, in which case only the most
recent observation is taken into account). This captures the idea that the longer ago data
has been generated, the likelier it is that the corresponding value of the market process
differs from its current value. Accordingly, data from longer ago is assigned a smaller
weight than data from the more recent past. Whether this intuition is true depends of
course on the specific characteristics of M(t).
By differentiating the righthandside of (6.5) w.r.t. M, we obtain the following explicit
expression for Mˆλ(t):
Mˆλ(t) =
∑ti=1(di − g(pi))λt−i
∑ti=1 λt−i
. (6.6)
(II) Estimation of M(t) with a sliding window. Let N ∈N≥2 ∪ {∞} be the window size,
determined by the decision maker. The estimate MˆN(t), with sliding window size N,
based on demand realizations d1, . . . , dt and prices p1, . . . , pt, is equal to
MˆN(t) = arg min
M>0
t
∑
i=max{t−N+1,1}
(di −M− g(pi))2. (6.7)
Here only data from the N most recent observations is used to form an estimate. All
data that is generated longer than N time periods ago, is neglected (if N = ∞, then all
available data is taken into account). Similar to the estimate with forgetting factor, the
rationale behind the estimate MˆN(t) is the idea that for data generated long ago, it is
more likely that the corresponding market value differs from its current value. This is
captured in the fact that only the N most recent observations are used to estimate M(t).
Whether this idea is correct depends again on the specifics of M(t).
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Differentiating the righthandside of (6.7) w.r.t. M, we obtain the following expression:
MˆN(t) =
1
min{N, t}
t
∑
i=max{t−N+1,1}
(di − g(pi)). (6.8)
Both estimation methods (I) and (II) depend on a decision variable, (λ resp. N), that can
be interpreted as a measure for the responsiveness to changes in the market. A high
value of λ resp. N means that much information from the historical data is used to form
estimates; this is advantageous in case of a stable market, but disadvantageous in case
of many or large recent changes in the market process. Similarly, a low value of λ resp.
N implies that the estimate of M(t) is mainly determined by recent data; naturally, this
is more beneficial in a volatile market than in a stable market. In Section 6.5 we offer
several guidelines how to choose the values of λ or N.
Remark 6.3. The estimation methods (I) and (II) are designed for a very generic market
process M(t), that can capture various ’forms’ such as trends, shock changes, seasonal
effects, Markov-modulated processes, et cetera. Instead, if one imposes a certain struc-
ture on M(t), estimators for M(t) can be tailored according to this specific structure.
For example, the firm could assume that M(t) = ct + et, where c ∈ R is a non-random
constant and (et)t∈N is a sequence of zero-mean i.i.d. random variables. Then a more
sensible estimator of M(t) would be Mˆ(t) = 2(t+ 1)−1 ∑ti=1(di − g(pi)), which satisfies
E
[
Mˆ(t)
]
= 2t+1 ∑
t
i=1 c · i = ct, and thus is an unbiased estimator. However, assuming
such additional structure comes with the cost of misspecification: if M(t) is not of the
form assumed by the firm, but for example c suffers from shock changes, this estimator
may perform quite badly. We avoid such misspecifications by using estimators that are
applicable in a very generic setting.
Market fluctuations influence the accuracy of the estimates Mˆλ(t) and Mˆn(t). The fol-
lowing quantities Iλ(t) and IN(t) measure this impact or influence of market variations
on the estimates. Observe that this impact is not solely determined by the market pro-
cess, but also by the choice of λ and N:
Iλ(t) = E
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1− λ
1− λt 1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
) t
∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ,
IN(t) = E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
 .
The following proposition gives a bound on the expected estimation error of (I) and (II),
in terms of λ, N, and the impact measures Iλ(t) and IN(t).
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Proposition 6.1. For all t ∈N,
E
[∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2] ≤ 2σ2 [ (1− λ)(1+ λ) (1+ λt)(1− λt)1(λ < 1) + 1t 1(λ = 1)
]
+ 2Iλ(t)
(6.9)
and
E
[∣∣MˆN(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2] ≤ 2 σ2min{N, t} + 2IN(t). (6.10)
If the processes (et)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, then
E
[∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2] ≤ σ2 [ (1− λ)(1+ λ) (1+ λt)(1− λt)1(λ < 1) + 1t 1(λ = 1)
]
+ Iλ(t) (6.11)
and
E
[∣∣MˆN(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2] ≤ σ2min{N, t} + IN(t), (6.12)
with equality in (6.11), (6.12) if the disturbance terms are homoscedastic, i.e. E[e2t | Ft−1] = σ2
for all t ∈N.
The first terms of the righthandsides of (6.9) - (6.12) are related to the natural fluctuations
in demand. The lower these fluctuations, measured by σ2, the lower this part of the
estimation error becomes. The second terms of the righthandsides of (6.9) - (6.12) relate
to the impact that market fluctuations have on the quality of the estimate of M(t).
6.4 Pricing policy and performance bounds
The two estimation methods (I) and (II), introduced in Section 6.3, can be used by the
seller to determine the selling prices. We study the situation where the seller uses the
following simple, myopic pricing policy: at each decision moment, the seller estimates
the market value with one of the two estimation methods described in Section 6.3. Sub-
sequently, s/he chooses the selling price that is optimal w.r.t. this estimate. In other
words, the seller always acts as if the current estimate of the market is correct.
We denote this policy by Φλ if the market is estimated by method (I), with forgetting
factor λ, and by ΦN if the market is estimated by method (II), with sliding window of
size N. The formal description of Φλ and ΦN is as follows.
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Myopic pricing policy Φλ / ΦN
Initialization: Choose λ ∈ [0, 1] or N ∈N≥2 ∪ {∞}.
Set p1 ∈ [pl , ph] arbitrarily.
For all t ∈N:
Estimation: Let Mˆ·(t) denote either Mˆλ(t) (for policy Φλ) or MˆN(t) (for policy ΦN).
Pricing: Set pt+1 = p∗(max{0, Mˆ·(t)}).
The following theorem provides upper bounds on the (long run) average regret, for
both myopic pricing policies Φλ and ΦN :
Theorem 6.1. There is a K0 > 0, only depending on g, such that for all T ≥ 2,
AverageRegret(Φλ, T) ≤ 2K0 1T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
Iλ(t) + 2K0σ2
[
1+ log(T − 1)
T − 1
]
1(λ = 1)
+ 2K0σ2
[
1− λ
1+ λ
+
2
T − 1
(
λ log(λ) + (1− λ) log(1− λ)
(1+ λ) log(λ)
)]
1(λ < 1),
and
AverageRegret(ΦN , T) ≤ 2K0T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t)
+ 2K0σ2
[
log(min{T − 1, N})
T − 1 +
1
min{N, T − 1}
]
.
Consequentially,
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1+ λ
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
]
, (6.13)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], and
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
IN(t)
]
, (6.14)
for all N ∈N≥2 ∪ {∞}, where we write 1/∞ = 0.
The main idea of the proof is to show that there is a K0 > 0 such that for any M and
M′, we have r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) ≤ K0(M−M′)2. Subsequently we apply the
bounds derived in Proposition 6.1.
Remark 6.4. By (6.11) and (6.12), if the processes (et)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are indepen-
dent, then all four inequalities of Theorem 6.1 are still valid if all righthandsides are
divided by 2.
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Remark 6.5. An explicit expression for K0 is derived in the proof of Theorem 6.1. To
obtain the most sharp bounds, one could also define K0 directly as
K0 = infM,M′>0,M 6=M′(r(p∗(M), M) − r(p∗(M′), M))/(M − M′)2. For the important
special case of a linear demand function, g(p) = −bp for some b > 0, it is not diffi-
cult to show p∗(M) = min{max{M/(2b), pl}, ph} and K0 = 1/(4b).
Remark 6.6. In dynamic pricing and learning studies that assume a stable market, one
often considers the asymptotic behavior of Regret(Φ, T) = (T− 1)AverageRegret(Φ, T),
where Φ the pricing policy that is used. Typically one proves bounds on the growth
rate of Regret(Φ, T) for a certain policy, e.g. Regret(Φ, T) = O(
√
T) or Regret(Φ, T) =
O(log(T)). A policy is considered ’good’ if the speed of convergence of the regret is
close the best achievable rate, cf. Chapters 3, 4, 5. In the setting with a changing market,
a simple example makes clear that one cannot do better than Regret(Φ, T) = O(T)
or AverageRegret(Φ, T) = O(1). Suppose M(t) is a Markov process taking values in
{M1, M2}, with M1 6= M2, and suppose P(M(t + 1) = Mi | M(t) = Mj) = 12 , for all
i, j ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ N. Let g(p) = −bp, for some b > 0, and choose [pl , ph] such that
p#(Mi) = Mi/(2b) ∈ (pl , ph), for i = 1, 2. Then for all t ∈ N, the instantaneous regret
incurred in period t + 1 satisfies
E [r(p∗(M(t + 1)), M(t + 1))− r(pt+1, M(t + 1))]
≥ inf
p∈[pl ,ph ]
[1
2
(r(p∗(M1), M1)− r(p, M1)) + 12 (r(p
∗(M2), M2)− r(p, M2))
]
≥ b
2
inf
p∈[pl ,ph ]
[
(p∗(M1)− p)2 + (p∗(M2)− p)2
]
≥ b
4
(p∗(M1)− p∗(M2))2
≥ 1
16b
(M1 −M2)2 > 0,
which implies that no policy can achieve a sub-linear Regret(Φ, T) = o(T). In fact,
any pricing policy achieves the optimal growth rate Regret(Φ, T) = O(T). Thus, the
challenge of dynamic pricing and learning in such a changing environment is not to
find a policy with optimal asymptotic growth rate, but rather to make the (long run)
average regret as small as possible.
In view of the remark above, the question raises whether the bounds from Theorem
6.1 are sharp. The following proposition answers this question for the case of a lin-
ear demand function with homoscedastic disturbance terms independent of the market
process.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose g(p) = −bp for some b > 0, E[e2t | Ft−1] = σ2 for all t ∈ N, the
processes (et)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, and M(t) ∈ [2bpl , 2bph] a.s. for all t ∈N.
Then with K0 = 1/(4b),
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) = K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1+ λ
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
]
, (6.15)
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for all λ ∈ [0, 1], and
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN) = K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
IN(t)
]
, (6.16)
for all N ∈N≥2 ∪ {∞}, where we write 1/∞ = 0.
6.5 Hedging against changes
The bounds on the regret that we derive in Theorem 6.1 can be used by the firm to
hedge against changes in the market. To this end, the firm should first decide what
type of changes it is anticipating on, in the form of assumptions on the market process.
Examples of such assumptions are (i) the market process is contained in an interval of
known size, (ii) the maximum change in the market between two consecutive periods is
bounded, (iii) market changes are bounded and occur only with a small probability, (iv)
the market process is a sequence of i.i.d. realizations of a random variable. Given such
assumptions on the market process, the firm can determine the corresponding optimal
choice of λ (in case policy Φλ is used) or N (in case of ΦN).
This is done as follows. First, one needs to translate the assumptions on the market
process into upper bounds on the impact measures Iλ(t) and IN(t). In particular, the
goal is to find (non-random) functions cT(λ) and cT(N), such that for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and
N ∈N≥2 ∪ {∞},
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
Iλ(t) ≤ cT(λ), (6.17)
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t) ≤ cT(N). (6.18)
By plugging these bounds into Theorem 6.1, we obtain bounds on both
AverageRegret(Φλ, T) and AverageRegret(ΦN , T) in terms of λ and N. The optimal
choices of λ and N are then determined by simply minimizing these bounds with re-
spect to λ and N. In some cases an explicit expression for the optimal choice may exist,
otherwise numerical methods are needed to determine the optimum.
The resulting optimal optimal λ and N may depend on the length of the time horizon
T. This may be undesirable to the firm, for instance because T is not known in advance,
or because the time horizon is infinite. In this case it is more appropriate to minimize
the LongRunAverageRegret. If c(λ) and c(N) are functions that satisfy
lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
Iλ(t) ≤ c(λ), (6.19)
lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t) ≤ c(N), (6.20)
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then (6.13) and (6.14) imply
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1+ λ
+ c(λ)
]
, (6.21)
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ c(N)
]
, (6.22)
and the optimal choices of λ and N can be determined by minimizing the righthand-
sides of (6.21) and (6.22).
Remark 6.7. It is interesting to observe that the optimal choices of λ and N are inde-
pendent of the function g. The relevant properties of g are captured by the constant K0,
but its value does not influence the optimal λ and N. In a way this separates optimal
estimation and optimal pricing: the first is determined by the impact of the market pro-
cess, while only the latter involves the function g. On the other hand, the variance of
the demand distribution, related to σ2, does influence the optimal λ and N. In addi-
tion, note that by Remark 6.4, the factor 2 on the righthandsides of (6.21) and (6.22)
can be removed if the processes (et)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent. In practice, it
may not always be known to the decision maker whether this condition is satisfied; but
fortunately, this does not influence the optimal choice of λ and N.
To illustrate the methodology, we now look in more detail to the market scenarios (i)
- (iv) mentioned in the beginning of this section. We derive the bound functions c(λ)
and c(N) for each scenario, and show how to choose λ and N in order to minimize the
righthandsides of (6.21) and (6.22).
Scenario (i). Bounds on the range of the market process. Here the firm assumes that for
all t ∈N, M(t) is a.s. contained in an interval with size d > 0. Then |M(i)−M(t+ 1)| ≤
d for all i = 1, . . . , t, and it follows that we can take c(λ) = c(N) = d2.
The righthandsides of (6.21) and (6.22) are minimized by taking λ = 1 and N = ∞. This
is true regardless the value of d.
At first sight it may seem somewhat surprising that it is beneficial to take into ac-
count all available sales data to estimate the market, including ’very old’ data. This
can be explained by noting that in a period t + 1, all preceding values of the market
M(1), . . . , M(t) may differ by d from the current value M(t+ 1). In such a volatile mar-
ket situation, it is best to ’accept’ an unavoidable error caused by market fluctuations,
and instead focus on minimizing the estimation error caused by natural fluctuations
e1, . . . , et in the demand distribution. This is best done when all available data is taken
into account; hence the optimality of choosing λ = 1 and N = ∞, even when d is very
small.
Scenario (ii). Bounds on one-step market changes. Here the firm assumes that for all
t ∈N, |M(t)−M(t + 1)| ≤ d a.s., for some d > 0. At the end of Section 6.7, we derive
c(λ) =
{
d2(1− λ)−2 if λ ∈ [0, 1)
∞ if λ = 1 ,
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and
c(N) =
{ 1
4 d
2(N + 1)2 if N ∈N≥2
∞ if N = ∞
.
Both c(λ) and c(N) are increasing in d. This can be interpreted as larger deviations in
the market process having more impact on the estimates. In addition, c(λ) and c(N)
are both increasing in its variables λ, N. This means that in this scenario, the impact
increases if more data is taken into account. This can be explained intuitively by ob-
serving that in this scenario, older data may have been influenced by more changes in
the market process than recent data.
Consider the upper bound (6.21). The derivative of σ2 (1−λ)
(1+λ) + d
2(1 − λ)−2 w.r.t. λ ∈
(0, 1) is zero if and only if (σ/d)2(1− λ)3 = (1 + λ)2; this follows from basic algebraic
manipulations. Since (1− λ)3 is decreasing and (1+ λ)2 is increasing in λ, we have the
following possibilities:
1. (σ/d)2 ≤ 1. Then σ2 (1−λ)
(1+λ) + d
2(1 − λ)−2 is increasing on λ ∈ (0, 1), and the
optimal choice is λ = 0.
2. (σ/d)2 > 1. Then there is a unique λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes σ2 (1−λ)
(1+λ) + d
2(1−
λ)−2. Although an explicit expression exists for λ∗, it is rather complicated, and
it is not informative to state it here. Computing λ∗ numerically is easy, and only
involves solving a cubic equation.
Now consider the upper bound (6.22). The expression σ
2
N +
1
4 d
2(N + 1)2 is minimized
by choosing N as the solution to N2(N + 1) = 2(σ/d)2, which follows by taking the
derivative w.r.t. N and some basic algebraic manipulations. It can easily be shown that
there is a unique solution N∗ ∈ R++, at which the minimum is attained, and that σ2N +
c(N) is minimized by choosing N as either bN∗c or dN∗e. If (σ/d)2 ≤ 10/4 then the
optimal N equals 1, if (σ/d)2 > 10/4 then the optimal N is strictly larger than 1.
In this scenario, the quantity (σ/d)2 serves as a proxy for the volatility of the market
process (M(t))t∈N relative to the variance of the disturbance terms (et)t∈N. Both for
Φλ and ΦN one can show that the optimal choice of λ and N is monotone increasing in
this quantity (σ/d)2. The larger the volatility of the market compared to the variance of
the disturbance terms, the fewer data should be used to estimate the market. If (σ/d)2
is sufficiently small, then the market fluctuations are quite large relative to the variance
of the disturbance terms, and it is optimal to take only the most recent data point into
account to estimate the market.
Scenario (iii). Bounded jump probabilities for the market process This scenario does
not only involve assumptions on the maximum amount of change in the market, but
also on the probability of change. In particular, the firm assumes that for all t ∈ N,
P (M(t + 1) 6= M(t)) ≤ e, and that all M(t) are contained in an interval of size d, for
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Figure 6.1: Relation between (σ/d)2 and λ∗, N∗, for scenario (ii)
some e ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0. At the end of Section 6.7, we derive
c(λ) =
{
d2e(1− λ2)−1 if λ ∈ [0, 1)
∞ if λ = 1
,
c(N) =
{
d2e (N+1)(2N+1)6N if N ∈N≥2
∞ if N = ∞
.
Both c(λ) and c(N) are increasing in d and e: the impact increases if market changes
occur more often (e increases), or if the magnitude of the jumps increases (d increases).
Furthermore, c(λ) and c(N) are both increasing in λ and N, which means that taking
more data into account increases the impact of market changes on the market estimate.
Consider the upper bound (6.21). The derivative of σ2 (1−λ)
(1+λ) + d
2e(1− λ2)−1 w.r.t. λ ∈
(0, 1) is zero if and only if σ
2
d2e (1− λ2)2 = λ(1 + λ)2; this follows from basic algebraic
manipulations. Since (1− λ2)2 is decreasing and λ(1 + λ)2 is increasing in λ, we have
the following possibilities:
1. σ
2
d2e ≤ 1. Then σ2
(1−λ)
(1+λ) + d
2e(1− λ2)−1 is increasing on λ ∈ (0, 1), and the optimal
choice is λ = 0.
2. σ
2
d2e > 1. Then there is a unique λ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes σ2 (1−λ)
(1+λ) + d
2e(1 −
λ2)−1. It is the unique solution in (0, 1) of the quartic equation σ2d2e (1− λ2)2 =
λ(1+ λ)2, which can easily be solved numerically.
Now consider the upper bound (6.22). The expression σ
2
N + d
2e
(N+1)(2N+1)
6N is minimized
onR++ by choosing N∗ =
√
3σ2
d2e +
1
2 , and the optimal N is equal to either bN∗c or dN∗e.
In addition, one can easily show that the optimal N equals 1 if σ
2
d2e ≤ 12 , and is strictly
larger than 1 if σ
2
d2e >
1
2 .
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The quantity σ
2
d2e serves as a proxy for the volatility of the market process (M(t))t∈N
relative to the variance of the disturbance terms (et)t∈N. A low value of σ
2
d2e means a
high volatility, a high value means a small volatility. This quantity is decreasing in the
jump probability e and the maximum market jump d, and increasing in the variance σ2
of the disturbance terms (et)t∈N. The effect of σ
2
d2e on λ
∗ and N∗ is shown in Figure 6.2.
It clearly shows that the smaller the volatility of the market (e.g. the larger σ
2
d2e ), the more
data should be taken into account to estimate the market process.
Figure 6.2: Relation between σ
2
d2e and λ
∗, N∗, for scenario (iii)
Scenario (iv). Market process as i.i.d. sequence. In this last scenario we consider, the
firm assumes that (M(t))t∈N is a sequence of i.i.d. realizations of a random variable X
on [0,∞), with finite variance denoted by Var(X). At the end of Section 6.7, we show
c(λ) = Var(X)
2
1+ λ
,
and
c(N) = Var(X)
(
1+
1
N
)
,
where we write 1/∞ = 0.
These bounds are increasing in Var(X): the higher the variance, the larger the impact of
market fluctuations on the estimates. Both c(λ) and c(N) are decreasing in its variables
λ resp. N, and the righthandsides of (6.22) and (6.21) are minimized by taking λ = 1 and
N = ∞; in other words, in this scenario it is optimal to take into account all available
data to estimate the market process.
Remark 6.8. The above presented methodology of hedging against change has some
similarities with robust optimization. There, one usually considers optimization prob-
lems whose optimal solutions depend on some parameters. These parameters are not
known exactly by the decision maker, but assumed to lie in a certain “uncertainty
set” which is known in advance. The optimal decision is then determined by opti-
mizing against the worst case of the possible parameter values. An improvement of
our methodology compared to robust optimization, is that we allow for many differ-
ent types of assumptions on the market process, as illustrated by the four scenarios
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described above. In contrast, robust optimization generally only assumes a setting of
an uncertainty set (comparable to our scenario (i)); trends, or Markov-modulated pro-
cesses, are generally not considered. In addition, in robust optimization there is often
no learning of the unknown parameters, whereas our methodology allows using accu-
mulating data to estimate the unknown process; in several instances this enables us to
“track” the market process.
6.6 Numerical illustration
In this section, we perform several numerical experiments to illustrate the pricing policy
and choice of variables λ, N, as described in Section 6.5.
Experiment 1: continuously fluctuating market process. For each t, M(t) is an inde-
pendent realization of a random variable, uniformly distributed on the interval [21, 24].
Take g(p) = −p, pl = 5, ph = 15, and let (et)t∈N be i.i.d. realizations of a standard
normal distribution. For each λ ∈ {0.81, 0.82, . . . , 0.99, 1} we run 1000 simulations of
the policy Φλ, and for all N ∈ {5, 15, 25, . . . , 195}, we run 1000 simulations of ΦN .
Figure 6.3: Sample path of M(t) and Mˆ(t) in a continuously fluctuating market
Figure 6.3 shows a typical sample path of M(t) and Mˆ(t), both for Φλ and ΦN . The
market, indicated by the solid line, is continuously fluctuating around its mean, 22.5.
The market estimate, depicted by the dashed line, stays much closer to 22.5.
The solid lines in Figure 6.4 show the simulation average of AverageRegret at t = 2000
for both Φλ and ΦN , at different values of λ. The dashed lines show the upper bounds
K0(σ2 1−λ1+λ + c(λ)) for Φλ, and K0(σ
2/N + c(N)) for ΦN , where c(λ) and c(N) are as
in Scenario (iv), K0 = 1/4 and Var(M(t)) = 3/4 for all t ∈ N. Note that (et)t∈N and
(M(t))t∈N are here independent, and thus by Remark 6.7, the factor 2 in the righthand-
sides of (6.21) and (6.22) is not present. The dashed and solid lines practically coincide
in these figures.
This figure shows exactly the structure predicted by Scenario (iv): the average regret
decreases as λ or N increases. The optimal choice of λ and N that minimize the long
run average regret, is to set λ = 1 and N = ∞.
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Figure 6.4: AverageRegret(Φλ, 2000) and AverageRegret(ΦN , 2000) for experiment 1.
Experiment 2: Bass model for market process. The Bass model (Bass, 1969) is a widely-
used model to describe the life-cycle or diffusion of an innovative product. An impor-
tant property of this model is that the market process M(t) is dependent on the realized
cumulative sales up to time t. The model for M(t) is
M(t) = max
{
0, a + b
t−1
∑
i=1
di + c
( t−1
∑
i=1
di
)2},
cf. equation (4) of Dodds (1973). We choose a = 33.6, c = −10−6 and b = 0.0116, and
set g(p) = −p, pl = 1 and ph = 50. Let (et)t∈N be i.i.d. realizations of a standard
normal distribution. The characteristic shape of the market that arises from this model,
is depicted in Figure 6.5. The solid lines denote a sample path of M(t), the dashed lines
a sample path of the estimates Mˆλ(t) and MˆN(t).
Figure 6.5: Sample path of M(t) and Mˆ(t) in the Bass-model
For each λ ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, . . . , 0.90} we run 1000 simulations of the policy Φλ, and
for all N ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . . , 25}, we run 1000 simulations of ΦN .
The solid lines in Figure 6.6 show the simulation-average of AverageRegret at t = 500
for both Φλ and ΦN , at different values of λ. The dashed lines show the upper bounds
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2K0(σ2 1−λ1+λ + c(λ)) for Φλ, and 2K0(σ
2/N + c(N)) for ΦN , where c(λ) and c(N) are as
in Scenario (ii), σ2 = 1, K0 = 1/4, and d = 0.27 (this was the largest observed value of
|M(t + 1)−M(t)| over all t and all simulations. Of course, this quantity is in practice
not observed by the seller, and a larger value of d just shifts the dashed lines upward in
the figure).
Figure 6.6: AverageRegret(Φλ, 500) and AverageRegret(ΦN , 500) for experiment 2.
The optimal value of λ according to our upper bound equals λ = 0.45, with a corre-
sponding upper bound on the regret of 0.31. The simulation average of
AverageRegret(Φ0.45, 500) was equal to 0.27. The optimal value of λ according to the
simulations, was λ = 0.60, with a simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ0.60, 500)
equal to 0.26.
The optimal value of N according to our upper bound equals N = 3, with a correspond-
ing upper bound on the regret of 0.32. The simulation average of
AverageRegret(Φ3, 500) was equal to 0.27. The optimal value of N according to the
simulations, was N = 4, with a simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ4, 500) equal to
0.26.
Figure 6.6 illustrates that taking into account all available data (λ = 1 or N = ∞) would
lead to a very large regret. Thus, in this scenario, taking into account the changing
nature of the market process improves the performance of the firm significantly.
Experiment 3: presence of price-changing competitors. Suppose the firm is acting in an
environment where several competing companies are selling substitute products on the
market. The firm knows that the competitors occasionally update their selling prices,
but is not aware of the moments at which these changes occur. For this setting, the
assumptions of scenario (iii) are appropriate.
In particular, consider the following case. The firm assumes that in each period, the
probability that the market process changes because of the behavior of competitors, is
not more than e. If a change occurs, the maximum jump is assumed to be not more than
d.
We choose g(p) = −p, pl = 1 and ph = 50, and let e = 0.02, d = 5. At each period t a
realization zt of a uniformly distributed random variable on [0, 1] is drawn. If zt ≥ 0.02
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then M(t) = M(t− 1); otherwise, M(t) is drawn uniformly from the interval [30, 35].
Let (et)t∈N be i.i.d. realizations of a standard normal distribution. (Note that these differ
from the constant e determined by the firm).
The characteristic the shape of the market that arises from this model, is depicted in
Figure 6.7. The solid lines denote a sample path of M(t), the dashed lines a sample path
of the estimates Mˆλ(t) and MˆN(t).
Figure 6.7: Sample path of M(t) and Mˆ(t) in the model with price-changing competi-
tors.
For each λ ∈ {0.10, 0.15, 0.20, . . . , 0.95} we run 1000 simulations of the policy Φλ, and
for all N ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . . , 25}, we run 1000 simulations of ΦN .
The solid lines in Figure 6.8 show the simulation average of AverageRegret at t = 500
for both Φλ and ΦN , at different values of λ. The dashed lines show the upper bounds
K0(σ2 1−λ1+λ + c(λ)) for Φλ, and K0(σ
2/N + c(N)) for ΦN , where c(λ) and c(N) are as in
Scenario (iii), σ2 = 1, K0 = 1/4, e = 0.02, and d = 5. Note that (et)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N
are here independent, and thus by Remark 6.7, the factor 2 in the righthandsides of
(6.21) and (6.22) is not present.
Figure 6.8: AverageRegret(Φλ, 500) and AverageRegret(ΦN , 500) for experiment 3.
The optimal value of λ according to our upper bound equals λ = 0.50, with a corre-
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sponding upper bound on the regret of 0.25.The simulation average of
AverageRegret(Φ0.50, 500) was equal to 0.11. The optimal value of λ according to the
simulations, was λ = 0.75, with a simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ0.75, 500)
equal to 0.08.
The optimal value of N according to our upper bound equals N = 3, with a correspond-
ing upper bound on the regret of 0.28. The simulation average of
AverageRegret(Φ3, 500) was equal to 0.12. The optimal value of N according to the
simulations, was N = 6, with a simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ6, 500) equal to
0.09.
Figure 6.8 illustrates that taking into account all available data (i.e. λ = 1 or N = ∞)
would lead to much larger regret than obtained at the optimal λ and N. Thus, similar
to scenario (ii), taking into account the changing nature of the market process leads to a
significant profit improvement.
6.7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6.1
Equation (6.6) can be rewritten as
Mˆλ(t)−M(t + 1) = ∑
t
i=1 eiλ
t−i
∑ti=1 λt−i
+
∑ti=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∑ti=1 λt−i
.
Note that (∑ti=1 λ
t−i)−1 = (1 − λt)−1(1 − λ)1(λ < 1) + 1t 1(λ = 1) and E
[
eiej
]
=
E
[
eiE
[
ej | Fi
]]
= 0 whenever i < j. As a result,
E
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑i=1 eiλt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 = t∑
i=1
λ2(t−i)E
[
e2i
]
≤ σ2
(
1− λ2t
1− λ2 1(λ < 1) + t1(λ = 1)
)
,
and (6.9) follows using |a + b|2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2 for all a, b ∈ R, and(
1− λ2t
1− λ2 1(λ < 1) + t1(λ = 1)
)(
1− λ
1− λt 1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
)2
=
1− λ
1+ λ
1+ λt
1− λt 1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1).
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If (et)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, then E[ei M(j)] = 0 for all i, j ∈N, and (6.11)
follows from
E
[∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2] = E
∣∣∣∣∣∑ti=1 eiλt−i∑ti=1 λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ E
∣∣∣∣∣∑ti=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i∑ti=1 λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ σ2
∣∣∣∣∣∑ti=1 λt−i∑ti=1 λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ E
∣∣∣∣∣∑ti=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i∑ti=1 λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ,
with equality if (et)t∈N is homoscedastic.
Similarly, equation (6.8) can be rewritten as
MˆN(t)−M(t + 1) = 1min{N, t}
( t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
ei +
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
M(i)−M(t + 1)
)
.
Equation (6.10) follows using |a + b|2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2 for all a, b ∈ R, and by noting
E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
ei
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
 = 1min{N, t}2 t∑i=1+(t−N)+ E
[
e2i
]
≤ σ2/ min{N, t}.
If (et)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, then E[ei M(j)] = 0 for all i, j ∈N, and (6.12)
follows from
E
[∣∣MˆN(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2]
= E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
ei
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
M(i)−M(t + 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ σ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
M(i)−M(t + 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ,
with equality if (et)t∈N is homoscedastic.
Proof of Theorem 6.1
We prove the theorem in two steps. In step 1, we show that there exists a K0 > 0 such
that for all M ≥ 0, M′ ∈ R,
r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) ≤ K0(M−M′)2. (6.23)
In step 2 we apply this result with M = M(t), M′ = Mˆλ(t) or M′ = MˆN(t), to obtain
the regret bounds.
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Step 1.
Fix M ≥ 0, and let r′(p, M) and r′′(p, M) denote the first and second derivative of
r(p, M) w.r.t. p. Let M′ ∈ R.
Case 1: p∗(M) = p#(M). Then r′(p∗(M), M) = 0, and a Taylor series expansion yields
r(p, M) = r(p∗(M), M) + 1
2
r′′( p˜, M)(p− p∗(M))2,
for some p˜ on the line segment between p and p∗(M). Let
K1 = sup
p∈P
|r′′(p, M)| = sup
p∈P
|2g′(p) + g′′(p)|,
and note that K1 is independent of M, and finite, because of the continuity of g′′(p).
Then
r(p∗(M), M)− r(p, M) ≤ K1
2
(p− p∗(M))2 for all p ∈ P . (6.24)
Write h(p) = −g(p)− pg′(p), and note that r′(p, M) = M− h(p). By assumption, for
each M ≥ 0 there is a unique p#(M) such that h(p) = M, i.e. p#(M) = h−1(M) is
well-defined. In addition, for all M ∈ h(P) = {h(p) | p ∈ P}, we have ∂∂M p#(M) =
(h−1)′(M) = 1/h′(h−1(M)) = −1/r′′(p∗(M), M) > 0. Thus, p#(M) is continuous,
differentiable, and monotone increasing on M ∈ h(P). These properties imply the
following: if there is an M ≥ 0 s.t. p#(M) > ph, then there is an Mh > 0 s.t. h−1(M) > ph
whenever M > Mh, h−1(Mh) = ph, and h−1(M) < ph whenever M < Mh. Similarly,
if there is an M ≥ 0 s.t. p#(M) < ph, then there is an Ml ∈ (0, Mh) s.t. h−1(M) > pl
whenever M > Ml , h−1(Ml) = pl , and h−1(M) < pl whenever M < Ml .
If M′ ≥ 0 and p∗(M′) = p#(M′), then a Taylor expansion yields
|p∗(M′)− p∗(M)| = |h−1(M′)− h−1(M)| ≤ |M′ −M|K2,
where K2 = supM∈h(P) |(h−1)′(M)| = 1/ infM∈h(P) |r′′(p∗(M), M)|, which is finite by
assumption.
If M′ ≥ 0 and p∗(M′) < p#(M′), then p∗(M′) = p∗(Mh) = ph, M′ > Mh, and
|p∗(M′)− p∗(M)| = |p∗(Mh)− p∗(M)| ≤ |Mh −M|K2 ≤ |M′ −M|K2.
If M′ ≥ 0 and p∗(M′) > p#(M′), then p∗(M′) = p∗(Ml) = pl , M′ < Ml , and
|p∗(M′)− p∗(M)| = |p∗(Ml)− p∗(M)| ≤ |Ml −M|K2 ≤ |M′ −M|K2,
It follows that |p∗(M′)− p∗(M)| ≤ K2|M′ − M| for all M′ ≥ 0, and thus by (6.24) we
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have
r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) ≤ 1
2
K1K22(M
′ −M)2, (6.25)
for all M′ ≥ 0, M ∈ h(P). That this inequality is also valid when M′ < 0, follows
immediately from the observation
r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) = r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(0), M) ≤ 1
2
K1K22(0−M)2
≤ 1
2
K1K22(M
′ −M)2.
Case 2: p∗(M) 6= p#(M). Then M /∈ [Ml , Mh]. Suppose M > Mh, the case M < Ml is
treated likewise. Suppose M′ ≥ 0. If M′ > Mh then r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) = 0,
suppose therefore M′ ≤ Mh. We have
r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) = r(p∗(Mh), M)− r(p∗(M′), M)
=p∗(Mh)[M + g(p∗(Mh))]− p∗(M′)[M + g(p∗(M′))]
=r(p∗(Mh), Mh)− r(p∗(M′), Mh) + (p∗(Mh)− p∗(M′))(M−Mh)
≤1
2
K1K22(M
′ −Mh)2 + K2(Mh −M′)(M−Mh)
≤
(
1
2
K1K22 +
1
4
K2
)
(M′ −M)2,
where in the last inequality we use the fact xy ≤ 14 (x+ y)2, x, y ∈ R, with x = Mh−M′,
y = M−Mh.
We have proven that for all M ∈ R, M′ ≥ 0,
r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) ≤
(
1
2
K1K22 +
1
4
K2
)
(M′ −M)2,
That this inequality is also valid when M′ < 0, follows immediately from the observa-
tion
r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(M′), M) = r(p∗(M), M)− r(p∗(0), M)
≤
(
1
2
K1K22 +
1
4
K2
)
(0−M)2
≤
(
1
2
K1K22 +
1
4
K2
)
(M′ −M)2.
This completes the proof of (6.23), with K0 = 12 K1K
2
2 +
1
4 K2.
Step 2.
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By Proposition 6.1, we obtain
AverageRegret(Φλ, T)
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[
r(p∗(M(t + 1)), M(t + 1))− r(p∗(Mˆλ(t)), M(t + 1))
]
≤ K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2]
≤ 2K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
[
σ2
[
(1− λ)
(1+ λ)
(1+ λt)
(1− λt)1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
]
+ Iλ(t)
]
.
Since
T−1
∑
t=1
λt
1− λt =
λ
1− λ +
T−1
∑
t=2
λt
1− λt ≤
λ
1− λ +
∫ T−2
t=1
λt
1− λt dt
≤ λ
1− λ +
−1
log(λ)
∫ λ
x=0
1
1− x dx =
λ
1− λ +
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
,
we have for λ < 1,
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(1− λ)
(1+ λ)
(1+ λt)
(1− λt) =
1− λ
1+ λ
+
2
T − 1
1− λ
1+ λ
T−1
∑
t=1
λt
1− λt
≤ 1− λ
1+ λ
+
1
T − 1
(
2λ
1+ λ
+ 2
1− λ
1+ λ
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
)
, (6.26)
and thus
AverageRegret(Φλ, T)
≤2K0σ2
[
1− λ
1+ λ
+
1
T − 1
(
2λ
1+ λ
+ 2
1− λ
1+ λ
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
)]
1(λ < 1)
+2K0σ2
[
1+ log(T − 1)
T − 1
]
1(λ = 1)
+
2K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
Iλ(t).
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In addition, we have
AverageRegret(ΦN , T)
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[
r(p∗(M(t + 1)), M(t + 1))− r(p∗(MˆN(t)), M(t + 1))
]
≤ K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[∣∣MˆN(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2]
≤ 2K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
[
σ2
min{N, t} + IN(t)
]
≤2K0σ2
[
log(min{T − 1, N})
T − 1 +
1
min{N, T − 1}
]
+
2K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t),
where we used
T−1
∑
t=1
1
min{N, t} =
N
∑
t=1
1
t
+
T−1
∑
t=N+1
1
N
≤ 1+ log(N) + T − 1− N
N
if T − 1 ≥ N,
T−1
∑
t=1
1
min{N, t} =
T−1
∑
t=1
1
t
≤ 1+ log(T − 1) if T − 1 < N,
and thus
T−1
∑
t=1
1
min{N, t} ≤ log(min{T − 1, N}) +
T − 1
min{N, T − 1} .
Proof of Proposition 6.2
The condition M(t) ∈ [2bpl , 2bph] a.s., for all t ∈ N, implies p∗(M) = M/(2b) for all
attainable values of M, and r(p∗(M), M) − r(p∗(M′), M)) = (M − M′)2/(4b) for all
attainable values of M and M′. By Proposition 6.1 we obtain
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[
r(p∗(M(t + 1)), M(t + 1))− r(p∗(Mˆλ(t)), M(t + 1))
]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
[
σ2
[
(1− λ)
(1+ λ)
(1+ λt)
(1− λt)1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
]
+ Iλ(t)
]
=K0
[
σ2
(1− λ)
(1+ λ)
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
]
,
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and
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[
r(p∗(M(t + 1)), M(t + 1))− r(p∗(MˆN(t)), M(t + 1))
]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
[∣∣MˆN(t)−M(t + 1)∣∣2]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
[
σ2
min{N, t} + IN(t)]
=K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t)
]
.
Calculation of cT(λ), c(λ), cT(N) and c(N) for scenario (2)
Let λ ∈ [0, 1). Then
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t−1
Iλ(t)
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− λ1− λt t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ 1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(1− λ)2
(1− λt)2
∣∣∣∣∣t+1∑i=1 d(t + 1− i)λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(1− λ)2
(1− λt)2 d
2
∣∣∣∣∣(t + 1) t+1∑i=1 λt−i −
t+1
∑
i=1
iλt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(1− λ)2
(1− λt)2 d
2
∣∣∣∣ (t + 1)(1− λt+1)λ(1− λ) − (t + 1)λ(1− λ) + (1− λt+1)(1− λ)2
∣∣∣∣2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(1− λ)2
(1− λt)2 d
2
∣∣∣−(t + 1)(1− λ)−1λt + (1− λ)−2(1− λt+1)∣∣∣2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(1− λ)−2
(1− λt)2 d
2
∣∣∣−(t + 1)(1− λ)λt + (1− λt+1)∣∣∣2
=
1
T − 1 (1− λ)
−2d2
T−1
∑
t=1
((
1− λt − tλt + tλt+1)
(1− λt)
)2
=
1
T − 1 (1− λ)
−2d2
T−1
∑
t=1
(
1− tλt 1− λ
1− λt
)2
,
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where we used ∑t+1i=1(t + 1)λ
t−i = (t + 1)λ−1(1− λ)−1(1− λt+1) and
t+1
∑
i=1
iλt−i =
t+1
∑
i=1
λt−i
i
∑
j=1
1 =
t+1
∑
j=1
t+1
∑
i=j
λt−i =
t+1
∑
j=1
(
λ−1
t+1
∑
i=1
λt+1−i − λt−j+1
j−1
∑
i=1
λj−1−i
)
=
t+1
∑
j=1
(
λ−1(1− λ)−1(1− λt+1)− λt−j+1(1− λ)−1(1− λj−1))
= (t + 1)λ−1(1− λ)−1(1− λt+1)− (1− λ)−1
t+1
∑
j=1
(
λt−j+1 − λt))
= (t + 1)λ−1(1− λ)−1(1− λt+1)− (1− λ)−1((1− λ)−1(1− λt+1)− (t + 1)λt)
= (t + 1)λ−1(1− λ)−1 − (1− λ)−2(1− λt+1).
We obtain
cT(λ) = (1− λ)−2d2 1T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(
1− tλt 1− λ
1− λt
)2
,
and taking the lim supT→∞ yields c(λ) = (1− λ)−2d2. For λ = 1,
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t−1
Iλ(t)
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ 1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=1 d(t + 1− i)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
d2
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=1 i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
d2
(t + 1)2
4
,
and lim supT→∞
1
T−1 ∑
T−1
t=1 d
2 (t+1)2
4 = ∞.
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Let N ∈N≥2, then
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t)
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ 1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
d(t + 1− i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣ dmin{N, t}
min{N,t}
∑
j=1
j
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
1
4
d2(min{N, t}+ 1)2
=
d2
4
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(N + 1)2 +
d2
4
1
T − 1
min{T−1,N−1}
∑
t=1
[(t + 1)2 − (N + 1)2]
=
d2
4
(N + 1)2 +
d2
4
1
T − 1
[
−min{T − 1, N − 1}(N + 1)2 +
min{T,N}
∑
t=2
t2
]
=
d2
4
(N + 1)2 +
d2
4
1
T − 1 ·[
(1−min{T, N})(N + 1)2 − 1+min{T, N}(min{T, N}+ 1)(2 min{T, N}+ 1)/6
]
,
where we used ∑Nt=1 t
2 = N(N + 1)(2N + 1)/6. After some algebraic manipulations,
we derive that
cT(N) =

1
4 d
2−1+T(T+1)(2T+1)/6
T−1 if T < N
1
4 d
2
[
(N + 1)2 + 1T−1 N(−4N2 − 3N + 7)/6
]
if T ≥ N .
Taking lim supT→∞, we obtain c(N) =
1
4 d
2(N + 1)2. For N = ∞,
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t) =
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ 1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=1 d(t + 1− i)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
d2
(t + 1)2
4
,
and lim supT→∞
1
T−1 ∑
T−1
t=1 d
2 (t+1)2
4 = ∞.
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Calculation of cT(λ), c(λ), cT(N) and c(N) for scenario (3)
For t ∈N, define
X(t) = min{k ∈ {1, . . . , t + 1} | M(k) = M(k + 1) = . . . = M(t + 1)},
and note that P(X(t) = k) ≤ P(M(k− 1) 6= M(k)) ≤ e. for all k = 2, . . . , t + 1.
For λ ∈ [0, 1),
E
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

=
t+1
∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k
 P(X(t) = k)
≤
t+1
∑
k=2
E
∣∣∣∣∣k−1∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k
 e
≤
t+1
∑
k=2
d2
∣∣∣∣∣k−1∑i=1 λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
e
=
t+1
∑
k=2
d2
∣∣∣λt−(k−1)(1− λ)−1(1− λk−1)∣∣∣2 e
=
t
∑
k=1
d2λ2(t−k)(1− λ)−2(1− 2λk + λ2k)e
=d2e(1− λ)−2[(1− λ2)−1(1− λ2t)− 2λt(1− λ)−1(1− λt) + tλ2t],
and thus
c(λ) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t−1
Iλ(t)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− λ1− λt t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
1
(1− λt)2 d
2e[(1− λ2)−1(1− λ2t)− 2λt(1− λ)−1(1− λt) + tλ2t]
= d2e(1− λ2)−1.
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For λ = 1,
1
t
E
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
2

=
t+1
∑
k=1
1
t
E
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k
 P(X(t) = k)
≤
t+1
∑
k=2
1
t
d2(k− 1)2e =
t
∑
k=1
1
t
d2k2e = d2e(t + 1)(2t + 1)/6,
and lim supT→∞
1
T−1 ∑
T−1
t=1 d
2e(t + 1)(2t + 1)/6 = ∞.
Let N ∈N≥2, then
IN(t) = E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

=
t+1
∑
k=1
E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k
 P(X(t) = k)
≤
t+1
∑
k=2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
k−1
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
e
= d2e
t
∑
k=1+(t−N)+
(
k− (t− N)+
min{N, t}
)2
= d2e
min{N,t}
∑
k=1
(
k
min{N, t}
)2
= d2e
(min{N, t}+ 1)(2 min{N, t}+ 1)
6 min{N, t} ,
and thus
c(N) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t)
≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
d2e
(min{N, t}+ 1)(2 min{N, t}+ 1)
6 min{N, t}
=d2e
(N + 1)(2N + 1)
6N
.
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If N = ∞, then
lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
IN(t)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
2

= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
t+1
∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k
 P(X(t) = k)
≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
t+1
∑
k=2
∣∣∣∣∣1t k−1∑i=1 d
∣∣∣∣∣
2
e
=∞.
Calculation of cT(λ), c(λ), cT(N) and c(N) for scenario (4)
Let λ ∈ [0, 1). Then
E
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

=E
[
t
∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t + 1))2λ2(t−i)
]
+E
[
∑
i 6=j,1≤i,j≤t
(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i(M(j)−M(t + 1))λt−j
]
=
t
∑
i=1
E
[
M(i)2 + M(t + 1)2 − 2M(i)M(t + 1)
]
λ2(t−i)
+ ∑
i 6=j,1≤i,j≤t
E
[
M(i)M(j)−M(i)M(t + 1)−M(t + 1)M(j) + M(t + 1)2
]
λ2t−i−j
=(E
[
X2
]
− E [X]2)
t
∑
i=1
2λ2(t−i) + ∑
i 6=j,1≤i,j≤t
(E
[
X2
]
− E [X]2)λ2t−i−j
=(E
[
X2
]
− E [X]2)
(
t
∑
i=1
λ2(t−i) +
t
∑
i=1
λt−i
t
∑
j=1
λt−j
)
=Var(X)
(
(1− λ2)−1(1− λ2t) + (1− λ)−2(1− λt)2
)
,
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and thus
c(λ) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(1− λ)2
(1− λt)2 Var(X)
(
(1− λ2)−1(1− λ2t) + (1− λ)−2(1− λt)2
)
= Var(X)
(
(1− λ)2(1− λ2)−1 + 1
)
= Var(X)
2
1+ λ
.
If λ = 1 then
E
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑i=1(M(i)−M(t + 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

=(E
[
X2
]
− E [X]2)
(
t
∑
i=1
1+
t
∑
i=1
t
∑
j=1
1
)
=Var(X)(t + t2),
and
c(1) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
1
t2
Var(X)(t + t2)
= Var(X).
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Let N ∈N≥2 ∪ {∞}, then
E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

=E
[
1
min{N, t}2
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t + 1))2
+
1
min{N, t}2 ∑i 6=j,1+(t−N)+≤i,j≤t
(M(i)−M(t + 1))(M(j)−M(t + 1))
]
=
1
min{N, t}2
[
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
E
[
M(i)2 + M(t + 1)2 − 2M(i)M(t + 1)
]
+ ∑
i 6=j,1+(t−N)+≤i,j≤t
E
[
M(i)M(j)−M(i)M(t + 1)−M(t + 1)M(j) + M(t + 1)2
] ]
=
2
min{N, t} (E
[
X2
]
− E [X]2) + min{N, t} − 1
min{N, t} (E
[
X2
]
− E [X]2)
=
(
1+
1
min{N, t}
)
Var(X),
and thus
c(N) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
E

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1min{N, t}
t
∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t + 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1
∑
t=1
(
1+
1
min{N, t}
)
Var(X)
=Var(X)
(
1+
1
N
)
.
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Chapter 7
Mean square convergence rates for maximum
quasi-likelihood estimators
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Motivation
We consider a statistical model of the form
E [Y(x)] = h(xTβ(0)), Var(Y(x)) = v(E [Y(x)]), (7.1)
where x ∈ Rd is a design variable, Y(x) is a random variable whose distribution de-
pends on x, β(0) ∈ Rd is an unknown parameter, and h and v are known functions on
R. Such models arise, for example, from generalized linear models (GLMs), where in
addition to (7.1) one requires that the distribution of Y(x) comes from the exponential
family (cf. Nelder and Wedderburn (1972), McCullagh and Nelder (1983), Gill (2001)).
We are interested in making inference on the unknown parameter β(0).
In GLMs, this is commonly done via maximum-likelihood estimation. Given a sequence
of design variables (xi)1≤i≤n and observed responses (yi)1≤i≤n, where each yi is a real-
ization of the random variable Y(xi), the maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) βˆn is a
solution to the equation ln(β) = 0, where ln(β) is defined as
ln(β) =
n
∑
i=1
h˙(xTi β)
v(h(xTi β))
xi(yi − h(xTi β)), (7.2)
and where h˙ denotes the derivative of h.
As discussed by Wedderburn (1974) and McCullagh (1983), if one drops the requirement
that the distribution of Y(x) is a member of the exponential family, and only assumes
(7.1), one can still make inference on β by solving ln(β) = 0. The solution βˆn is then
called a maximum quasi-likelihood estimator (MQLE) of β(0).
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In this chapter, we are interested in the quality of the estimate βˆn for models satisfying
(7.1) by considering the expected value of ||βˆn − β(0)||2, where ||·|| denotes the Eu-
clidean norm. We derive conditions such that βˆn converges a.s. to β(0) as t grows large,
and obtain bounds on the mean square convergence rates. These bounds are key in
proving regret bounds for the pricing policies considered in Chapters 3,4 and 5.
7.1.2 Literature
Although much literature is devoted to the (asymptotic) behavior of maximum (quasi-
)likelihood estimators for models of the form (7.1), practically all of them focus on a.s.
upper bounds on ||βˆn − β(0)|| instead of mean square bounds. The literature may be
classified according to the following criteria:
1. Assumptions on (in)dependence of design variables and error terms.
The sequence of vectors (xi)i∈N is called the design, and the error terms (ei)i∈N
are defined as
ei = yi − h(xTi β(0)), (i ∈N).
Typically, one either assumes a fixed design, with all xi non-random and the ei
mutually independent, or an adaptive design, where the sequence (ei)i∈N forms
a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. its natural filtration and where the design
variables (xi)i∈N are predictable w.r.t. this filtration. This last setting is appropri-
ate for sequential decision problems under uncertainty, where decisions are made
based on current parameter-estimates.
2. Assumptions on the dispersion of the design vectors.
Define the design matrix
Pn =
n
∑
i=1
xixTi , (7.3)
and denote by λmin(Pn), λmax(Pn) the smallest and largest eigenvalues of Pn.
Bounds on ||βˆn − β(0)|| are typically stated in terms of these two eigenvalues,
which in some sense quantify the amount of dispersion in the sequence (xi)i∈N.
3. Assumptions on the link function.
In GLM terminology, h−1 is called the link function. It is called canonical or natural
if h˙ = v ◦ h, otherwise it is called a general or non-canonical link function. For
canonical link functions, the quasi-likelihood equations (7.2) simplify to ln(β) =
∑ni=1 xi(yi − h(xTi β)) = 0.
To these three sets of assumptions, one usually adds smoothness conditions on h and v,
and assumptions on the moments of the error terms.
An early result on the asymptotic behavior of solutions to (7.2), is from Fahrmeir and
Kaufmann (1985). For fixed design and canonical link function, provided λmin(Pn) =
Ω(λmax(Pn)1/2+δ) a.s. for a δ > 0 and some other regularity assumptions, they prove
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asymptotic existence and strong consistency of (βˆn)n∈N (their Corollary 1; for the def-
inition of Ω(·), O(·) and o(·), see the next paragraph on notation). For general link
functions, these results are proven assuming λmin(Pn) = Ω(λmax(Pn)) a.s. and some
other regularity conditions (their Theorem 5). Chen et al. (1999) consider only canonical
link functions. In the fixed design case, they obtain strong consistency and convergence
rates
||βˆn − β(0)|| = o({(log(λmin(Pn)))1+δ/λmin(Pn)}1/2) a.s.,
for any δ > 0; in the adaptive design case, they obtain convergence rates
||βˆn − β(0)|| = O({(log(λmax(Pn))/λmin(Pn)}1/2) a.s.
Their proof however is reported to contain a mistake, see Zhang and Liao (2008, page
1289). Chang (1999) extends these convergence rates for adaptive designs to general
link functions, under the additional condition λmin(Pn) = Ω(nα) a.s. for some α > 1/2.
His proof however also appears to contain a mistake, see Remark 7.1. Yin et al. (2008)
extends the setting of Chang (1999), with adaptive design and general link function, to
multivariate response data. They obtain strong consistency and a.s. convergence rates
||βˆn − β(0)|| = o({λmax(Pn) log(λmax(Pn))}1/2{log(log(λmax(Pn)))}1/2+δ/λmin(Pn))
for δ > 0, under assumptions on λmin(Pn),λmax(Pn) that ensure that this asymptotic
upper bound is o(1) a.s. A recent study restricted to fixed designs and canonical link
functions is Zhang and Liao (2008), who show ||βˆn − β(0)|| = Op(λmin(Pn)−1/2), pro-
vided λmin(Pn) = Ω(λmax(Pn)1/2) a.s. and other regularity assumptions.
7.1.3 Assumptions and contributions
In contrast with the above-mentioned literature, we study bounds for the expected
value of ||βˆn − β(0)||2. The design is assumed to be adaptive; i.e. the error terms (ei)i∈N
form a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. the natural filtration {Fi}i∈N, and the de-
sign variables (xi)i∈N are predictable w.r.t. this filtration. For applications of our results
to sequential decision problems, where each new decision can depend on the most re-
cent parameter estimate, this is the appropriate setting to consider. In addition, we
assume supi∈N E
[
e2i | Fi−1
] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s. for some σ > 0, and supi∈N E [|ei|r] < ∞ for
some r > 2.
We consider general link functions, and only assume that h and v are thrice continuously
differentiable with h˙(z) > 0, v(h(z)) > 0 for all z ∈ R. Concerning the design vectors
(xi)i∈N, we assume that they are contained in a bounded subset X ⊂ Rd. Let λ1(Pn) ≤
λ2(Pn) denote the two smallest eigenvalues of the design matrix Pn (if the dimension
d of β(0) equals 1, write λ2(Pn) = λ1(Pn)). We assume that there is a (non-random)
n0 ∈ N such that Pn0 is invertible, and there are (non-random) functions L1, L2 on N
such that for all n ≥ n0: λ1(Pn) ≥ L1(n), λ2(Pn) ≥ L2(n), and
L1(n) ≥ cnα, for some c > 0, 12 < α ≤ 1 independent of n. (7.4)
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Based on these assumptions, we obtain three important results concerning the asymp-
totic existence of βˆn and bounds on E[||βˆn − β(0)||2]:
1. First, notice that a solution to (7.2) need not always exist. Following Chang (1999),
we therefore define the last-time that there is no solution in a neighborhood of
β(0):
Nρ = sup
{
n ≥ n0 : there is no β ∈ Rd with ln(β) = 0 and
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ} .
For all sufficiently small ρ > 0, we show in Theorem 7.1 that Nρ is finite a.s., and
provide sufficient conditions such that E[Nηρ ] < ∞, for η > 0.
2. In Theorem 7.2, we provide the upper bound
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n>Nρ] = O( log(n)L1(n) + n(d− 1)
2
L1(n)L2(n)
)
, (7.5)
where 1n>Nρ denotes the indicator function of the event {n > Nρ}.
3. In case of a canonical link function, Theorem 7.3 improves these bounds to
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n>Nρ] = O( log(n)L1(n)
)
. (7.6)
This improvement clearly is also valid for general link functions provided d = 1.
It also holds if d = 2 and ||xi|| is bounded from below by a positive constant (see
Remark 7.2).
An important intermediate result in proving these bounds is Proposition 7.2, where we
derive
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi
)−1 n
∑
i=1
xiei
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= O
(
log(n)
L(n)
)
,
for any function L that satisfies λmin
(
∑ni=1 xix
T
i
) ≥ L(n) > 0 for all sufficiently large n.
This actually provides bounds on mean square convergence rates in least-squares linear
regression, and forms the counterpart of Lai and Wei (1982) who prove similar bounds
in an a.s. setting.
7.1.4 Applications
A useful application of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 is the derivation of upper bounds of
quadratic cost functions in β. For example, let c(β) be a non-negative bounded func-
tion with ||c(β)− c(β(0))|| ≤ K||β− β(0)||2 for all β ∈ Rd and some K > 0. Application
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of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 yield the upper bound
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣c(βˆn)− c(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣] ≤ E [∣∣∣∣∣∣c(βˆn)− c(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n>Nρ]+ E [∣∣∣∣∣∣c(βˆn)− c(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n≤Nρ]
≤ K · E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n>Nρ]+ E
[
Nηρ
]
nη
max
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣c(β)− c(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣2
= O
(
log(n)
L1(n)
+ n−η
)
.
In dynamic pricing problems, such arguments are used to design decision rules and
derive upper bounds on the regret, cf. Chapters 3, 4, and 5. These type of arguments
can also be applied to other sequential decision problems with parametric uncertainty
where the objective is to minimize the regret; for example, the multiperiod inventory
control problem (Anderson and Taylor (1976), Lai and Robbins (1982)), or parametric
variants of bandit problems (Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2009), Rusmevichientong and
Tsitsiklis (2010)).
In his review on experimental design and control problems, Pronzato (2008, page 18,
Section 9) mentions that existing consistency results for adaptive design of experiments
are usually restricted to models that are linear in the parameters. The class of statistical
models that we consider is much larger than only linear models; it includes all models
satisfying (7.1). Our results may therefore also find application in the field of sequential
design of experiments.
7.1.5 Organization of the chapter
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 contains our results con-
cerning the last-time Nρ and upper bounds on E[||βˆn − β(0)||21n>Nρ ], for general link
functions. In Section 7.3 we derive these bounds in the case of canonical link functions.
Section 7.4 contains the proofs of the assertions in Section 7.2 and 7.3. In the appendix,
Section 7.5, we collect and prove several auxiliary results which are used in the proofs
of the theorems of Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
Notation. For ρ > 0, let Bρ = {β ∈ Rd |
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ} and ∂Bρ = {β ∈ Rd |∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ρ}. The closure of a set S ⊂ Rd is denoted by S¯, the boundary by
∂S = S¯\S. For x ∈ R, bxc denotes the largest integer that does not exceed x. The
Euclidean norm of a vector y is denoted by ||y||. The norm of a matrix A equals
||A|| = maxz:||z||=1 ||Az||. The 1-norm and ∞-norm of a matrix are denoted by ||A||1
and ||A||∞. yT denotes the transpose of a vector or matrix y. If f (x), g(x) are functions
with domain in R and range in (0,∞), then f (x) = O(g(x)) means there exists a K > 0
such that f (x) ≤ Kg(x) for all x ∈ N, f (x) = Ω(g(x)) means g(x) = O( f (x)), and
f (x) = o(g(x)) means limx→∞ f (x)/g(x) = 0.
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7.2 Results for general link functions
In this section we consider the statistical model introduced in Section 7.1.1 for general
link functions h, under all the assumptions listed in Section 7.1.3. The first main result
is Theorem 7.1, which shows finiteness of moments of Nρ0 . The second main result is
Theorem 7.2, which proves asymptotic existence and strong consistency of the MQLE,
and provides bounds on the mean square convergence rates.
Our results on the existence of the quasi-likelihood estimate βˆn are based on the follow-
ing fact, which is a consequence of the Leray-Schauder theorem (Leray and Schauder,
1934).
Lemma 7.1 (Ortega and Rheinboldt, 2000, 6.3.4, page 163). Let C be an open bounded set
in Rn, F : C¯ → Rn a continuous mapping, and (x − x0)T F(x) ≥ 0 for some x0 ∈ C and all
x ∈ ∂C. Then F(x) = 0 has a solution in C¯.
This lemma yields a sufficient condition for the existence of βˆn in the proximity of
β(0) (recall the definitions Bρ = {β ∈ Rd |
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ} and ∂Bρ = {β ∈ Rd |∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ρ}):
Corollary 7.1. For all ρ > 0, if supβ∈∂Bρ(β − β(0))T ln(β) ≤ 0 then there exists a β ∈ Bρ
with ln(β) = 0.
A first step in applying Corollary 7.1 is to provide an upper bound for (β− β(0))T ln(β).
To this end, write g(x) = h˙(x)v(h(x)) , and choose a ρ0 > 0 such that (c2 − c1c3ρ) ≥ c2/2 for
all 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0, where
c1 = sup
x∈X,
β∈Bρ0
1
2
|g¨(xTβ)| ||x|| , c2 = inf
x∈X,
β,β˜∈Bρ0
g(xTβ)h˙(xT β˜), c3 = sup
i∈N
E[|ei| | Fi−1]. (7.7)
The existence of such a ρ0 follows from the fact that h˙(x) > 0 and g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R.
Lemma 7.2. Let 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0, β ∈ Bρ, n ∈N, and define
An =
n
∑
i=1
g(xTi β
(0))xiei, Bn =
n
∑
i=1
g˙(xTi β
(0))xixTi ei,
Jn = c1
n
∑
i=1
(|ei| − E[|ei| | Fi−1])xixTi .
Then (β − β(0))T ln(β) ≤ Sn(β) − (c2/2)(β − β(0))T Pn(β − β(0)), where the martingale
Sn(β) is defined as
Sn(β) = (β− β(0))T An + (β− β(0))T Bn(β− β(0)) +
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (β− β(0))T Jn(β− β(0)).
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Following Chang (1999), define the last-time
Nρ = sup{n ≥ n0 | there is no β ∈ Bρ s.t. ln(β) = 0}.
The following theorem shows that the η-th moment of Nρ is finite, for 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0 and
sufficiently small η > 0. Recall our assumptions supi∈N E [|ei|r] < ∞, for some r > 2,
and λmin(Pn) ≥ L1(n) ≥ cnα, for some c > 0, 12 < α ≤ 1 and all n ≥ n0.
Theorem 7.1. Nρ < ∞ a.s., and E[N
η
ρ ] < ∞ for all 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0 and 0 < η < rα− 1.
Remark 7.1. Chang (1999) also approaches existence and strong consistency of βˆn via
application of Corollary 7.1. To this end, he derives an upper bound An + Bn + Jn− nαe∗
for (β− β(0))T ln(β), cf. his equation (21). He proceeds to show that for all β ∈ ∂Bρ the
last time that this upper bound is positive, has finite expectation (cf. his equation (22)).
However, to deduce existence of βˆn ∈ Bρ from Corollary 7.1, one needs to prove (in
Chang’s notation)
E
[
sup{n ≥ 1 | ∃β ∈ ∂Bρ : An + Bn + Jn − nαe∗ ≥ 0}
]
< ∞,
but Chang proves
∀β ∈ ∂Bρ : E [sup{n ≥ 1 | An + Bn + Jn − nαe∗ ≥ 0}] < ∞.
(Here the terms An, Bn, Jn and e∗ depend on β).
The following theorem shows asymptotic existence and strong consistency of βˆn, and
provides mean square convergence rates.
Theorem 7.2. Let 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0. For all n > Nρ there exists a solution βˆn ∈ Bρ to ln(β) = 0,
and limn→∞ βˆn = β(0) a.s. Moreover,
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n>Nρ] = O( log(n)L1(n) + n(d− 1)
2
L1(n)L2(n)
)
. (7.8)
Remark 7.2. If d = 1 then the term n(d−1)
2
L1(n)L2(n)
in (7.8) vanishes. If d = 2, the next to
smallest eigenvalue λ2(Pn) of Pn is actually the largest eigenvalue of Pn. If in addition
infi∈N ||xi|| ≥ dmin > 0 a.s. for some dmin > 0, then λmax(Pn) ≥ 12 tr(Pn) ≥ dmin2 n, and
n(d−1)2
L1(n)L2(n)
= O
(
1
L1(n)
)
. The bound in Theorem 7.2 then reduces to
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n>Nρ] = O( log(n)L1(n)
)
. (7.9)
Remark 7.3. In general, the equation ln(β) = 0 may have multiple solutions. Proce-
dures for selecting the “right” root are discussed in Small et al. (2000) and Heyde (1997,
Section 13.3). Tzavelas (1998) shows that with probability one there exists not more than
one consistent solution.
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7.3 Results for canonical link functions
In this section we consider again the statistical model introduced in Section 7.1.1, under
all the assumptions listed in Section 7.1.3. In addition, we restrict to canonical link
functions, i.e. functions h that satisfy h˙ = v ◦ h. The quasi-likelihood equations (7.2)
then simplify to
ln(β) =
n
∑
i=1
xi(yi − h(xTi β)) = 0. (7.10)
This simplification enables us to improve the bounds from Theorem 7.2. In particular,
the main result of this section is Theorem 7.3, which shows that the term O
(
n(d−1)2
L1(n)L2(n)
)
in (7.8) vanishes, yielding the following upper bound on the mean square convergence
rates:
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n>Nρ] = O( log(n)L1(n)
)
.
In the previous section, we invoked a corollary of the Leray-Schauder Theorem to prove
existence of βˆn in a proximity of β(0). In the case of canonical link function, a similar
existence result is derived from the following fact:
Lemma 7.3 (Chen et al., 1999, Lemma A(i)). Let H : Rd → Rd be a continuously differen-
tiable injective mapping, x0 ∈ Rd, and δ > 0, r > 0. If infx:||x−x0||=δ ||H(x)− H(x0)|| ≥ r
then for all y ∈ {y ∈ Rd | ||y− H(x0)|| ≤ r} there is an x ∈ {x ∈ Rd | ||x− x0|| ≤ δ} such
that H(x) = y.
Chen et al. (1999) assume that H is smooth, but an inspection of their proof reveals that
H being a continuously differentiable injection is sufficient.
We apply Lemma 7.3 with H(β) = P−1/2n ln(β) and y = 0:
Corollary 7.2. Let 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0, n ≥ Nρ, δ > 0 and r > 0. If
∣∣∣∣∣∣Hn(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ r and
infβ∈∂Bδ
∣∣∣∣∣∣Hn(β)− Hn(β(0)))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ r then there is a β ∈ Bδ with P−1/2n ln(β) = 0, and thus
ln(β) = 0.
Remark 7.4. The proof of Corollary 7.2 reveals that ln(β) is injective for all n ≥ n0, and
thus βˆn is uniquely defined for all n ≥ Nρ.
The following theorem improves the mean square convergence rates of Theorem 7.2 in
case of canonical link functions.
Theorem 7.3. In case of a canonical link function,
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n≥Nρ] = O( log(n)L1(n)
)
, (0 < ρ ≤ ρ0). (7.11)
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Remark 7.5. Some choices of h, e.g. h the identity or the logit function, have the prop-
erty that infx∈X,β∈Rd h˙(xTβ) > 0, i.e. c2 in equation (7.7) has a positive lower bound
independent of ρ0. Since canonical link functions have c1 = 0 in equation (7.7), we then
can choose ρ0 = ∞ in Lemma 7.2, Theorem 7.1 and Theorem 7.3. Then Nρ0 = n0 and βˆn
exists a.s. for all n ≥ n0. Moreover, we can drop assumption (7.4) and obtain
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2] = O( log(n)L1(n)
)
, (n ≥ n0). (7.12)
for any positive lower bound L1(n) on λmin(Pn). Naturally, one needs to assume
log(n) = o(L1(n)) in order to conclude from (7.12) that E
[
||βˆn − β(0)||2
]
converges to
zero as n→ ∞.
7.4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 7.2
A Taylor expansion of h and g yields
yi − h(xTi β) = yi − h(xTi β(0)) + h(xTi β(0))− h(xTi β) = ei − h˙(xTi β˜(1)i,β )xTi (β− β(0)),
(7.13)
g(xTi β) = g(x
T
i β
(0)) + g˙(xTi β
(0))xTi (β− β(0)) +
1
2
(β− β(0))T g¨(xTi β˜(2)i,β )xixTi (β− β(0)),
(7.14)
for some β˜(1)i,β , β˜
(2)
i,β on the line segment between β and β
(0). As in Chang (1999, page
241), it follows that
(β− β(0))T ln(β) = (β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
g(xTi β)xi(ei − h˙(xTi β˜(1)i,β )xTi (β− β(0)))
= (β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
g(xTi β
(0))xiei
+ (β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
g˙(xTi β
(0))xTi (β− β(0))xiei
+ (β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
[
1
2
(β− β(0))T g¨(xTi β˜(2)i,β )xixTi (β− β(0))
]
xiei
− (β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
g(xTi β)xi h˙(x
T
i β˜
(1)
i,β )x
T
i (β− β(0))
= (β− β(0))T An + (β− β(0))T Bn(β− β(0)) + (I)− (I I),
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where we write (I) = (β − β(0))T ∑ni=1
[
1
2 (β− β(0))T g¨(xTi β˜(2)i,β )xixTi (β− β(0))
]
xiei and
(I I) = (β− β(0))T ∑ni=1 g(xTi β)xi h˙(xTi β˜(1)i,β )xTi (β− β(0)). Since
(I) =(β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
[
1
2
(β− β(0))T g¨(xTi β˜(2)i,β )xi
]
xixTi (β− β(0))ei
≤(β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
[
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ |g¨(xTi β˜(2)i,β )| ||xi||] xixTi (β− β(0))|ei|
≤c1(β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ xixTi |ei|(β− β(0))
≤c1(β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ xixTi (|ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1])(β− β(0))
+c1(β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ xixTi E [|ei| | Fi−1] (β− β(0))
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (β− β(0))T Jn(β− β(0))
+c1c3
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (β− β(0))T n∑
i=1
xixTi (β− β(0))
and
(I I) ≥ c2(β− β(0))T
n
∑
i=1
xixTi (β− β(0)),
by combining all relevant inequalities we obtain
(β− β(0))T ln(β) ≤ (β− β(0))T An + (β− β(0))T Bn(β− β(0))
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (β− β(0))T Jn(β− β(0))− (c2/2)(β− β(0))T n∑
i=1
xixTi (β− β(0)),
using (c1c3
∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣− c2) ≤ (c1c3ρ− c2) ≤ −c2/2.
Proof of Theorem 7.1
Fix ρ ∈ (0, ρ0] and 0 < η < rα− 1. Let Sn(β) be as in Lemma 7.2. Define the last-time
T = sup{n ≥ n0 | sup
β∈∂Bρ
Sn(β)− ρ2(c2/2)L1(n) > 0}.
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By Lemma 7.2, for all n > T,
0 ≥ sup
β∈∂Bρ
Sn(β)− ρ2(c2/2)L1(n) ≥ sup
β∈∂Bρ
Sn(β)− (c2/2)(β− β(0))T Pn(β− β(0))
≥ sup
β∈∂Bρ
(β− β(0))T ln(β),
which by Corollary 7.1 implies n > Nρ. Then Nρ ≤ T a.s., and thus E[Nηρ ] ≤ E[Tη ] for
all η > 0. The proof is complete if we show the assertions for T.
If we denote the entries of the vector An and the matrices Bn, Jn by An[i], Bn[i, j], Jn[i, j],
then
sup
β∈∂Bρ
Sn(β) ≤ ρ ||An||+ ρ2 ||Bn||+ ρ3 ||Jn||
≤ ρ ∑
1≤i≤d
|An[i]|+ ρ2 ∑
1≤i,j≤d
|Bn[i, j]|+ ρ3 ∑
1≤i,j≤d
|Jn[i, j]|,
using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the fact that ||x|| ≤ ||x||1, ||A|| ≤ ∑i,j |A[i, j]|
for vectors x and matrices A. (This fact can be derived from the inequality ||A|| ≤√||A||1 ||A||∞). We now define d + 2d2 last-times:
TA[i] = sup{n ≥ n0 | ρ|An[i]| −
1
d + 2d2
ρ2(c2/2)L1(n) > 0}, (1 ≤ i ≤ d),
TB[i,j] = sup{n ≥ n0 | ρ2|Bn[i, j]| −
1
d + 2d2
ρ2(c2/2)L1(n) > 0}, (1 ≤ i, j ≤ d),
TJ[i,j] = sup{n ≥ n0 | ρ3|Jn[i, j]| −
1
d + 2d2
ρ2(c2/2)L1(n) > 0}, (1 ≤ i, j ≤ d).
By application of Proposition 7.1, Section 7.5, the last-times TA[i] and TB[i,j] are a.s. finite
and have finite η-th moment, for all η > 0 such that r > η+1α > 2. Chow and Teicher
(2003, page 95, Lemma 3) states that any two nonnegative random variables X1, X2 sat-
isfy
E [(X1 + X2)η ] ≤ 2η(E
[
Xη1
]
+ E
[
Xη2
]
), (7.15)
for all η > 0. Consequently
sup
i∈N
E [||ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1] |r] ≤ sup
i∈N
E [||ei|+ E [|ei| | Fi−1] |r]
≤ sup
i∈N
2r(E [|ei|r] + E [(E [|ei| | Fi−1])r]) < ∞,
and Proposition 7.1 implies that the last-times TJ[i,j] are also a.s. finite and have finite
η-th moment, for all η > 0 such that r > η+1α > 2. Now set T = ∑1≤i≤d TA[i] +
∑1≤i,j≤d TB[i,j] +∑1≤i,j≤d TJ[i,j]. If n > T , then supβ∈∂Bρ Sn(β)− ρ2(c2/2)L1(n) ≤ 0, and
thus T ≤ T a.s. and E [Tη ] ≤ E [T η ]. T is finite a.s., since all terms TA[i], TB[i,j] and TJ[i,j]
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are finite a.s. Moreover, by repeated application of (7.15), for all η > 0 there is a constant
Cη such that
E[T η ] ≤ Cη
[
∑
1≤i≤d
E
[
TA[i]
]
+ ∑
1≤i,j≤d
E
[
TηB[i,j]
]
+ ∑
1≤i,j≤d
E
[
TηJ[i,j]
]]
.
It follows that E [T η ] < ∞ for all η > 0 such that r > η+1α > 2. In particular, this implies
Nρ < ∞ a.s., and E
[
Nηρ
]
< ∞.
Proof of Theorem 7.2
The asymptotic existence and strong consistency of βˆn follow directly from Theorem 7.1
which shows Nρ < ∞ a.s. for all 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0.
To prove the mean square convergence rates, let 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0.
By contraposition of Corollary 7.1, if there is no solution β ∈ Bρ to ln(β) = 0, then
there exists a β′ ∈ ∂Bρ such that (β′ − β(0))T ln(β′) > 0, and thus Sn(β′)− (c2/2)(β′ −
β(0))T Pn(β′ − β(0)) > 0 by Lemma 7.2. In particular,
(β′ − β(0))T(c2/2)Pn(β′ − β(0))
− (β′ − β(0))T
[
An + Bn(β′ − β(0)) +
∣∣∣∣∣∣β′ − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ Jn(β′ − β(0))] ≤ 0,
and, writing
(I) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣(c2/2)−1P−1n [An + Bn(β′ − β(0)) + ρJn(β′ − β(0))]∣∣∣∣∣∣2
and
(I I) =
(d− 1)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣An + Bn(β′ − β(0)) + ρJn(β′ − β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣2
L1(n)L2(n)(c2/2)2
,
Lemma 7.7, Section 7.5, implies
ρ2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣β′ − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≤ (I) + (I I). (7.16)
We now proceed to show
(I) + (I I) < Un, (7.17)
for some Un, independent of β′ and ρ, that satisfies
E [Un] = O
(
log(n)
L1(n)
+
n(d− 1)2
L1(n)L2(n)
)
.
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Thus, if there is no solution β ∈ Bρ of ln(β) = 0, then ρ2 < Un. This implies that there
is always a solution β ∈ BU1/2n to ln(β) = 0, and thus ||βˆn − β
(0)||21n>Nρ ≤ Un a.s., and
E
[
||βˆn − β(0)||21n>Nρ
]
≤ E [Un].
To prove (7.17), we decompose (I) and (II) using the following fact: if M, N are d × d
matrices, and N(j) denotes the j-th column of N, then
||MN|| = max
||y||=1
||MNy|| = max
||y||=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣M d∑j=1 y[j]N(j)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max||y||=1 d∑j=1 ||My[j]N(j)||
≤
d
∑
j=1
||MN(j)|| .
As a result we get
∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1n Bn(β′ − β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P−1n n∑i=1 g˙(xTi β(0))xieixTi
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣∣∣β′ − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ρ
d
∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P−1n n∑i=1 g˙(xTi β(0))xieixi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
and ∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1n Jn(β′ − β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P−1n n∑i=1 c1xi(|ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1])xTi
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣∣∣β′ − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ρ
d
∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P−1n n∑i=1 c1xi(|ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1])xi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ .
In a similar vein we can derive∣∣∣∣∣∣Bn(β′ − β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑i=1 g˙(xTi β(0))xieixi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
and ∣∣∣∣∣∣Jn(β′ − β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑i=1 c1xi(|ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1])xi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ .
It follows that
(I) ≤ 2(c2/2)−2
(∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1n An∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1n Bn(β′ − β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + ρ20 ∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1n Jn(β′ − β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣2)
≤ Un(1) +Un(2) +Un(3),
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where we write
Un(1) = 2(c2/2)−2
∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1n An∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ,
Un(2) = 2(c2/2)−2ρ202
 d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P−1n n∑i=1 g˙(xTi β(0))xieixi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ,
Un(3) = 2(c2/2)−2ρ402
 d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P−1n n∑i=1 c1xi(|ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1])xi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ,
and
(I I) ≤ Un(4) +Un(5) +Un(6),
where we write
Un(4) =
2(d− 1)2 ||An||2
L1(n)L2(n)(c2/2)2
,
Un(5) =
2(d− 1)2
L1(n)L2(n)(c2/2)2
(
ρ0
d
∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑i=1 g˙(xTi β(0))xieixi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
)2
,
Un(6) =
2(d− 1)2
L1(n)L2(n)(c2/2)2
ρ20
(
ρ0
d
∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑i=1 c1xi(|ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1])xi[j]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
)2
.
The desired upper bound Un for (I) + (I I) equals Un = ∑6j=1 Un(j). For Un(1), Un(2),
Un(3), apply Proposition 7.2 in Section 7.5 on the martingale difference sequences
(g(xTi β
(0))ei)i∈N, (g˙(xTi β
(0))xi[j]ei)i∈N, and (c1(|ei| − E [|ei| | Fi−1] xi[j])i∈N. This im-
plies the existence of a constant K1 > 0 such that E[Un(1) +Un(2) +Un(3)] ≤ K1 log(n)L1(n) .
For Un(4), Un(5), Un(6), the assumption
sup
i∈N
E
[
e2i | Fi−1
]
≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s.
implies the existence of a constant K2 > 0 such that E [Un(4) +Un(5) +Un(6)] ≤
K2n(d−1)2
L1(n)L2(n)
.
Proof of Corollary 7.2
It is sufficient to show that H(β) is injective. Suppose P−1/2n ln(β) = P−1/2n ln(β′) for
some β, β′. Since n ≥ n0 this implies ln(β) = ln(β′). By a first order Taylor expansion,
there are β˜i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, on the line segment between β and β′ such that ln(β)− ln(β′) =
∑ni=1 xix
T
i h˙(x
T
i β˜i)(β− β′) = 0. Since infx∈X,β∈Bρ h˙(xTβ) > 0, Lemma 7.8 in Section 7.5
implies that the matrix ∑ni=1 xix
T
i h˙(x
T
i β˜i) is invertible, and thus β = β
′.
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Proof of Theorem 7.3
Let 0 < ρ ≤ ρ0 and n ≥ Nρ. A Taylor expansion of ln(β) yields
ln(β)− ln(β(0)) =
n
∑
i=1
xi(h(xTi β
(0))− h(xTi β)) =
n
∑
i=1
xixTi h˙(x
T
i βin)(β
(0) − β),
for some βin, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, on the line segment between β(0) and β.
Write Tn(β) = ∑ni=1 xix
T
i h˙(x
T
i βin), and choose k2 >
(
infβ∈Bρ ,x∈X h˙(xTβ)
)−1
. Then
λmin (k2Tn(β)− Pn) = λmin
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi (k2h˙(x
T
i βin)− 1)
)
≥
(
inf
β∈Bρ0 ,x∈X
(k2h˙(xTβ)− 1)
)
λmin(Pn), for all β ∈ Bρ,
by Lemma 7.8. As in Bhatia (2007, page 11, Exercise 1.2.12), this implies
yTk2Tn(β)y ≥ yT Pny and yTk−12 Tn(β)−1y ≤ yT P−1n y for all y ∈ Rd.
Define Hn(β) = P−1/2n ln(β), rn =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Hn(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣, and δn = rnk−12 √L1(n) . If δn > ρ then it
follows immediately that ||βˆn − β(0)|| ≤ ρ < ||Hn(β
(0))||
k−12
√
L1(n)
. Suppose δn ≤ ρ. Then for all
β ∈ ∂Bδn ,∣∣∣∣∣∣Hn(β)− Hn(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1/2n (ln(β)− ln(β(0)))∣∣∣∣∣∣2
= (β(0) − β)TTn(β)P−1n Tn(β)(β(0) − β)
≥ (β(0) − β)TTn(β)k−12 Tn(β)−1Tn(β)(β(0) − β)
≥ (β(0) − β)T Pnk−22 (β(0) − β)
≥ k−22
∣∣∣∣∣∣β(0) − β∣∣∣∣∣∣2 λmin(Pn)
≥ k−22 δ2nL1(n),
and thus infβ∈∂Bδn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Hn(β)− Hn(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ k−12 √L1(n)δn = rn and ∣∣∣∣∣∣H(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ rn. By
Corollary 7.2 we conclude that
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆn − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ||Hn(β(0))||k−12 √L1(n) a.s.
Now E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣Hn(β(0))∣∣∣∣∣∣2] = E [(∑ni=1 xiei)T P−1n (∑ni=1 xiei)] = E[Qn], where Qn is as in
the proof of Proposition 7.2. There we show E[Qn] ≤ K log(n), for some K > 0 and all
n ≥ n0, and thus we have E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣β− β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1n≥Nρ] = O ( log(n)L1(n) ).
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7.5 Appendix: auxiliary results
In this appendix, we prove and collect several probabilistic results which are used in the
preceding sections. Proposition 7.1 is fundamental to Theorem 7.1, where we provide
sufficient conditions such that the η-th moment of the last-time Nρ is finite, for η > 0.
The proof of the proposition makes use of two auxiliary lemma’s. Lemma 7.4 is a maxi-
mum inequality for tail probabilities of martingales; for sums of i.i.d. random variables
this statement can be found e.g. in Loève (1977a, Section 18.1C, page 260), and a mar-
tingale version was already hinted at in Loève (1977b, Section 32.1, page 51). Lemma
7.5 contains a so-called Baum-Katz-Nagaev type theorem proven by Stoica (2007). There
exists a long tradition of these type of results for sums of independent random variables,
see e.g. Spataru (2009) and the references therein. Stoica (2007) makes an extension to
martingales. In Proposition 7.2 we provide L2 bounds for least-squares linear regression
estimates, similar to the a.s. bounds derived by Lai and Wei (1982). The bounds for the
quality of maximum quasi-likelihood estimates, Theorem 7.2 in Section 7.2 and Theo-
rem 7.3 in Section 7.3, are proven by relating them to these bounds from Proposition 7.2.
Lemma 7.6 is an auxiliary result used in the proof of Proposition 7.2. Finally, Lemma 7.7
is used in the proof of Theorem 7.2, and Lemma 7.8 in the proof of Theorem 7.3.
Lemma 7.4. Let (Xi)i∈N be a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. a filtration {Fi}i∈N. Write
Sn = ∑ni=1 Xi, and suppose supi∈N E[X2i | Fi−1] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s., for some σ > 0. Then for all
n ∈N and e > 0,
P
(
max
1≤k≤n
|Sk| ≥ e
)
≤ 2P
(
|Sn| ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
. (7.18)
Proof. We use similar techniques as de la Peña et al. (2009, Theorem 2.21, p.16), where
(7.18) is proven for independent random variables (Xi)i∈N. Define the events A1 =
{S1 ≥ e} and Ak = {Sk ≥ e, S1 < e, . . . , Sk−1 < e}, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Then Ak(1 ≤ k ≤ n) are
mutually disjoint, and {max1≤k≤n Sk ≥ e} =
⋃n
k=1 Ak.
P
(
max
1≤k≤n
Sk ≥ e
)
≤ P
(
Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
+ P
(
max
1≤k≤n
Sk ≥ e, Sn < e−
√
2σ2n
)
≤ P
(
Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
+
n
∑
k=1
P
(
Ak, Sn < e−
√
2σ2n
)
≤ P
(
Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
+
n
∑
k=1
P
(
Ak, Sn − Sk < −
√
2σ2n
)
(1)
= P
(
Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
+
n
∑
k=1
E
[
1Ak E
[
1Sn−Sk<−
√
2σ2n | Fk
]]
(2)
≤ P
(
Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
+
n
∑
k=1
1
2
P (Ak)
= P
(
Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
+ P
(
max
1≤k≤n
Sk ≥ e
)
,
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where (1) uses Ak ∈ Fk, and (2) uses E[1Sn−Sk<−√2σ2n | Fk] = P(Sk − Sm >
√
2σ2n |
Fk) ≤ E[(Sn − Sk)2 | Fk]/(2σ2n) ≤ 1/2 a.s. This proves P(max1≤k≤n Sk ≥ e) ≤
2P(Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n). Replacing Sk by −Sk gives P(max1≤k≤n−Sk ≥ e) ≤ 2P(−Sn ≥
e−
√
2σ2n). If e−
√
2σ2n ≤ 0 then (7.18) is trivial; if e >
√
2σ2n then
P
(
max
1≤k≤n
|Sk| ≥ e
)
≤ P
(
max
1≤k≤n
Sk ≥ e
)
+ P
(
max
1≤k≤n
−Sk ≥ e
)
≤ 2P
(
Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
+ 2P
(
−Sn ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
= 2P
(
|Sn| ≥ e−
√
2σ2n
)
.
Lemma 7.5 (Stoica, 2007). Let (Xi)i∈N be a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. a filtration
{Fi}i∈N. Write Sn = ∑ni=1 Xi and suppose supi∈N E[X2i | Fi−1] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s. for some
σ > 0. Let c > 0, 12 < α ≤ 1, η > 2α− 1, r > η+1α . If supi∈N E [|Xi|r] < ∞, then
∑
k≥1
kη−1P (|Sk| ≥ ckα) < ∞.
Proposition 7.1. Let (Xi)i∈N be a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. a filtration {Fi}i∈N.
Write Sn = ∑ni=1 Xi and suppose supi∈N E[X2i | Fi−1] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s. for some σ > 0. Let
c > 0, 12 < α ≤ 1, η > 2α− 1, r > η+1α , and define the random variable T = sup{n ∈ N ||Sn| ≥ cnα}, where T takes values inN∪ {∞}. If supi∈N E [|Xi|r] < ∞, then
T < ∞ a.s., and E [Tη ] < ∞.
Proof. There exists an n′ ∈ N such that for all n > n′, c(n/2)α −
√
2σ2n ≥ c(n/2)α/2.
For all n > n′,
P (T > n) = P (∃k > n : |Sk| ≥ ckα)
≤ ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
∃2j−1 ≤ k < 2j : |Sk| ≥ ckα
)
≤ ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
sup
1≤k≤2j
|Sk| ≥ c(2j−1)α
)
(1)
≤ 2 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c(2j−1)α −
√
2σ22j
)
(2)
≤ 2 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c(2j−1)α/2
)
.
where (1) follows from Lemma 7.4 and (2) from the definition of n′.
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For t ∈ R+ write St = Sbtc. Then
∑
j≥log2(n)
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c(2j−1)α/2
)
=
∫
j≥log2(n)
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c(2j−1)α/2
)
dj (7.19)
=
∫
k≥n
P (|Sk| ≥ c(k/2)α/2) 1k log(2)dk = ∑k≥n
P (|Sk| ≥ c(k/2)α/2) 1k log(2) , (7.20)
using a variable substitution k = 2j.
By Chebyshev’s inequality,
P (T > n) ≤ 2 ∑
k≥n
P (|Sk| ≥ c(k/2)α/2) 1k log(2) ≤ 2 ∑k≥n
σ2k(c(k/2)α/2)−2 1
k log(2)
,
which implies P (T = ∞) ≤ lim infn→∞ P(T > n) = 0. This proves T < ∞ a.s.
Since
E[Tη ] ≤ η
[
1+ ∑
n≥1
nη−1P(T > n)
]
≤ η
[
1+ n′ · (n′)η−1 + ∑
n>n′
nη−1P(T > n)
]
≤ M ∑
n>n′
nη−1 ∑
j≥blog2(n)c
P
(
|S2j | ≥ c(2j−1)α/2
)
,
for some constant M > 0, it follows by (7.19), (7.20) that E[Tη ] < ∞ if
∑
n≥1
nη−1 ∑
k≥n
P (|Sk| ≥ c(k/2)α/2) k−1 < ∞.
By interchanging the sums, it suffices to show
∑
k≥1
kη−1P
(
|Sk| ≥ 2−1−αckα
)
< ∞.
This last statement follows from Lemma 7.5.
Let (ei)i∈N be a martingale difference sequence w.r.t. a filtration {Fi}i∈N, such that
supi∈N E[e2i | Fi−1] = σ2 < ∞ a.s., for some σ > 0. Let (xi)i∈N be a sequence of
vectors in Rd. Assume that (xi)i∈N are predictable w.r.t. the filtration (i.e. xi ∈ Fi−1
for all i ∈ N), and supi∈N ||x||i ≤ M < ∞ for some (non-random) M > 0. Write
Pn = ∑ni=1 xix
T
i . Let L : N → R+ be a (non-random) function and n0 ≥ 2 a (non-
random) integer such that λmin(Pn) ≥ L(n) for all n ≥ n0, and limn→∞ L(n) = ∞.
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Proposition 7.2. There is a constant K > 0 such that for all n ≥ n0,
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi
)−1 n
∑
i=1
xiei
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ K log(n)
L(n)
.
The proof of Proposition 7.2 uses the following result:
Lemma 7.6. Let (yn)n∈N be a nondecreasing sequence with y1 ≥ e.
Write Rn = 1log(yn) ∑
n
i=1
yi−yi−1
yi
, where we put y0 = 0. Then Rn ≤ 2 for all n ∈N.
Proof. Induction on n. R1 = 1log(y1) ≤ 1 ≤ 2. Let n ≥ 2 and define g(y) =
1
log(y)
y−yn−1
y +
log(yn−1)
log(y) Rn−1. If Rn−1 ≤ 1, then Rn = g(yn) ≤ 1log(yn) + 1 ≤ 2. Now suppose Rn−1 > 1.
Since z 7→ (1 + log(z))/z is decreasing in z on z ≥ 1, and since yn−1 ≥ 1, we have
(1 + log(y))/y ≤ (1 + log(yn−1))/yn−1 for all y ≥ yn−1. Together with Rn−1 > 1 this
implies
∂g(y)
∂y
=
1
y(log(y))2
[
−1+ yn−1
y
(1+ log(y))− log(yn−1)Rn−1
]
< 0,
for all y ≥ yn−1. This proves Rn = g(yn) ≤ maxy≥yn−1 g(y) = g(yn−1) = Rn−1 ≤ 2.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. Write qn = ∑ni=1 xiei and Qn = qnP
−1
n qn. For n ≥ n0, Pn is
invertible, and∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1n qn∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1/2n ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 · ∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1/2n qn∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≤ λmin(Pn)−1qnP−1n qn ≤ L(n)−1Qn a.s.,
where we used
∣∣∣∣∣∣P−1/2n ∣∣∣∣∣∣ = λmax(P−1/2n ) = λmin(Pn)−1/2. We show E[Qn] ≤ K log(n),
for a constant K to be defined further below, and all n ≥ n0.
Write Vn = P−1n . Since Pn = Pn−1 + xnxTn , it follows from the Sherman-Morrison formula
(Bartlett, 1951) that Vn = Vn−1 − Vn−1xnx
T
n Vn−1
1+xTn Vn−1xn
, and thus
xTn Vn = x
T
n Vn−1 −
(xTn Vn−1xn)xTn Vn−1
1+ xTn Vn−1xn
= xTn Vn−1/(1+ xTn Vn−1xn).
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As in Lai and Wei (1982), Qn satisfies
Qn =
(
n
∑
i=1
xTi ei
)
Vn
(
n
∑
i=1
xiei
)
=
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xTi ei
)
Vn
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xiei
)
+ xTn Vnxne
2
n + 2x
T
n Vn
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xiei
)
en
= Qn−1 +
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xTi ei
)(
−Vn−1xnx
T
n Vn−1
1+ xTn Vn−1xn
)(n−1
∑
i=1
xiei
)
+ xTn Vnxne
2
n + 2
xTn Vn−1
1+ xTn Vn−1xn
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xiei
)
en
= Qn−1 −
(xTn Vn−1 ∑n−1i=1 xiei)
2
1+ xTn Vn−1xn
+ xTn Vnxne
2
n + 2
xTn Vn−1
1+ xTn Vn−1xn
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xiei
)
en.
Observe that
E
[
xTn Vn−1
1+ xTn Vn−1xn
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xiei
)
en
]
= E
[
xTn Vn−1
1+ xTn Vn−1xn
(
n−1
∑
i=1
xiei
)
E [en | Fn−1]
]
= 0
and
E
[
xTn Vnxne
2
n
]
= E
[
xTn VnxnE
[
e2n | Fn−1
]]
≤ E
[
xTn Vnxn
]
σ2.
By telescoping the sum we obtain
E[Qn] ≤ E[Qmin{n,n1}] + σ2
n
∑
i=n1+1
E[xTi Vixi],
where we define n1 ∈ N to be the smallest n ≥ n0 such that L(n) > e1/d for all n ≥ n1.
We have
det(Pn−1) = det(Pn − xnxTn )
= det(Pn)det(I − P−1n xnxTn )
= det(Pn)(1− xTn Vnxn), (n ≥ n1). (7.21)
Here the last equality follows from Sylvester’s determinant theorem det(I + AB) =
det(I + BA), for matrices A, B of appropriate size.
We thus have xTn Vnxn =
det(Pn)−det(Pn−1)
det(Pn)
. For all n ∈ N define yn = det(Pn+n1). Then
(yn)n∈N is a nondecreasing sequence with y1 ≥ det(Pn1+1) ≥ λmin(Pn1+1)d ≥ e. Lemma
7.6 implies
n
∑
i=n1+1
xTi Vixi =
n
∑
i=n1+1
yi−n1 − yi−1−n1
yi−n1
=
n−n1
∑
i=1
yi − yi−1
yi
≤ 2 log(yn−n1)
= 2 log(det(Pn)), a.s.
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Now
log(det(Pn)) ≤ d log(λmax(Pn)) ≤ d log(tr(Pn)) ≤ d log(n sup
i∈N
||xi||2)
≤ d log(nM2).
Furthermore, for all n0 ≤ n ≤ n1 we have
E [Qn] ≤ E
[
||qn||2 λmax(P−1n )
]
≤ E
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑i=1 xiei
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
L(n0)−1

≤ L(n0)−1E
[
2
n
∑
i=1
e2i sup
i∈N
||xi||2
]
≤ 2L(n0)−1M2n1σ2,
and thus for all n ≥ n0,
E [Qn] ≤ E
[
Qmin{n,n1}
]
+ σ2
n
∑
i=n1+1
E
[
xTi Vixi
]
≤ 2L(n0)−1M2n1σ2 + d log(n) + d log(M2)
≤ K log(n),
where K = d + [2L(n0)−1M2n1σ2 + d log(M2)]/ log(n0).
Lemma 7.7. Let A be a positive definite d× d matrix, and b, x ∈ Rd. If xT Ax+ xTb ≤ 0 then
||x||2 ≤ ∣∣∣∣A−1b∣∣∣∣2 + (d− 1)2 ||b||2λ1λ2 , where 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 are the two smallest eigenvalues of A.
Proof. Let 0 < λ1 ≤ . . . ≤ λd be the eigenvalues of A, and v1, . . . , vd the corresponding
eigenvectors. We can assume that these form an orthonormal basis, such that each x ∈
Rd can be written as ∑di=1 αivi, for coordinates (α1, . . . , αd), and b = ∑
d
i=1 βivi for some
(β1, . . . , βd). Write
S =
{
(α1, . . . , αd) |
d
∑
i=1
αi(λiαi + βi) ≤ 0
}
.
The orthonormality of (vi)1≤i≤d implies that S equals
{
x ∈ Rd | xT Ax + xTb ≤ 0
}
.
Fix α = (α1, . . . , αd) ∈ S and write R = {i | αi(λiαi + βi) ≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ d}, Rc =
{1, . . . , d}\R. For all i ∈ R, standard properties of quadratic equations imply α2i ≤
λ−2i β
2
i and αi(λiαi + βi) ≥
−β2i
4λi
. For all i ∈ Rc,
αi(λiαi + βi) ≤ ∑
i∈Rc
αi(λiαi + βi) ≤ −∑
i∈R
αi(λiαi + βi) ≤ c,
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where we define c = ∑i∈R
β2i
4λi
. By the quadratic formula, αi(λiαi + βi)− c ≤ 0 implies
−βi −
√
β2i + 4λic
2λi
≤ αi ≤
−βi +
√
β2i + 4λic
2λi
.
(Note that λi > 0 and c > 0 implies that the square root is well-defined). It follows that
α2i ≤ 2
β2i + β
2
i + 4λic
4λ2i
=
β2i
λ2i
+ 2c/λi, (i ∈ Rc),
and thus
||x||2 =
d
∑
i=1
α2i ≤ ∑
i∈R
λ−2i β
2
i + ∑
i∈Rc
(
β2i
λ2i
+
2
λi
∑
j∈R
β2j
4λj
)
≤
d
∑
i=1
λ−2i β
2
i +
1
2
(
∑
i∈Rc
1
λi
)(
∑
j∈R
1
λj
)(
n
∑
i=1
β2i
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣A−1b∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + (d− 1)2 1
λ1
1
λ2
||b||2 ,
where we used
∣∣∣∣A−1b∣∣∣∣2 = ∑dj=1 β2jλ−2j and (∑i∈Rc 1) (∑j∈R 1) ≤ 2(d− 1)2.
Remark 7.6. The dependence on λ1λ2 in Lemma 7.7 is tight in the following sense: for
all d ≥ 2 and all positive definite d× d matrices A there are x ∈ Rd, b ∈ Rd such that
xT Ax + xTb ≤ 0 and
||x||2 ≥ 1
8
(
||A−1b||+ ||b||
2
λ1λ2
)
.
In particular, choose β1 = β2 > 0, α1 = −β1/(2λ1),
α2 = (−β2 −
√
β22 + 4λ2β
2
1/(4λ1))/(2λ2), and set b = β1v1 + β2v2 and x = α1v1 +
α2v2, where v1, v2 are the eigenvectors of A corresponding to eigenvalues λ1, λ2. Then
xT Ax + xTb = ∑2i=1 αi(λiαi + βi) = 0 and
||x||2 = α21 + α22 ≥ β21/(4λ21) + β22/(4λ22) + β21/(4λ1λ2) ≥
1
8
||A−1b||2 + ||b||2/(8λ1λ2).
Lemma 7.8. Let (xi)i∈N be a sequence of vectors inRd, and (wi)i∈N a sequence of scalars with
0 < infi∈N wi. Then for all n ∈N,
λmin
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi wi
)
≥ λmin
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi
)
( inf
i∈N
wi).
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Proof. For all z ∈ Rd,
zT
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi wi
)
z ≥ ( inf
i∈N
wi)zT
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi
)
z.
Let v˜ be a normalized eigenvector corresponding to λmin
(
∑ni=1 xix
T
i wi
)
. Then
λmin
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi
)
= min
||v||=1
vT
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi
)
v ≤ v˜T
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi
)
v˜
≤ v˜T
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi wi
)
v˜( inf
i∈N
wi)−1
= λmin
(
n
∑
i=1
xixTi wi
)
( inf
i∈N
wi)−1.
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Future directions
In this section we identify several open questions and relevant avenues for future re-
search, which could lead to interesting extensions of the results obtained in this thesis.
We show in Chapter 3 that certainty equivalent pricing in a single product setting, with
infinite inventory and linear demand function, is not strongly consistent. More pre-
cisely, we show that with positive probability the price converges to the highest ad-
missible price, which is different from the optimal price. Simulations however suggest
that a much stronger result holds: the price sequence converges with probability one,
but the limit price equals the optimal price with probability zero. This means that with
certainty equivalent pricing the price never converges to the optimal price. This has,
however, not yet been formally proven.
In Chapter 4, we study dynamic pricing and learning for multiple products with infi-
nite inventory, and in Chapter 5, we consider a single product with finite inventory. A
natural extension is to combine both settings, and to consider multiple products with
finite inventories. Some additional modeling is then needed to describe what happens
if some of the products are out-of-stock: does this increase the demand for substitute
products? And how does this depend on the selling prices? An interesting question
is whether a certainty equivalent policy has a good performance, as in Chapter 5, or
whether exogenous price dispersion is necessary.
The excellent performance of certainty equivalent pricing in the finite capacity setting
of Chapter 5 can be explained by an endogenous learning property: using a policy that
is optimal with respect to a parameter estimate close to the true parameter induces
price dispersion, which leads to fast learning of the parameters. This property does
not only occur in dynamic pricing problems, but possibly also in many other Markov
decision problems. One could formulate a general framework of repeated Markov deci-
sion problems with incomplete information, and study how the presence or absence of
an endogenous learning property influences the performance of a certainty equivalent
policy. Another interesting question is whether the derived O(log2(T)) bound on the
regret can be improved by any pricing strategy.
The demand function of Chapter 6 consists of an unknown, time-varying part and a
known, price-dependent part. An extension that would be of great practical interest is to
assume that the price-dependent part is also unknown to the firm and has to be learned
from data. One step further, one could assume that this term is time-varying as well. It is
not clear if a certainty equivalent pricing policy performs well in such a setting, or that
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active price experimentation is necessary. Two other interesting extensions related to
pricing in time-varying markets are models with finite inventory (see, for instance, the
recent work by Besbes and Saure, 2012), and non-parametric approaches (for example,
similar to Yu and Mannor, 2011).
Selling prices of competitors often play a major role in the pricing strategy of a firm, and
it therefore seems natural to study pricing and learning policies in a competitive envi-
ronment. Neglecting competitive aspects may have negative consequences, as shown
in Cooper et al. (2012). The area of repeated games with incomplete information may
provide a natural framework to study dynamic pricing and learning in a competitive
environment. However, even without incomplete information, the long-term dynamics
of repeated games can be very complicated. This possibly explains why the literature
on dynamic pricing and learning with competition is still relatively scarce.
Recent literature on pricing and assortment problems reveals that it may be beneficial
to consider pricing decisions and assortment planning simultaneously instead of sep-
arately. The same holds for pricing and inventory problems: in many situations, it is
beneficial to determine a joint pricing and inventory replenishment strategy. These ob-
servations imply that it may be rewarding to study data-driven policies for these com-
bined decision problems under uncertainty. For joint pricing and assortment problems,
a first step in this direction is taken by Talebian et al. (2012).
A further suggestion for future research is related to the quality of the upper bounds
on mean square convergence rates of maximum quasi-likelihood estimators, which are
studied in Chapter 7. In Theorem 7.2, we provide such upper bounds for general link
functions. Application of these bounds in Chapter 4 leads to Regret(T) = O(T2/3) for
the pricing policy studied there. It is an open question whether this growth rate on
the regret can be improved upon, and whether the bounds in Theorem 7.2 are tight.
Likewise, the growth rate Regret(T) = O(
√
T log(T)) of the policy discussed in Section
4.4.2 is based on Theorem 7.3, where upper bounds on the mean square convergence
rates for maximum quasi-likelihood estimators are obtained in case of canonical link
functions. These bounds involve a log(t)-term, which causes the factor
√
log(T) in the
regret bounds. It is an open question whether this log(t)-term is only a result of the
used proof techniques, or that this term really is present in the asymptotic behavior of
the regret. In the former case, removing this
√
log(T)-term in the regret bound would
imply that, for canonical link functions, the pricing policy of Chapter 4 has Regret(T) =
O(
√
T). In single-product settings such policies are asymptotically optimal, in the sense
that there is no policy with Regret(T) = o(
√
T).
The MLE-cycle policy by Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) is an example of a pric-
ing policy that achieves optimal rate Regret(T) = O(
√
T). However, in this policy the
unknown parameters are estimated using only a small subset of the available sales data.
The fact that this subset is non-random and determined in advance greatly simplifies the
mathematical analysis. In contrast, the pricing policies of Chapter 3 and 4 do always use
all available sales data; this comes with the price of a small additional term in the regret
bounds. It would be somewhat remarkable and counterintuitive if a policy that uses
all available data does always perform worse than a policy that neglects a large part of
the data. However, den Boer (2012b) shows that adding data does not necessarily im-
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prove the expected quality of parameter estimates. It is interesting to study conditions
that guarantee improved parameter estimates when data is added, and to apply these
results to different pricing policies.
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Dynamisch prijzen en leren
Dynamisch prijzen is voor veel commerciële bedrijven een onmisbaar onderdeel van het
prijsbeleid. Het kernidee van dynamisch prijzen is dat verkoopprijzen op een slimme
manier continu aangepast kunnen worden aan veranderende omstandigheden. Dit
omvat zowel externe factoren (bijvoorbeeld variërende marktomstandigheden of prijs-
wijzigingen bij concurrenten) als interne factoren (bijvoorbeeld wisselende voorraad-
niveaus van de aangeboden producten). Dynamisch prijzen is met name effectief als
verkoopprijzen eenvoudig en kosteloos zijn aan te passen, zoals bijvoorbeeld bij inter-
netverkoop of als gebruik wordt gemaakt van digitale prijsetiketten.
In zulke digitale verkoopomgevingen is vaak veel historische verkoopdata beschikbaar,
met waardevolle informatie over klantengedrag en marktomstandigheden. Zulke ge-
gevens hebben een enorm potentieel om prijsbeslissingen van bedrijven te verbeteren,
en een belangrijke vraag is dan ook hoe deze gegevensstroom effectief gebruikt kan
worden om optimale verkoopprijzen te genereren. Idealiter zou een bedrijf steeds beter
willen “leren” hoe klanten reageren op verschillende verkoopprijzen naarmate er meer
gegevens beschikbaar komen, om vervolgens haar prijsbeleid daar op aan te passen. Er
is dan een continue wederzijdse beïnvloeding tussen de prijsbeslissingen van het bedrijf
en de verkoopdata die daardoor voortgebracht wordt. In dit proefschrift bestuderen we
de vraag hoe deze “combinatie van dynamisch prijzen en leren” het beste gerealiseerd
kan worden.
Een belangrijke eerste stap om bruikbare informatie te abstraheren uit de stroom van
verkoopgegevens is het formuleren van een vraagmodel: een wiskundige beschrijving
van de relatie tussen verkoopprijzen en de vraag naar producten. Zo’n model bevat
doorgaans een aantal onbekende parameters, en het model wordt pas bruikbaar in de
praktijk als een schatting van de waarden van deze parameters beschikbaar is. Er be-
staan diverse statistische technieken om op basis van de beschikbare verkoopgegevens
zulke schattingen te bepalen. Telkens als er nieuwe verkoopgegevens bijkomen kunnen
deze schattingen worden bijgewerkt, zodat deze op steeds meer gegevens zijn geba-
seerd. In het ideale geval leidt dit ertoe dat, naarmate er meer verkoopgegevens be-
schikbaar komen, het vraagmodel een steeds betere beschrijving van de werkelijkheid
geeft, en het bedrijf zo steeds beter “leert” hoe de vraag naar haar producten afhangt
van de verkoopprijzen.
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Dit leren is geen vanzelfsprekendheid. Sommige prijsstrategieën die in de praktijk veel
gebruikt worden staan leren juist in de weg. Eén van deze strategieën is het zogenaamde
“certainty equivalent” (CE) prijzen, waarbij, op elk moment dat de prijs wordt aange-
past, de prijs wordt gekozen die optimaal is als men aanneemt dat de dan beschikbare
statistische schattingen correct zijn. Met andere woorden, men kiest altijd voor de ver-
koopprijs die op het moment van beslissen het beste lijkt. Dit lijkt een logische en intuï-
tieve manier van prijzen bepalen: waarom zou men afwijken van wat de beste beslissing
lijkt te zijn? Het blijkt echter dat deze manier van prijzen in sommige situaties tot grote
verliezen kan leiden. Een voorbeeld hiervan wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 3.
Een verklaring voor dit enigszins tegenintuïtieve en verrassende resultaat ligt in het feit
dat het leren van parameterwaarden en het bepalen van optimale prijzen niet twee vol-
komen onafhankelijke processen zijn, maar juist sterk van elkaar afhangen. De kwaliteit
van prijsbeslissingen wordt rechtstreeks beïnvloed door de kwaliteit van de schatters in
het vraagmodel, en deze worden op hun beurt sterk beïnvloed door de mate van va-
riatie of spreiding in de verkoopprijzen. Over het algemeen geldt: hoe meer spreiding
in de prijzen, hoe betere schattingen. Spreiding in prijzen betekent echter ook dat er
afgeweken wordt van de optimale prijs, en dit brengt kosten met zich mee. Een goede
prijsstrategie zorgt dus voor een optimale balans tussen enerzijds optimalisatie van de
verwachte opbrengsten op korte termijn, en anderzijds de optimalisatie van het leerpro-
ces. Bij CE prijzen wordt geen rekening gehouden met deze balans, maar ligt de nadruk
volledig op het maximaliseren van de directe opbrengsten. Dit gaat ten koste van de
kwaliteit van het leerproces, wat resulteert in slechtere prijs-beslissingen op de lange
termijn.
In hoofdstuk 3 stellen we een prijsstrategie voor die wél een optimale balans bereikt:
“controlled variance pricing” (CVP). Het idee is dat de prijzen zo dicht mogelijk bij de
CE prijzen worden gekozen, maar met een extra conditie die een bepaalde hoeveelheid
prijsvariatie garandeert. Door deze mate van prijsvariate zorgvuldig te fine-tunen kan
deze prijsstrategie een goede balans vinden tussen de twee doelen van winstmaxima-
lisatie en optimalisatie van het leerproces. We leiden structurele resultaten af over de
kwaliteit van deze prijsstrategie (dat wil zeggen: resultaten die onafhankelijk zijn van
specifieke getallenvoorbeelden). Hieruit blijkt dat CVP in structurele zin vrijwel niet
meer te verbeteren is. Daarnaast is CVP eenvoudig implementeerbaar en geschikt voor
een zeer grote klasse van vraagmodellen, waardoor deze prijsstrategie in veel prakti-
sche toepassingen van nut kan zijn.
De vraag naar een product hangt doorgaans niet alleen af van de eigen prijs, maar ook
van prijzen van vergelijkbare producten die aangeboden worden. Als een bedrijf meer-
dere producten aanbiedt hangen de optimale verkoopprijzen niet alleen af van de prijs-
elasticiteit van de afzonderlijke producten, maar ook van de verschillende substitutie-
effecten. Dit vraagt om een gemeenschappelijke prijsstrategie voor het gehele aanbod
van producten.
In hoofdstuk 4 introduceren we een prijsstrategie die in staat is om uit de stroom van
binnenkomende verkoopdata al deze substitutie-effecten te leren. De prijsstrategie is
gebaseerd op dezelfde principes als CVP: het optimaal balanceren van winstmaximali-
satie op de korte termijn en het leren van alle onbekende parameters op de lange termijn.
Net als bij de situatie met één product vindt het leren alleen plaats als er voldoende
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prijsvariatie is. Door deze prijsvariatie in meerdere dimensies op een slimme manier te
meten kunnen we een prijsstrategie formuleren die in staat is om alle onbekende prijs-
elasticiteiten en substitutie-effecten te leren. We leiden structurele resultaten af over de
kwaliteit van deze prijsstrategie. Hieruit blijkt ondermeer dat, voor een bepaalde klasse
van vraagmodellen, dynamisch prijzen en leren met meerdere producten niet structu-
reel moeilijker is dan met één product.
In de situatie beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 en 4 worden de verkoopprijzen niet beïnvloed
door voorraadniveaus van de aangeboden producten. Er zijn echter ook producten
waarvan de optimale prijs sterk afhangt van de resterende voorraad. Dit is in het bij-
zonder het geval bij producten die in beperkte hoeveelheid gedurende een begrensde
periode worden aangeboden, zoals vliegtickets, hotelkamerreserveringen en concert-
kaartjes. Voor dit type producten geldt dat alle voorraad die gedurende de verkooppe-
riode niet wordt verkocht geen geld oplevert. Als gevolg hiervan is het optimaal om
de verkoopprijs continu aan te passen, afhankelijk van de resterende voorraad en de
duur van de resterende verkoopperiode. Als er nog veel producten op voorraad zijn
die nog maar korte tijd verkocht kunnen worden, dan is het voordelig om de prijs te
laten zakken; als er nog slechts enkele producten beschikbaar zijn die nog vrij lange tijd
verkocht kunnen worden, dan is het optimaal om de prijs te verhogen. Dit continu aan-
passen van de verkoopprijs, afhankelijk van de resterende voorraad en de duur van de
resterende verkoopperiode, wordt al in veel branches toegepast.
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt dynamisch prijzen en leren voor de situatie dat een beperkte
voorraad gedurende een begrensde periode aangeboden wordt. Net als in hoofdstuk 3
en 4 is er een onderliggend vraagmodel dat de relatie tussen vraag en prijs beschrijft.
Onbekende parameters in het vraagmodel worden geschat op grond van binnenko-
mende verkoopdata, gebruikmakend van statistische technieken. We bestuderen de
vraag wat een goede prijsstrategie is en hoe de kwaliteit ervan gekarakteriseerd kan
worden.
Een verrassend resultaat uit hoofdstuk 5 is dat de eenvoudige CE strategie in de situatie
met eindige voorraad en eindige verkoopperiode uitstekend werkt. De firma hoeft geen
rekening te houden met het optimaliseren van het leerproces, maar kan op elk moment
eenvoudigweg de prijs kiezen die optimaal lijkt op grond van de beschikbare parame-
terschattingen. De onbekende parameters worden “geleerd” naarmate er steeds meer
data beschikbaar komt, en vergeleken met de situatie beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 en 4
gebeurt dit leren ook nog eens zeer snel.
De verklaring voor deze uitkomsten ligt in de grote mate van variatie in verkoopprij-
zen die de CE prijsstrategie genereert. De optimale verkoopprijs van het aangeboden
product wordt bepaald door de hoeveelheid resterende voorraad en de duur van de res-
terende verkoopperiode; omdat deze twee constant wijzigen, varieert de optimale ver-
koopprijs ook voortdurend. Daardoor treedt er als vanzelf veel prijsvariatie op, waar-
door de onbekende parameters van het vraagmodel zeer snel geleerd worden. Dit snelle
leren leidt er toe dat de CE prijzen al snel van goede kwaliteit zijn. Ter vergelijking: in
de situatie beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 en 4 moet de firma zelf actief zorgen voor vol-
doende prijsvariatie om uiteindelijk de onbekende parameters te leren. Leren is in die
situatie daardoor in structurele zin veel moeilijker.
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Het leren van klantengedrag en marktkarakteristieken uit binnenkomende verkoopdata
veronderstelt een zekere stabiliteit in de markt. Fluctuaties in de marktomstandigheden
hebben doorgaans een negatief effect op de kwaliteit van het leerproces. In de prak-
tijk zijn veranderingen in de markt vaak eerder regel dan uitzondering: technologische
innovaties, marketing campagnes, prijsveranderingen bij concurrenten en vele andere
gebeurtenissen kunnen veranderingen in de relatie tussen vraag en prijs veroorzaken.
Deze veranderingen verhinderen het daadwerkelijk leren van de vraag-prijs relatie. Dit
roept de vraag op of de binnenkomende verkoopdata dan nog wel bruikbaar is voor het
bepalen van verkoopprijzen, en zo ja, hoe dat dan het beste kan gebeuren.
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt dynamisch prijzen en leren in een omgeving met veranderende
marktomstandigheden. We introduceren twee technieken om fluctuerende marktcijfers
te schatten uit historische verkoopdata, en karakteriseren de kwaliteit van deze schat-
tingsmethodes. Beide technieken kennen aan elk datapunt een gewicht toe dat bepaalt
hoeveel invloed dit punt heeft op de schatter; deze gewichten worden steeds kleiner
naarmate de corresponderende data langer geleden is gegenereerd. Door deze gewich-
ten zorgvuldig te kiezen kan de verkoper een schatter definiëren die zowel snel reageert
op veranderingen in de markt, als ook gebaseerd is op zoveel mogelijk relevante data.
We bestuderen een eenvoudige CE prijsstrategie, die op elk beslismoment op basis van
de beschikbare schattingen de optimale verkoopprijs kiest. We karakteriseren de kwa-
liteit van deze prijsstrategie, en laten zien hoe vervolgens de optimale gewichten in de
schatter gekozen moeten worden. Dit resulteert in een methodologie die een bedrijf
in staat stelt dynamisch te prijzen en te leren in een veranderende markt, en zo gefun-
deerde prijsbeslissingen te nemen en actief te reageren op fluctuaties in de markt.
In hoofdstuk 7 onderzoeken we de relatie tussen de kwaliteit van statistische schatters
en de mate van spreiding in de design variabelen. De resultaten uit dit hoofdstuk wor-
den veelvuldig toegepast in de hoofdstukken 3 - 6 om de kwaliteit van prijsstrategieën
te karakteriseren.
De resultaten in dit proefschrift zijn niet alleen relevant voor dynamisch prijzen, maar
in feite voor elk beslissingsprobleem waarbij er meerdere beslissingen na elkaar geno-
men moeten worden en waarbij de kwaliteit van beslissingen niet van tevoren bekend is
maar slechts “al doende” geleerd kan worden. Belangrijke vragen bij zulke beslissings-
problemen zijn: is het genoeg om altijd de beslissing te nemen die, op het moment van
beslissen, het beste lijkt? Of moet daar soms bewust van afgeweken worden, met het
doel meer te leren over hoe het systeem werkt, ook als dit kosten met zich meebrengt?
Hoe snel vindt dit leren plaats? En wat gebeurt er als het gedrag van het systeem aan
veranderingen onderhevig is? Dit proefschrift behandelt deze vragen in de context van
dynamisch prijzen en leren.
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